Problems of Communism

JULY-AUGUST 1983

KIEV AND THE KREMLIN
Yaroslav Bilinsky

Polish Echoes in the Baltic
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Moscow and Bonn
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Book Reviews
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Problems of Communism

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Cover: The June 16, 1983, election of Yuriy Andropov Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium; behind Andropov are Volodymyr Shcherbytskyi and Heydar Aliyev. Photo by TASS from Sovfoto.

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IN THIS ISSUE OF

Problems of Communism

Articles

Shcherbytskyi, Ukraine, and Kremlin Politics
Yaroslav Bilinsky

Reviewing his accomplishments and weaknesses in May 1982, Ukrainian First Secretary Volodymyr Shcherbytskyi must have concluded that his prospects for advancement to higher political office in Moscow were dim, despite his efforts over the previous 10 years to run Ukraine to the Kremlin's liking. By mid-1983, Shcherbytskyi had not been selected by Andropov for a high position in the central party or government apparatus. Furthermore, the decreasing weight of Ukrainians in all-Union politics might require Shcherbytskyi to combine forces with leaders of other republics to protect the economic interests of the European portions of the USSR.

Polish Echoes in the Baltic
V. Stanley Vardys

The echoes of the Polish events of 1980–81 did reverberate through the Baltic region, and there is evidence of concern among local Communist leaders regarding possible spillover effects. Moves were taken both to contain and to placate social groups considered susceptible to the Polish contagion. On balance, the Soviet system still seems too disciplined, too repressive to permit revolutionary ideas in Eastern Europe to trigger a spontaneous movement for reform in the Soviet Union itself.

Andropov, Kohl, and East-West Issues
Elizabeth Pond

The recent accessions of Yuriy Andropov and Helmut Kohl in Moscow and Bonn have made little difference in the respective governments' expectations for Soviet–West German relations or for the Federal Republic's role in East-West politics. The Kohl government, like its predecessor, will continue to nudge the superpowers toward an arms control agreement but will deploy new NATO missiles on schedule in December 1983 if no agreement is reached. The Andropov government will continue to try to woo Bonn away from the United States but prevent West German dominance in Europe; and on the Euromissile issue, it will still pursue a policy of negotiation and propaganda, dealing directly with Bonn while encouraging antinuclear sentiments in the German public.

* * *

Essay-reviews

Castro's Failed Revolution
Luis E. Aguilar

Realistic observers are likely to relish the ironies presented by Castro's Cuba: a country that has only just spawned a mass exodus of "boat people" is held up by the radical Latin American Left as a model of development and social change; a proud, even flamboyant national and "nonaligned" leader finds himself bound to the policy of the Soviet Union and dependent upon its largesse. This essay, reviewing four recent works, explores how the Cuban revolution went astray and the costs of the process.

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Writing the GDR's History
Norman M. Naimark

The 30th anniversary in 1979 of the founding of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) marked the coming-of-age of East Germany. The commemoration prompted the publication of dozens of memoirs and biographies glorifying the GDR's recent past and heralding East Germany's political continuity and socioeconomic stability. But party historians are also now venturing deep into the German past to claim for the GDR such unlikely antecedents as Martin Luther and Frederick the Great. Scholarship in West Germany is also changing: scholars no longer concentrate heavily on the fall of the Weimar Republic and the rise of Adolf Hitler and have begun to investigate seriously the postwar period.

Laboring Under Socialism
Paul Hollander

Whatever the theoretical position of workers in socialist systems, the life of workers in today's USSR and Eastern Europe is bleak. Alienation seems prevalent everywhere, despite the fact that the conditions of workers vary significantly from country to country. The suppression of Solidarity—a Polish workers' movement striving for meaningful political participation—by the authorities of this supposed workers' state provides another discouraging example of the dichotomy between theory and reality.

Stalin Recalled
Niels Erik Rosenfeldt

The field of Stalinology is not exhausted. Fruitful research remains to be done by those who can combine careful and critical use of memoir literature with the best Kremlinological approaches to persons and policies. In the one case, one must avoid the pitfalls of emotionally colored reminiscences; in the other, one must broaden the perspective to include "cultural politics" and "political culture."

Encyclopedia of Russian Life
Alexander Kazhdan

The new *Cambridge Encyclopedia of Russia and the Soviet Union* provides useful insight into the strengths and weaknesses of the USSR, although the volume suffers from occasional flaws and lapses.

Ethnonationalism
Melvin Croan

The politicization of ethnic identity continues to be a major factor in many states and in the international system. Reconciling larger political structures with centrifugal nationalist sentiments presents serious dilemmas for multinational states—be they capitalist or socialist. Contrary to Communist ideology, Communism has not resolved the contradictions of nationalism, as present-day developments in Yugoslavia and other East European states show.

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Shcherbytskyi, Ukraine, and Kremlin Politics

By Yaroslav Bilinsky

On May 28, 1982, there took place the festive celebration of the 1,500th anniversary of the founding of Kiev, the capital of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, deliberately planned to coincide with the 60th anniversary of the formation of the Soviet Union.[1] The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU), the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and the Council of Ministers of the USSR awarded the city an Order of Friendship of Peoples and sent a congratulatory message. The festivities were attended by "delegations of the capital of our Fatherland, Moscow, of Leningrad, of the Russian Federation, of the Byelorussian SSR, of the capitals of the fraternal union republics, of the hero-cities of Volgograd, Sevastopol', Odessa, Novorossiysk, Kerch, Tula, of the hero-fortress of Brest, of all oblasts of Ukraine. Present were the heads of the general consulates of socialist countries in Kiev."[2] Volodymyr Shcherbytskyi, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, gave the keynote address. But Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU, was conspicuously absent from the festivities.

While Shcherbytskyi was of course aware that for several months Brezhnev's physical—and possibly his political—health had not been good,[3] he also knew that Brezhnev had resumed his activities in May and was still General Secretary. Brezhnev's attendance at the ceremonies in Kiev, therefore, would have been most desirable from the viewpoint of Shcherbytskyi, who certainly tried to have Brezhnev take part.[4] By traveling to Kiev, Brezhnev would have symbolically expressed confidence in Shcherbytskyi, which might have boosted the latter's career. Shcherbytskyi must have felt that the outlook for him was not very bright. Not only had Yuriy Andropov preempted the post in the CC CPSU Secretariat left vacant by Mikhail Suslov's death, but Ukrainian KGB Chief Vitalii Fedorchuk was advanced to a job in Moscow while Shcherbytskyi was not.[5] Thus, in May 1982

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[1]The connection between the two events had been explicitly made by Volodymyr Shcherbytskyi, First Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine, in a speech to party secretaries on June 8, 1981: "Next year we will celebrate the 60th anniversary of the establishment of the USSR. A significant event will be the 1,500th anniversary of the city of Kiev. The preparation for and the celebration of the USSR anniversary and of Kiev's jubilee as well will undoubtedly result in a striking demonstration of the triumph of the Leninist nationality policy of the CPSU, of the friendship of peoples in our country, of the ideas of Soviet patriotism and Socialist internationalism." See V. V. Shcherbytskyi, "To Heighten the Activity of Ideological Work," *Kommunist Ukrainy* (Kiev), July 1981, p. 7.

This is not to say that Shcherbytskyi was responsible for first linking the two events, nor that the decision had been made in 1981. See Omeljan Pritsak, "Behind the Scenes of the Proclamation of Kiev's 1,500th Anniversary," *Suchasnist'* (Munich), September 1981, pp. 46–54; and Roman Solchanyk, "Kiev's 1500th Anniversary and Soviet Nationality Policy," *Radio Liberty Research* (Munich), RL 186/82, May 5, 1982.

[2]*Radyans'ka Ukraina* (Kiev), May 29, 1982.

[3]In late March–early April 1982, Brezhnev suffered a serious physical setback, provoking widespread speculations in the West that he might resign at the next Central Committee meeting of the CPSU, which was eventually held on May 24, 1982. For a typical story in the West of Brezhnev's illness and its effect on Soviet politics, see "Brezhnev: The Final Days," *Newsweek*, (New York, NY), Apr. 12, 1982, pp. 30ff. There were also rumors that Brezhnev's daugther Galina Churbanov was implicated in a corruption scandal. See *Soviet Analyst* (Richmond, Surrey), Mar. 10, 1982, pp. 2–3.

[4]Brezhnev was given the first medal commemorating Kiev's establishment and was made Honorary Citizen of Kiev. Brezhnev's greeting—in Russian—adorned the backdrop behind the speaker's podium in the Ukrainian capital. *Pravda* (Moscow), May 17, 1982; and *Radyans'ka Ukraina*, May 26, May 27, and the photograph May 29, 1982.

[5]Suslov died on Jan. 25, 1982. See *Pravda*, Jan. 27, 1982. Andropov was selected as a secretary of the CPSU Secretariat at the May 24, 1982, plenum. See ibid., May 25, 1982. On May 26, Fedorchuk was appointed all-Union KGB head.

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Soloists of the Dance and Song company of the Ukrainian SSR at May 1982 observances of the 1,500th anniversary of the Ukrainian capital Kiev.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

Shcherbytskyi was being overlooked in Moscow and snubbed in Kiev. Reviewing his accomplishments and weaknesses then, with an eye to possible advancement to higher political office in Moscow, Shcherbytskyi must have concluded that—despite his efforts over the previous ten years to run the Ukraine to Brezhnev's liking—he nevertheless had three vulnerable points: (1) a worsening relationship with Brezhnev and probably with Brezhnev's closest protégé, Konstantin Chernenko; (2) his less than complete command over the Ukrainian Communist Party; and (3) the diminished weight of Ukrainians among the full (voting) members of the CC CPSU, who formally elect the top leaders in the Soviet Union.

Shcherbytskyi and Brezhnev

Shcherbytskyi's relationship to Brezhnev had not always been as distant as it appeared to be in May 1982. Shcherbytskyi had long been a member of Brezhnev's Dnipropetrovsk clan.[6] A graduate of the Dnipropetrovsk Institute of Chemical Engineering, Shcherbytskyi had been second, then first secretary of the party city committee of Dniprodzerzhinsk, Brezhnev's native town (from 1948 to 1954). In 1954, he became second and in 1955, first secretary of the Dnipropetrovsk *obkom* (a position held by Brezhnev from 1947 until 1950, and by Brezhnev's associate Andrey Kirilenko until 1955.) After Shcherbytskyi suffered a setback in 1963—loss of the premiership in Ukraine and of his candidate membership on the CPSU Presidium (Politburo)—it was evidently Brezhnev who helped him to regain his old positions both in Kiev and Moscow in 1965, after Nikita Khrushchev's fall. Furthermore, Shcherbytskyi was promoted to full CPSU Politburo member already in April of 1966, again undoubtedly thanks to Brezhnev's influence. Most important, on May 19, 1972, Brezhnev dismissed Petro Shelest and promoted Shcherbytskyi to First Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine.[7]

In 1976, the two leaders apparently had good rapport. In his closing remarks to the 1976 congress of the Ukrainian party, Shcherbytskyi boasted to the delegates that he had summarized its proceedings to Brezhnev by telephone, saying:

We stressed the exceptionally business-like, warm, and we can say, friendly atmosphere in which our Congress has proceeded. Leonid Il'ich said that nobody could doubt that the Congress of Ukrainian Communists would proceed exactly like that.[8]

The following year, 1977, was a very good one for Shcherbytskyi. Ukrainian farmers harvested more grain than called for by the annual plan. Brezhnev congratulated Shcherbytskyi, and Shcherbytskyi was handsomely decorated. On September 13, 1977, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet awarded him an Order of Lenin and his second Gold Medal with Hammer and Sickle of Hero of Socialist Labor. The orders were pinned on him by Brezhnev himself on September 29, 1977, at a festive ceremony in the Kremlin attended by all full and candidate members of the Politburo and all CC CPSU secretaries with the sole exception of Kirilenko.[9] In his remarks, Brezhnev

[6]The fullest and best account is Joel C. Moses, "Regional Cohorts and Political Mobility in the USSR: The Case of Dnepropetrovsk," *Soviet Union/Union Soviétique* (Tempe, AZ), Vol. 3, No. 1, 1976, pp. 63–89.

[7]See the officially unconfirmed but very plausible account in "Ethnocide of the Ukrainians in the USR," in *The Ukrainian Herald, Issue 7–8*, Baltimore, MD, Smoloskyp, 1976, pp. 127–28.

[8]*Radyans'ka Ukraina*, Feb. 14, 1976.

[9]*Pravda*, Sept. 30, 1977.

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stressed his personal links with Shcherbytskyi:

All of us, and I perhaps more than many other comrades, are well aware how much energy, will power, and Bolshevist ardor you have given to the cause of the development and flourishing of Soviet Ukraine. I remember well your work at the plant where I also once worked. Since then you have covered a great and, I should say, glorious road of a party and state leader.[10]

Yet in 1978, and especially in 1979, Shcherbytskyi was dealt several rebuffs by Brezhnev. In February 1978 three Soviet leaders became 60 years old: full Politburo member and Secretary Fëdor Kulakov, Politburo candidate member and First Secretary of the Byelorussian CP Piatr Masherov, and Shcherbytskyi. The official message congratulating Kulakov was a little longer and much warmer than those addressed to Masherov and Shcherbytskyi.[11] Kulakov and Masherov were each awarded the title of Hero of Socialist Labor with the Order of Lenin and the Hammer and Sickle Gold Medal, but Shcherbytskyi had to make do with an Order of the October Revolution. Admittedly, Shcherbytskyi had already been handsomely decorated, but it must still have rankled him that in February 1978 his decree was identical to that of Masherov (who was a mere candidate member of the Politburo and with whom Brezhnev had never had any close rapport) and distinctly inferior to that of Kulakov. Within a week of his birthday, Kulakov was handed his decorations in a nice and dignified ceremony in the Kremlin.[12] When Shcherbytskyi's day in the Kremlin finally came—in July—he had to share it with Dr. Yevgeniy Chazov, a recipient of a Lenin Order with Hammer and Sickle Medal and Brezhnev's cardiologist. In their photographic coverage of the award ceremony, *Pravda* tried to "put Shcherbytskyi down" and *Radyans'ka Ukraina* to "build him up."[13]

The year 1979 brought two more disappointments for Shcherbytskyi. In September Brezhnev paid a two-day visit to Dnipropetrovsk and Dniprodzerzhinsk, but did not use that excellent opportunity to praise Shcherbytskyi, who accompanied him throughout the visit.[14] In November, 74-year-old Nikolay Tikhonov



Ukrainian party chief Volodymyr Shcherbytskyi applauds as Soviet Premier Nikolay Tikhonov delivers the report on "The Main Guidelines for the Economic Development of the USSR for 1981–85 and the Period Ending in 1990" at the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February 1981.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

was made a full member of the CPSU Politburo after having been first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers since 1976—a clear indication that he, and not an outsider like Shcherbytskyi, was being groomed to take over Aleksey Kosygin's post.[15] Shortly thereafter, Shcherbytskyi gave an interesting interview in Kiev to two *Pravda* correspondents.[16] The editorial introduction to the interview was lukewarm, in contrast to the praise heaped on Shcherbytskyi in the same paper only two years previously. In the course of the inteview Shcherbytskyi said:

I want to note: nowadays... we still run into cases where workers who want to solve public questions find it difficult to gain access to some leaders. It is important to pay attention to that phenomenon as well and to organize one's work more carefully. Sometimes we also find an unequal relation of a leader to his subordinates: some are closer to him, others are, so to speak, kept at a great distance. Such leaders have, as a rule, their limited circle of contacts.... People are noticing it. Unfortunately, they do not always say it openly, straight out. Such conditions, however, proliferate gradually: toadies and accommodationists make

[10]Ibid. See also Roman Solchanyk's "The Politics of Stability in the Ukraine," *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 283/77, Dec. 16, 1977, p. 6.

[11]Cf. *Pravda*, Feb. 4, Feb. 13, and Feb. 17, 1978.

[12]Ibid. and *Radyans'ka Ukraina*, Feb. 10, 1978.

[13]Cf. *Pravda*, July 7, 1978, and *Radyans'ka Ukraina*, July 7,1978 (see the nonstandard photo along a long table in the former and Shcherbytskyi shaking Brezhnev's hand in the latter).

[14]*Pravda*, Sept. 22 and 23, 1979; *Radyans'ka Ukraina*, same dates.

[15]*Radyans'ka Ukraina*, Nov. 28, 1979.

[16]"A Creative, Innovative Approach," *Pravda*, Dec. 28, 1979.

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their appearance. Very skillfully they find a vulnerable spot and use it for their personal benefit and to the detriment of the cause.

From the context it would appear that Shcherbytskyi's strictures apply to unnamed Soviet medium-ranking executives. But so passionately plaintive is Shcherbytskyi's denunciation that one is led to suspect that he is referring to Brezhnev and to Shcherbytskyi's own inability to gain admittance to Brezhnev's inner circle. On May 9, 1981, Brezhnev made a major foreign policy speech in Kiev and then addressed the republic party and government leaders in a more informal setting.[17] In a virtual replay of the 1979 visit he did not say a single kind word about Shcherbytskyi. These examples are sufficient to adduce that Brezhnev's absence from the 1,500th anniversary celebration in Kiev was almost certainly a political snub to Shcherbytskyi whom Brezhnev had come to dislike by early 1979, if not already in 1978.

Shcherbytskyi in Ukraine

Shcherbytskyi's career as first secretary in Ukraine can perhaps be best understood by comparing his approach with that of his predecessor, Shelest. In addition to having different political allegiances,[18] Shcherbytskyi and Shelest also differed sharply in outlook. In a comprehensive article, Grey Hodnett found that Shelest was in part a doctrinaire "left wing" Communist who was working against the true interests of the Ukrainian people:

The hardline positions he took on economic incentives and rewards, his concentration upon heavy industry and armaments and failure to pay much attention to light industry, his apparent unconcern with West Ukrainian economic development, his resistance to agricultural investment, his hostility to the West, and his support of "revolutionary" movements abroad—were all contrary to what most Ukrainians would probably have defined as "national interests."[19]

Yet, there was another side to Shelest, best shown in his sentimentally patriotic book *O Ukraine, Our Soviet Land.*[20] This Shelest believed in the essential autonomy and equality of the Ukrainian nation and attributed no special role to the Russians; he implicitly equated the relations among Soviet republics with the relations among the socialist bloc countries. This Shelest also stated that "Ukrainian Social Democratic organizations played a key role in the *creation* of the Bolshevik party," implying that Ukraine was a charter member of the Bolshevik organization.[21]

While Shelest's "leftist" disagreements with Brezhnev's policy toward the West—especially Brezhnev's invitation to President Nixon to come to Moscow and Kiev—triggered Shelest's dismissal in May 1972, on the eve of the first Nixon-Brezhnev summit meeting, the more important reason for

Petro Shelest addresses the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in April 1971, a year before he was ousted from the post of first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist party.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

[17] Ibid., May 10, 1981.

[18] Shelest's political loyalties apparently ran to Oleksii Kyrychenko and possibly to Mykola Pidhornyi (or Nikolay Podgornyy, the more familiar Russian version of his name). See Grey Hodnett, "Petro Efimovich Shelest," in George W. Simmonds, Ed., *Soviet Leaders*, New York, NY, Thomas Crowell, 1967, p. 99.

[19] Grey Hodnett, "The Views of Petro Shelest," *Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S., Inc.* (New York, NY), Vol. XIV (1978-80), No. 37-38, p. 243.

[20] P. Yu. Shelest, *Ukraino nasha Radyans'ka* (O Ukraine, Our Soviet Land), Kiev, Vydavnytstvo politychnoi literatury Ukrainy, 1970.

[21] Hodnett, "The Views of Petro Shelest," pp. 212, 222-23.

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Shelest's fall has to be sought in the Ukrainian party secretary's "rightist" deviation on the nationality question. On this issue, the differences between Shelest and Shcherbytskyi are quite noticeable. For example, Shcherbytskyi's speech on the 50th anniversary of the establishment of the Ukrainian SSR is a standard cliché-ridden account that carefully skirts any controversial points and quotes Brezhnev copiously.[22] By contrast, in Shelest's 1970 book the first quotation is from Lenin, and even that is three pages into the text.[23] The publication record of the two men reveals that Shelest's writings were predominantly in Ukrainian and published in Kiev, while three of Shcherbytskyi's four books were published in Moscow in Russian.[24]

The Language Issue. The most dramatic contrast between Shelest's and Shcherbytskyi's approaches, however, is provided by their respective attitudes toward fostering the Ukrainian language. In the summer of 1965 Shelest—using the republic's Minister of Higher Education Yuriy M. Dadenkov as a stalking horse—tried to make Ukrainian the language of instruction in universities under the ministry's jurisdiction.[25] He failed, but this rebuff did not prevent Shelest from calling on Ukrainian writers in November 1966 to cultivate and develop their native language, or from promising them party support in this endeavor.[26] Shcherbytskyi, on the other hand, gave the Central Committee's reports to the Ukrainian party congresses in both 1976 and 1981 in Russian, a gesture that Shelest would have considered beneath contempt.

While some of these differences could be dismissed as merely symbolic, they nevertheless can have real consequences. This is particularly true of "linguistic" politics. The most noticeable characteristic distinguishing the Ukrainians from the Russians is their language. Although the struggle for language rights may be just a tangible manifestation of the intangible struggle for national survival,[27] the process of linguistic assimilation in Ukraine became central to the emergence of Ukrainian dissent in the 1960's and 1970's and required action by both Shelest and Shcherbytskyi. Thus, highlights of that process are pertinent, even if a thorough analysis of linguistic assimilation on the part of Ukrainians is beyond the scope of this article.

Data from the censuses of 1959, 1970, and 1979 show an increase of the Russian population in Ukraine, from 7.1 million persons in 1959 to 10.5 million in 1979, or from 16.3 to 21.1 percent of the total republic population.[28] They also show the increasing linguistic Russification of self-declared Ukrainians: in 1959, 93.5 percent of them said that they knew Ukrainian best (the term "native language" is really a misnomer), in 1970, 91.4 percent did so; and in 1979, only 89.1 percent. In absolute numbers, there were 32.2 million self-declared Ukrainians in Ukraine in 1959, 35.3 million in 1970, and 36.5 million in 1979. The number of Ukrainians whose first language was Ukrainian increased from 30.1 million in 1959 to 32.3 million in 1970, and grew to only 32.5 million in 1979. Furthermore, in response to a question on *second* language, the number of self-declared Ukrainians in the republic for whom Ukrainian is neither the first nor the second language of discourse increased from 1.5 million in 1970 to 1.9 million in 1979.

Unfortunately, the authorities have not released a breakdown on language use according to urban and rural residents from the 1979 census. But a comparison of rural with urban dwellers shows that while the Ukrainian language was firmly entrenched in the countryside in both 1959 and 1970, among the urban Ukrainian population linguistic assimilation to Russian had made considerable inroads, the percentage of Ukrainian speakers being 84.7 in 1959 and 82.8 in 1970. It is most telling that although the proportion of self-declared Ukrainians in the cities increased slightly—from 61.5 percent of the total in 1959 to 62.9 of the total in 1970—the proportion of Ukrainian speakers decreased by nearly 2 percent.

It is difficult to pinpoint precisely why so many Ukrainians have adopted Russian as their first language of discourse. Certainly, one significant factor has been that, beginning in the mid-1960's, Ukrainians—particularly those living in the cities—have been subjected to political and social pressures to as-

[22]There is no reference to the semi-rehabilitated Ukrainian National Communist Mykola Skrypnyk, a key figure in the establishment of the Communist Party of Ukraine in 1918. See V. Shcherbytskyi, "50 Years of the Ukrainian Socialist Republic," in M. Lypovchenko, Ed., *Sotsialistychna diisnist' i nationalistychni vyhadky* (Socialist Reality and Nationalist Fabrications), Kiev, Vydavnytstvo politychnoi literatury Ukrainy, 1968, pp. 16–38.

[23]Shelest, op. cit., p. 7.

[24]A priceless study and compilation by Christian Duevel, with exact figures on press runs, has been published as "Flurry of Publishing by Members of the Politburo," *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 324/79, Munich, 1979.

[25]V. Chornovil, "What Bohdan Stenchuk Defends...," *Ukrainian Herald, Issue 6: Dissent in Ukraine*, Baltimore, MD, Smoloskyp, 1977, pp. 24, 33.

[26]Hodnett, "The Views of Petro Shelest," p. 214.

[27]Walker Connor, "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?" *World Politics* (Princeton, NJ), April 1972, p. 338.

[28]Data for 1959 and 1970 from Central Statistical Administration's *Itogi vsesoyuznoy perepisi naseleniya 1959 goda: Ukrainskaya SSR* (Results of All-Union 1959 Population Census: Ukrainian SSR), Moscow, Gosstatizdat 1963 and Vol. 4, *Natsional'nyy sostav naseleniya SSSR* (National Composition of the USSR), Moscow, Statistika, 1973. For the 1979 data, see *Vestnik Statistiki* (Moscow), August 1980.

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similate.[29] The decreasing availability of Ukrainian-language primary and secondary schools undoubtedly constitutes a part of these pressures.[30] The Russification of primary and secondary schools is in turn linked to the widespread Russification of higher educational institutions. The latter might explain why Shelest tried to reverse this trend in 1965. The Russification trend becomes quite apparent when one looks at the share of Ukrainian-language books published in Ukraine from 1940 through 1980. As Table 1 shows, the proportion has varied widely, from a low of 24 to a high of 60 percent. The high of 3,975 Ukrainian books was reached in 1958, i.e., during the period of revival of Ukrainian literature and culture running from the late 1950's to early 1960's. What is rather striking is that the low was reached not under Stalin—when more than 40 percent of the books published were in Ukrainian—but under Brezhnev. While the absolute figure of 2,164 Ukrainian books in 1980 exceeds the 1940 figure of 2,012 books, an increase of 152 titles in 40 years is really not much.

Although Shcherbytskyi seems to have largely supported pro-assimilationist developments—undoubtedly favored in Moscow by Mikhail Suslov, Brezhnev, and others—he modified somewhat his ideological and cultural course in the late 1970's. For example, there was the dismissal of Valentyn Malanchuk, the

[29]Some poignant anecdotal evidence is found in Leonid Plyushch, *History's Carnival: A Dissident's Autobiography*, New York, NY, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1979, pp. 114, 173; and in Moisei Fishbein, "Gaps in Understanding," *Suchasnist'*, June 1980, p. 35.

[30]For instance, in 1935–36 less than 13 percent of all schoolchildren in what was then the Ukrainian SSR (exclusive of Western Ukraine and the Crimea) were taught in Russian; by 1974 their number tripled to "almost 40 percent." See Harold R. Weinstein, "Language and Education in the Soviet Ukraine," *Slavonic and East European Review* (London), 20 (1941), p. 142, for the 1935–36 figure. For the 1974 figure, see the then Ukrainian SSR Minister of Education Oleksander Marinich, summary of his report in the editorial "Improve the Teaching of the Russian Language in All National Schools of the Country," *Russkiy yazyk v natsional'noy shkole* (Moscow), April 1974, p. 9. See also the following recent studies: Isabelle Kreindler, Ed., "The Changing Status of Russian in the Soviet Union," *International Journal of the Sociology of Language* (The Hague), No. 33, 1982; Roman Solchanyk, "Russian Language and Soviet Politics," *Soviet Studies* (Glasgow), January 1982, pp. 23–42; Yaroslav Bilinsky, "Expanding the Use of Russian or Russification?...," *Russian Review* (Stanford, CA), July 1981, pp. 317–32.



The vocational-technical school of the Kiev computer and control machines plant utilizes Russian-language teaching aids.

—Novosti from Sovfoto.

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Table 1: Books in Ukrainian as Percent of Total Books Published in Ukraine

Year	Percent
1940	42
1950	45
1953	59
1956	45
1957	53
1958	60
1960	49
1965	41
1970	38
1976	27
1980	24

SOURCES: For 1940–58, *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1958 godu* (USSR National Economy in 1958), Moscow, Statistika, 1959, pp. 872–73; for 1960, *Pechat' SSSR v 1960 godu* (USSR Publishing in 1960), Moscow, Kniga, 1961, p. 54; for 1965, *Pechat' SSSR v 1965 godu*, p. 95; for 1970, *Pechat' SSSR v 1970 godu*, p. 95; for 1976, *Pechat' SSSR v 1976 godu*, p. 101; for 1980, *Pechat' SSSR v 1980 godu*, p. 140.

secretary for ideology, on April 26, 1979. He was fired shortly before the release of another in a series of periodic CC CPSU decrees on ideological, political, and educational work. This timing might, of course, have helped Shcherbytskyi to seem sensitive to the winds from Moscow. But why dismiss Malanchuk at all? Malanchuk had worked in western Ukraine, rising to the position of ideological secretary of the Lviv oblast (1963–67) and serving from 1967 to 1972 as deputy minister of higher education of the Ukrainian SSR. He was notorious in Ukrainian dissident circles as a "well-known Ukrainophobe, a fierce Russian chauvinist, careerist."[31] Shortly before Shelest's dismissal in 1972, Malanchuk published a series of four articles in which he cautiously criticized Shelest's book *O Ukraine, Our Soviet Land*.[32] In October 1972, Shcherbytskyi made Malanchuk ideological secretary and candidate Politburo member of the Ukrainian party in place of Shelest's appointee Dr. Fedir D. Ovcharenko.[33] Yet six and a half years later Shcherbytskyi fired him without any explanation.[34] Malanchuk obviously was not fired for lack of zeal, but he may have been dismissed for lack of ability. Malanchuk's replacement as secretary and candidate Politburo member was Oleksander Kapto. Kapto had graduated from Dnipropetrovsk State University but does not seem to be a member of the Dnipropetrovsk clan.[35] He served in the Komsomol, then in a variety of ideological posts, becoming head of the Culture Department in the Secretariat of the Ukrainian party's Central Committee. After reading some pieces by Malanchuk and Kapto, I suspect that, compared with Kapto, Malanchuk simply was dull—no recommendation for the top propagandist.[36]

A plausible explanation is that Shcherbytskyi was trying to reach accommodation, a limited "cultural détente," with the Ukrainian intelligentsia by publishing the works of some authors who had first achieved prominence during the Shelest period.[37] Shcherbytskyi had mended some of his fences as early as 1976 when he allowed the well-known Ukrainian writer Oles Honchar to address the 25th Ukrainian party congress. Reportedly, Honchar had been close to Shelest, to the point that he may have written some of Shelest's speeches. Honchar was given a respectful hearing and was reelected a full member of the Ukrainian party Central Committee (as he was again at the 1981 congress).[38]

Shortly after Malanchuk's dismissal, Lina Kostenko's novel in verse *Marusya Churai* was published.[39] Kostenko, a talented poet, was one of the leading figures among the questioning Ukrainian cultural intelligentsia of the 1960's. While her works were published in the late 1950's and early 1960's, they had not been for many years thereafter. *Marusya Churai* caused a literary sensation, especially after it had been favorably reviewed by the dean of Ukrainian establishment poets, Mykola Bazhan.[40] It deals with the last years of a historical figure, the Ukrainian bal-

[31] "Ethnocide of the Ukrainians...," p. 127.

[32] Malanchuk, "Two Conceptions of Ukraine's Past and Present," *Zhovten'* (Lviv), No. 1, 1972, pp. 101–09; No. 3, 1972, pp. 97–107; No. 4, 1972, pp. 96–108; and No. 5, 1972, pp. 110–21.

[33] *Radyans'ka Ukraina*, Oct. 11, 1972, p. 1.

[34] On the entire episode see Roman Solchanyk, "Ukraine's Ideology Chief Purged," *Soviet Analyst*, Aug. 30, 1979, pp. 2–4. That Malanchuk left in disgrace can be inferred from an account by Fedir Morhun, in *Moskva* (Moscow), No. 3, 1980, p. 45, in which he refers to Malanchuk by office, but no longer by name. References to Malanchuk and to Morhun courtesy of Werner G. Hahn.

[35] He is not included in Moses's thorough study (see fn. 6).

[36] Compare, for instance, Malanchuk's college textbook *Istoricheskiy opyt KPSS po resheniyu national'nogo voprosa i razvitiyu national'nykh otnosheniy v SSSR* (The Historical Experience of the CPSU in Solving the National Question and Developing National Relations in the USSR), Moscow, Vysshaya shkola, 1972, with O.S. Kapto's lively articles "Raise the Quality of Teaching, Improve Political Educational Work in the Social Sciences Departments," *Kommunist Ukrainy*, August 1981, pp. 27–37, and "Increase the Effectiveness of Ideological Work," *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 18, December 1981, pp. 50–60.

[37] Roman Solchanyk, "The Ukraine in the Brezhnev Era: Politics and the National Question," in *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 459–82, Nov. 16, 1982, p. 9.

[38] See *Radyans'ka Ukraina*, Feb. 13, 1976, p. 7, for the text of this speech; ibid., Feb. 14, 1976, p. 2, for the CC list. For membership in preceding CC see Herwig Kraus, "Leading Organs of the Communist Party of the Ukraine," *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 391–75, Sept. 17, 1975, p. 10.

[39] Lina Kostenko, *Marusya Churai: Istorychnyi roman u virshakh* (Marusya Churai: A Historical Novel in Verse), Kiev, Radyans'kyi pys'mennyk, 1979, 8,000 copies; signed for typesetting July 10, 1979, and for printing Oct. 18, 1979. A collection of her lyrical poetry had been published in 1977 and another poetry collection containing not only lyrical poems but also a section of poetry entitled "The X's of History," with both historical and political connotations, appeared in 1980. See her *Nad berehamy vichnoi riky: Poezii* (On the Banks of the Eternal River: Poems), Kiev, Radyans'kyi pys'mennyk, 1977, and her *Nepovtornist': Virshi, Poemy* (Uniqueness: Verses and Poems), Kiev, Molod', 1980.

[40] See Bazhan's review in *Literaturna Ukraina* (Kiev), Mar. 4, 1980, p. 2.

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ladeer Marusya Churai, who lived in Poltava at the time of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytskyi. The lovingly authentic recreation of the life of the Ukrainian burghers and cossacks in the 17th century cannot but reinforce the Ukrainians' pride in their history and literature.

In 1981 a new edition of the works of the late Vasyl Symonenko was published.[41] Some of his poems are transparently, angrily anti-Russian. The 1982 edition of *Kobzar*, the masterpiece of the most revered Ukrainian national poet, Taras Shevchenko (1814–61), also was unusual. From 1977 to 1981, editions of that work never included certain of his anti-Russian poems,[42] but the 1982 edition included all but one of the previously censored poems, with a touching attempt by the commentator to explain away their anti-Russian implications.[43] These developments on the Ukrainian literary scene testify at least to Shcherbytskyi's and Kapto's flexibility.

Dissent. Shelest and Shcherbytskyi both faced a growing dissident movement in Ukraine. The first large-scale arrests of dissidents had been ordered under Shelest in August–September 1965. In the last months of Shelest's rule in 1972 many more Ukrainian dissidents were arrested than in 1965.[44] Repression of dissent under Shcherbytskyi has been both more extensive and more brutal than under Shelest. In part, this can be explained by the fact that dissent became better organized and focused.

The strongest dissident challenge to Shcherbytskyi came from the indigenous Ukrainian Helsinki Group which in turn was modeled on and maintained a good working relationship with the Moscow Helsinki Group. It was the genius of Russian physicist Yuriy Orlov to recognize that the Helsinki Final Act, signed August 1, 1975—and widely publicized in the Soviet Union as a triumph of Soviet diplomacy in general and Brezhnev's in particular—could be used to defend human rights in the USSR, provided that pressure was simultaneously exerted from abroad. The Moscow Public Group to Help the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords was set up on May 12, 1976. Within a month or so, the formation of a Ukrainian Helsinki Group was being discussed; its establishment under the leadership of Mykola Rudenko was formally announced on November 9, 1976. Helsinki groups were also formed in Lithuania, Georgia, and Armenia. Ultimately, the Ukrainian Helsinki Group would become the largest, with 37 members. Until his departure for the United States, liaison with the Moscow Group was maintained through Major General Petro Grigorenko, who was a charter member of both the Moscow and the Ukrainian groups.[45]

Oles Honchar, prize-winning Ukrainian author.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

[41] *Lebedi Materyn'stva* (Swans of Maternity), Kiev, Molod', 1981. Symonenko died of cancer in December 1963.

[42] Petro Odarchenko, "T. H. Shevchenko's 'Kobzar'—under the Yoke of Contemporary Censorship in Ukraine," *Ukrains'ki Visti* (Detroit, MI), Mar. 12, 1980.

[43] T. Shevchenko, *Kobzar*, Kiev, Dnipro, 1982, 50,000 copies, signed for typesetting Nov. 20, 1981, and for printing Aug. 8, 1982.

[44] The exact figure for the arrests in 1972 is unknown, but the anonymous author in *Ukrainian Herald*, Issue 7/8, rejects as "absolutely false," i.e., too low, the figure of about 100 arrested dissidents given by Radio Liberty ("Ethnocide of the Ukrainians ...," p. 138). *A conservative number for arrests in August–September 1965 would* be 30. The biographies of 20 of those who were subsequently tried were published by Vyacheslav Chornovil, *Lykho z rozumu: Portrety dvatsyaty "zlochyntsiv"* (Woe from Wit: Portraits of Twenty Criminals), Paris, P.I.U.F., 1967.

[45] See mainly L. Alexeyeva, "Yuriy Orlov—Leader of the Moscow Helsinki Group," *Kontinent* (Munich), No. 21 (1979), pp. 177–203, and No. 22 (1980), pp. 195–221; Petro Grigorenko, *V podpol''ye mozhno vstretit' tol'ko gryz* (In the Underground, You Meet Only Rats), New York, Detinetz, 1981, pp. 743–58, 771–74; "Testimony of Dr. Nina Strokata-Karavansky On the Ukrainian Helsinki Group: A Brief History (1976–81)," in US Congress, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, *Implementation of the Helsinki Accords. Hearing: Fifth Anniversary of the Formation of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group* (November 16, 1981), Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1982, pp. 69–80; Yaroslav Bilinsky and Tõnu Parming, "Helsinki Watch Committees in the Soviet Republics: Implications for Soviet Nationality Policy," *Nationalities Papers* (Charleston, IL), Spring 1981, pp. 1–25.

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Rudenko, the leader of the Ukrainian Group, was a formidable figure. Born in the heavily Russified Donetsk Basin in 1920 into the family of a coal miner, he became a dedicated Communist. In 1939 he began his military service in the crack Dzerzhinsky Cavalry Division of the NKVD (predecessor of the KGB), which guarded Stalin and other government leaders; he then transferred to a regular unit as political commissar, sustaining a severe wound from which he never completely recovered. During 1947–50, at the height of Stalinist reaction, Rudenko was deputy secretary, then secretary of the party organization of the Writers' Union of Ukraine. In the late 1950's and 1960's Rudenko, already a well-published Ukrainian poet and writer, slowly turned to dissent and established contact with General Grigorenko, Andrey Sakharov, and other members of the Sakharov circle.

The Helsinki Group presented Shcherbytskyi and Fedorchuk in Kiev, and their superiors Brezhnev and Andropov in Moscow, with a sixfold challenge:

- The Group was overwhelmingly composed of "labor camp graduates." Doubt was thereby cast on the efficacy of post-Stalinist punitive processes. One dissident explained this as follows: unless the authorities start shooting people as they did under Stalin, they will have to put up with the emergence of a group of professional oppositionists.

- The Group was led by a former member of the Ukrainian Communist elite. The impression was thus created that you could not even trust the Communists.

- The Group subscribed to a political platform of general human rights, as defined by the Helsinki accords, which included—but was not limited to—the traditional cultural concerns of Ukrainian dissidents of the 1960's.

- On the basis of that platform a political link was effected with liberal Russian democrats such as Orlov and Sakharov.

- The Ukrainian Group gained the organized sympathy and support not only of Ukrainian citizens' groups abroad but also of government circles, as well as of international nongovernmental groups such as Amnesty International.[46]

[46]In addition to the CSCE hearing cited in fn. 45, see the materials from the Ukrainian Human Rights Awareness Week in the US House of Representatives, *Congressional Record—House* (Washington, DC), June 22–23, 1982, pp. H3784–89, H3822; June 23, 1982, pp. E3019–20, E3027–28, E3041; and June 24, 1982, pp. E3121–22.

Mykola Rudenko, writer, poet, and founder of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group.

—Committee for the Defense of Soviet Political Prisoners.

- Most important, the Group set the unwelcome precedent of the emergence of independent but coordinated political organizations in four Soviet republics that to a greater or lesser degree were infected by nationalism.

A decision was made immediately to suppress the Ukrainian Helsinki Group. Rudenko and Oleksa Tykhyi have the unenviable distinction of being among the first Helsinki monitors to be arrested and the first to be tried: on July 1, 1977, Rudenko drew a sentence of seven years in a labor camp plus five years of exile, while "recidivist" Tykhyi was sentenced to ten and five years. By the fifth anniversry of the Group, in November 1981, 25 of its 36 living members were serving various sentences in the Gulag, two had been exiled far from Ukraine, three had been released from camp or exile and were apparently inactive, and six had been allowed to leave for the West.[47] If the vitality of a dissident organization is to be measured by its pub-

[47]See "Testimony by Dr. Nina Strokata-Karavansky . . .," loc. cit., table on pp. 74–77.

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lished output, then the Soviet Ukrainian part of the Group was in effect destroyed in 1980.[48] But those members of the Group who are now abroad have continued their work.

The man who has the credit for the partial destruction of the Group is Vitalii Fedorchuk, the former Ukrainian KGB chief, who briefly (May–December 1982) succeeded Andropov as head of the all-Union KGB. When Fedorchuk was appointed in July 1970 he was an outsider, who had made his career in the KGB's military counterintelligence apparatus. He had not been associated with the party or KGB apparatuses in Ukraine.[49]

It was Fedorchuk who organized the arrests of dissidents in January 1972. It was also during Fedorchuk's tenure that at least two very suspicious deaths occurred among dissidents or persons close to them: the mysterious murder of artist Alla Horska in November 1970,[50] and the "suicide" by hanging (after his eyes had been gouged out) of rock composer Volodymyr Ivasyuk in 1979.[51] Two recent articles by Fedorchuk, written while he was Ukrainian KGB chief, show that he was most concerned with political dissent that had international implications—for instance, dissent that accused the Soviet government of not honoring the Helsinki accords.[52] An anonymous samizdat author attributes this statement to Fedorchuk: "In the course of 1980 we did a great job: we rendered harmless forty Ukrainian nationalists. In order to avoid needless international frictions the majority of them were sentenced for ordinary criminal offenses."[53] In general, warns the anonymous author, the Ukraine was chosen as a "proving ground" in the KGB war on political dissidents. It would seem that with Fedorchuk's promotion, the methods he perfected in the Ukraine could be applied on an all-Union scale.

Economy. In the economic field, Shelest and Shcherbytskyi had to deal with a mature industrial-agricultural economy whose growth was slowing down (see Table 2). Moscow's decision to invest heavily in the eastern regions, especially in eastern portions of the RSFSR, which became evident in the 8th Five-Year Plan (1966–70), could not but negatively affect the output of coal, Ukraine's traditional major contribution to the Soviet energy balance. Both Shelest and Shcherbytskyi, who then served as his Prime Minister, lobbied for higher investments in the Donbas, but to

Table 2: Production of Coal, Steel, Rolled Steel, and Electricity in Ukraine, 1960–80

Year	Coal	Steel	Rolled steel	Electricity
	(million metric tons)			(bil.kwh)
1960	172.1	26.2	18.0	53.9
1965	194.3	37.0	26.0	94.6
1970	207.1	46.6	32.7	137.6
1971	209.5	47.4	33.4	149.9
1972	211.2	49.2	34.1	158.4
1973	212.6	51.0	35.4	172.0
1974	214.0	52.4	36.7	181.0
1975	216.0	53.1	37.7	195.0
1976	218.0	53.1	37.7	209.0
1977	217.0	53.7	37.8	215.0
1978	210.9	56.7	38.0	221.8
1979	205.0	56.1	37.2	231.0
1980	197.0	53.7	36.0	236.0

SOURCES: For 1960–73, Ukrainian Central Statistical Administration, *Narodne hospodarstvo Ukrains'koi RSR u 1973 rotsi: Statystychnyi shchorichnyk* (The National Economy of the Ukrainian SSR in 1973: Statistical Yearbook), Kiev, Vydavnytstvo politychnoi literatury Ukrainy, 1974, pp. 100–01; for subsequent years, *Yezhegodnik bol'shoy sovetskoy entsiklopedii* (Yearbook of the Great Soviet Encylopedia), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo "Sovetskaya entsiklopediya," 1975, p. 193; 1977, p. 185; 1978, p. 180; 1979, p. 170; 1980, p. 176; and 1981, p. 181.

[48]The most recent nearly complete *Informatsyinyi byuleten'* in my possession dates back to May 1980. I have also seen a small fragment of the same publication for September 1980.

[49]Born in 1918, Fedorchuk worked from 1934 to 1936 on small newspapers in the Zhytomyr and Kiev regions. In 1936–39, he attended a military school *(voyennoye uchilishche).* Upon graduation, he joined the organs of state security (NKVD). It is not clear whether he served during World War II as a regular officer or, more probably, an officer of counterintelligence *(Smersh).* Later he finished the Higher School of the KGB. See *Deputaty Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR: Desyatyy sozyv* (Deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Tenth Convocation), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo "Izvestiya Sovetov Deputatov Trudyashchikhsya SSSR," 1979, p. 452. Exactly what Fedorchuk had been doing prior to his appointment to the Ukrainian KGB post in July 1970 is not clear. We know, however, that at the height of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 Major General V. V. Fedorchuk was prominent enough to address a high-level military meeting at the Frunze Central Hall of the Soviet Army in Moscow. See "Vigilance—Our Weapon," *Krasnaya zvezda* (Moscow), Oct. 28, 1962. We also know that sometime in the 1960's Fedorchuk headed the so-called Special Departments (the KGB counterintelligence and internal security sections) of the Soviet Army Group in the German Democratic Republic. See Aleksey Myagkov, *Inside the KGB*, Richmond, Surrey, Foreign Affairs Publishing Co., 1976, p. 90. Apparently between August and December 1967, Fedorchuk was promoted to head of the Third KGB Directorate in Moscow (in charge of all KGB special departments within the Soviet military.) Boris Meissner has noted: "According to some reports, Fedorchuk is supposed to have worked for a time in the foreign department of the KGB under Andropov." ("Transition in the Kremlin," *Problems of Communism* [Washington, DC], January–February 1983, p. 16.) Fedorchuk has been placed in the eastern RSFSR prior to his becoming Ukrainian KGB chief, but the dates are not known. "Ukrainian KGB Boss in Politburo," *Radio Free Europe Research* (Munich), No. 1900, Oct. 9, 1973, p. 3.

[50]See *Ukrainian Herald . . ., Issue 4*, Munich, ABN Press Bureau, 1972, pp. 7–30; also Leonid Plyushch, op. cit., pp. 234–38.

[51]See Arkhiva Samizdata No. 3800 "Ivasyuk Volodymyr," n.d., n. p., in *Materialy Samizdata* (Munich), No. 45/79, Dec. 24, 1979; also "Big Brother Is Everywhere," *TIME* (New York, NY), June 23, 1980, p. 39.

[52]V. V. Fedorchuk, "High Political Awareness of the Soviet Peoples—A Reliable Shield Against the Subversive Probes of Imperialism," *Kommunist Ukrainy*, October 1980, pp. 10–26, esp. p. 20; and idem, "Ideological Diversions—the Weapon of Imperialism," *Pid praporom leninizmu* (Kiev), No. 19, October 1981, pp. 10–17, esp. pp. 12–13.

[53]Anonymous, "The Situation in Ukraine," AS No. 4532, p. 1, in *Materialy Samizdata*, No. 2/82, Jan. 15, 1982. See also Roman Solchanyk, "Top KGB Post in Moscow Goes to Ukrainian Security Chief," *The Ukrainian Weekly* (Jersey City, NJ), June 13, 1982, p. 3.

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no avail.[54] To a certain degree, the noticeable decline in the rate of increase of coal output between 1966 and 1970 is attributable to a change in the central regime's priorities. On the other hand, the famous Ukrainian coal and metallurgical industries had been aging and ailing for some time, and it is hard to see what Shcherbytskyi could have done differently in the late 1970's, except to call on Moscow for massive investments in a modernization program.[55] It is true that Shcherbytskyi did not openly challenge Brezhnev on this issue at either the 1976 or 1981 Ukrainian CP and CPSU congresses—but this may have been only realistic in the light of what happened to his predecessor.[56]

In agriculture, Shcherbytskyi has been either more skillful or more fortunate than Shelest (see Table 3 on page 12). Shelest became Ukrainian CP first secretary in July 1963. The average annual gross output of grain in the Ukraine in 1961–65 was 29.3 million metric tons; in 1966–70 the average was 33.4 million metric tons; and in 1971–75 it was already 40.0 million metric tons.[57] In 1977 and 1978 there were all-time bumper crops—48.6 and 50.6 million metric tons of grain respectively. Bad climatic conditions, however, plunged the harvests to only 34 million metric tons in the next year and to 38.3 million in 1980. The four-year annual average for 1976–79 was 44.4 million tons; the five-year average for 1976–80, only 43.2 million.[58] In view of the performance during the 10th Five-Year Plan (1976–80) and given the fact that the drought in Ukraine in 1981 in terms of extent and duration exceeded those in the bad years of 1972,

[54]At the 1966 congresses of the Ukrainian and all-Union Communist parties, Shelest uncharacteristically did *not* criticize central economic policy; but Prime Minister Shcherbytskyi did, at the Moscow gathering (cf. Shelest in *Pravda Ukrainy* (Kiev), Mar. 16, 1966, and *Pravda*, Mar. 31, 1966, pp. 2–3, with Shcherbytskyi in *Pravda*, Apr. 7, 1966, p. 2). In 1971, Shelest strongly criticized central economic policies at both the Kiev and Moscow congresses, while Shcherbytskyi played the silent loyalist. See Shelest in *Radyans'ka Ukraina*, Mar. 18, 1971, p. 2; and *Pravda*, Apr. 1, 1971, p. 3. On Shcherbytskyi, see *Radyans'ka Ukraina*, Mar. 20, 1971, pp. 2–4; and *Pravda*, Apr. 7, 1971, p. 8. See also Yaroslav Bilinsky, "The Communist Party of Ukraine After 1966," in Peter J. Potichnyj, Ed., *Ukraine in the Seventies*, Oakville, Ontario, Mosaic Press, 1975, pp. 245, 249.

[55]See especially Shcherbytskyi's speech to the plenum of the Ukrainian party's Central Committee on Nov. 25, 1981 in *Radyans'ka Ukraina*, Nov. 26, 1981; also Ukrainian Prime Minister Lyashko's complaint in *Pravda*, Feb. 28, 1981. Very revealing is V. Cherkasov, "Metal of the South," *Pravda*, June 9, 1981, p. 2. See also Shcherbytskyi's complaints at the Oct. 22, 1982, and Nov. 29, 1982, Ukrainian party plenums (*Radyans'ka Ukraina*, Oct. 23 and Nov. 30, 1982); the letter by three metallurgists, "Workers' Conscience Dictates This," (ibid., Dec. 5, 1982); and an open letter, "Metallurgists, Don't Let Us Down!" (ibid., Jan. 9, 1983).

For two scholarly treatments of the problem see A.S. Romaniuk and I. Slowikowski, "The Non-Renewable Resources of Ukraine," in Potichnyj, op. cit., pp. 3–32; and Leslie Dienes, "Minerals and Energy," in I.S. Koropeckyj, Ed., *The Ukraine within the USSR: An Economic Balance Sheet*, New York, NY, Praeger, 1977, pp. 155–89.

[56]See Shcherbytskyi's report to the 25th Ukrainian party congress (*Radyans'ka Ukraina*, Feb. 11, 1976, pp. 2–6) and his report to the 25th CPSU Congress (*Pravda*, Feb. 26, 1976, p. 3). His report to the 26th Ukrainian party congress (*Radyans'ka Ukraina*, Feb. 11, 1981) contained no explicit critique at all, and his report to the 26th CPSU Congress (*Pravda*, Feb. 24, 1981) contained mild criticism of unnamed central agencies.

[57]Ukrainian Central Statistical Administration, *Narodne Hospodarstvo Ukrainskoi RSR u 1973 rotsi: Statystychnyi Shchorichnyk* (National Economy of the Ukrainian SSR in 1973: Statistical Yearbook) Kiev, Vydavnytstvo politychnoi literatury Ukrainy, 1974.

[58]The five-year average was calculated by the author.



Traditional Ukrainian industries: at left, the Abakumov mine of the Donetskugol Combine; at right, forging machinery produced by the Novokramatorsky engineering works.

—Novosti and TASS from Sovfoto.

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Table 3: Gross Output of Cereals in Ukraine, 1960–80

(million metric tons)

Year	Output	Year	Average annual output
1960	21.8	1956–60	23.9
1965	31.7	1961–65	29.3
1970	36.4	1966–70	33.4
1971	39.4		
1972	32.6		
1973	48.4		
1974	45.9		
1975	—	1971–75	40.0
1976	44.6		
1977	48.6		
1978	50.6		
1979	34.0		
1980	38.3	1976–80	43.2

SOURCES: For 1960–73, Ukrainian Central Statistical Administration, *Narodne hospodarstvo Ukrains'koi RSR u 1973 rotsi: Statystychnyi shchorichnyk* (The National Economy of the Ukrainian SSR in 1973: Statistical Yearbook), Kiev, Vydavnytstvo politychnoi literatury Ukrainy, 1974, p. 192; For subsequent years, *Yezhegodnik bol'shoy sovetskoy entsiklopedii* (Yearbook of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo "Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya," 1977, p. 185; 1978, p. 179; 1979, p. 169; 1980, p. 176; and 1981, p. 180.

1975, and 1979, the published goals for the average annual gross output of grain in the 11th Five-Year Plan (1981–85) of 51–52 million metric tons appear very optimistic.[59]

Shcherbytskyi, if not Shelest, has also had to face another economic bottleneck: namely, difficulties with labor.[60] To judge from the passionate denunciation of Polish trade unions at the 1981 Ukrainian party congress by Ukrainian trade union leader Vitalii Solohub, and by other materials, Ukrainian workers were not totally immune to the Polish disease.[61] Although there were no major strikes in Ukraine, Shcherbytskyi was apparently very glad when martial law was imposed in Poland.[62]

Party Politics. Ever since the 1966 CPSU congress—his first as general secretary—Brezhnev had hinted that admission to the party should be restricted and that undesirable elements should be purged. The 1971 congress decided upon an "exchange of party cards" in principle, but left it up to a CC CPSU plenum to decide on a date of implementation. Shelest, who together with his predecessor Nikolay Podgornyy had greatly expanded the Ukrainian party membership, apparently belonged to the group of high party leaders who urged Brezhnev to go slowly. As late as August 1971 he pleaded that "much remains to be done to prepare well for this important organizational-political measure."[63] The CC CPSU plenum which decided that the exchange of party cards was to commence in 1973 was the same plenum (May 19, 1972) that removed Shelest from his first secretaryship in Ukraine.

Shcherbytskyi, who does not seem to have shared Shelest's misgivings about the purge or mini-purge, released no clear-cut figures about its extent upon its completion (May 20, 1975), or at the 1976 party congresses in Kiev and Moscow. In 1977, two years after the exchange was completed, an official Ukrainian party history stated that "more than 37,000 persons" had not received new party cards (i.e., had been expelled from the party).[64] This figure appears to be unusually low. The "exchange of party cards" in Azerbaydzhan resulted in the separation from that party of 2.3 percent of its 1971 members, and the percentage for the CPSU as a whole was given as 2.4 percent.[65] But in Ukraine, where the first secretary had recently been dismissed in disgrace, the explusions from the party allegedly came to only 1.5 percent. In 1977, I estimated that the true rate of Ukrainian party expulsions was 4.6 percent of the 1971 gross membership and that the true rate of CPSU expulsions lay between 2.9 and 3.2 percent.[66]

[59] *Radyans'ka Ukraina*, Jan. 23, 1982. The figures are from "Grain Production—the Key Problem of Agriculture," ibid., Jan. 29, 1983.

[60] See Shcherbytskyi in ibid., Jan. 23, 1982; also F. Douglas Whitehouse and David W. Bronson, "Manpower," in Koropeckyj, *The Ukraine Within the USSR*.

[61] Solohub, *Radyans'ka Ukraina*, Feb. 12, 1981. See also the letter by a Ukrainian worker in Kiev, cited in Roman Solchanyk, "*Samizdat* Report on Strikes in Kiev," *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 267/81, July 6, 1981, pp. 2–3; and other materials by Solchanyk: "Criticism of Local Trade Union Organs in the Ukraine: Impact of Polish Developments?" ibid., RL 303/80, Aug. 27, 1980; "Poland's Impact inside the USSR," *Soviet Analyst*, Sept. 9, 1981, pp. 3–5; "Labor Problems in the Ukraine," *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 389/81, Sept. 29, 1981; and "*Samizdat* Report on Strike in Kiev and Food Supply Problems," ibid., RL 477/81, Dec. 1, 1981.

[62] *Radyans'ka Ukraina*, Jan. 23, 1982.

[63] Cited by Christian Duevel in "Shelest Ousted from Ukrainian CP leadership," Radio Liberty, *Central Research Division* (Munich), CRD 128/72, May 30, 1972, p. 8; also Bilinsky, "The Communist Party of Ukraine After 1966," p. 242.

[64] Institute of Party History under the CC of the CP of Ukraine, *Ocherki istorii Kommunisticheskoy Partii Ukrainy* (Outline History of the Communist Party of Ukraine), 4th ed., Kiev, Izdatel'stvo politicheskoy literatury Ukrainy, 1977, p. 753.

[65] At the 1976 Congress of the Azerbaydzhan CP, Heydar Aliyev gave the following figures: The total of party members and candidates was 287,823. In the period 1971–76, there were 47,502 new members admitted to the party. Another 3,658 members were expelled; 1,682 had "lost touch with their party organizations" and were dropped; and 670 candidates were refused admission. *Bakinskiy rabochiy* (Baku), Jan. 29, 1976, p. 6.

Totaling the expulsions and quasi-expulsions, we get a *minimum* figure (no mortality calculations were possible) of 6,010 or 2.3 percent of the January 1, 1971, party membership figure of 258,549. *Yezhegodnik bol'shoy sovetskoy entsiklopedii 1971* (Yearbook of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia 1971), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo "Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya," 1972.

[66] Yaroslav Bilinsky, "Politics, Purge, and Dissent in the Ukraine since the Fall of Shelest," in Ihor Kamenetsky, Ed., *Nationalism and Human Rights: Processes of Modernization in the USSR*, Littleton, CO, Libraries Unlimited, 1977, pp. 173–74. In calculating these figures the author received help from Messrs. Godfrey Baldwin and Stephen Rapawy of the Foreign Demographic Analysis Division, US Department of Commerce.

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After his appointment as first secretary, Shcherbytskyi purged many oblast party secretaries as well as other prominent supporters of Shelest.[67] Nevertheless, when we look at the composition of the Politburo and Secretariat of the Ukrainian party in both 1976 and 1981, we find that Shcherbytskyi's position is perhaps not as solid as he might have wished.

In 1976, Shcherbytskyi's Dnipropetrovsk clan had two full members out of eleven in the Ukrainian Politburo (Shcherbytskyi himself and Oleksii Vatchenko, his close associate, then first secretary of the Dnipropetrovsk oblast committee) and two out of five candidate Politburo members (Viktor Dobryk, first secretary of the Lviv *obkom*, and agricultural expert Petro Pohrebnyak). In the Secretariat, Shcherbytskyi was alone. He had to share power with the Donetsk group, the largest party organization in Ukraine. That faction included full Politburo members Oleksander Lyashko, chairman of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers and formerly secretary for industry (June 1963–March 1966) and second—or "cadres"—secretary (March 1966–September 1969) in the Ukrainian party Secretariat; trade union leader Solohub; and Oleksii Tytarenko, industrial secretary of the Ukrainian party Central Committee since 1966. Two other Donetsk "graduates" were candidate members of the Politburo: economic secretary Iakiv Pohrebnyak and Borys Kachura, first secretary of the Donetsk *obkom* since January 1976. Shcherbytskyi did have the support of a majority of the Kharkiv faction, including Ivan Sokolov, first secretary of the Kharkiv oblast committee; and of Oleksander Botvyn, first secretary of the Kiev city committee, who joined Shcherbytskyi and Dobryk in their explicit criticisms of Shelest.[68] At the 1976 Ukrainian CP Congress, Botvyn was made full Politburo member, without having to undergo the candidate stage. Sokolov, an ethnic Russian, was given the sensitive post of second secretary (for cadres, i.e., party personnel) and the accompanying full Politburo membership (he was the first non-Ukrainian second secretary since December 1949). Hryhorii Vashchenko, Sokolov's predecessor as Kharkiv *obkom* first secretary, was shunted aside to the post of first deputy chairman of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers, but remained a full Politburo member. In sum, I agree with Roman Solchanyk that "the durability of Lyashko and the fact that the 'Donetsk group' that he heads continues to be strongly represented in the Politburo and Secretariat reflect a balancing of forces rather than a takeover by Shcherbytskyi."[69]

This raises the question of the character of the Donetsk party organization. Borys Lewytzkyj has made a strong but not overwhelming case that their members are centralists, oriented toward Moscow rather than Kiev, working "in an environment where the nationality problem is virtually nonexistent."[70] Granted that the Ukrainian language is less frequently spoken in Donetsk than in Lviv; this does not necessarily make the Donetsk faction alien to Ukrainian affairs. At party congress after party congress the Donetsk leaders have complained that authorities in Moscow have not given enough funds to revive the Donetsk coal mines. It should also not be forgotten that two of the most prominent leaders of Ukrainian dissent, Ivan Dzyuba of the 1960's and Mykola Rudenko of the 1970's, were both born in the Donetsk region.

Changes in the Ukrainian party Politburo between 1976 and 1981 were largely routine. By 1981, Shcherbytskyi had not gained much ground: the Dnipropetrovsk group was represented only by Shcherbytskyi and Vatchenko as full Politburo members (two out of eleven) and Dobryk and newcomer Evhenii Kachalovsky (appointed in April 1980) as candidate Politburo members (two of six); the Donetsk group found itself somewhat strengthened by the June 1976 promotion of Kachura to full Politburo membership; in January 1980, Botvyn was appointed ambassador to Czechoslovakia;[71] Yuriy El'chenko, his replacement as first secretary of the Kiev city committee, does not seem to be one of Shcherbytskyi's adherents. The 1981 Ukrainian party congress made no changes in this alignment.

Two appointments in 1982 throw light on Shcherbytskyi's political strength in Ukraine. First, Fedorchuk's successor as republic KGB chief was his deputy Stepan Mukha. Mukha has a Dnipropetrovsk party background, like Shcherbytskyi, and could perhaps strengthen the latter's power.[72] However, in October Shcherbytskyi was not allowed to replace the deceased second secretary Sokolov with one of his Dnipropetrovsk protégés. Instead, the post went to

[67] Ibid., pp. 171–73.

[68] See the list of members of the Ukrainian party Politburo in *Radyans'ka Ukraina*, Feb. 14, 1976, p. 1. For Botvyn's speech see ibid., Feb. 12, 1976, p. 2.

[69] Solchanyk, "Politics of Stability in the Ukraine," p. 6.

[70] Borys Lewytzkyj, "The Ruling Party Organs of Ukraine," in Potichnyj, op. cit., p. 273.

[71] For these and a variety of other changes in the Ukrainian party leadership during this period, see Herwig Kraus, "Death of Ukrainian First Deputy Premier," *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 53/80, Feb. 4, 1980; idem, "Promotions in the Politburo of the Ukrainian Communist Party," ibid., RL 150/80, Apr. 21, 1980; Stephan Kellar, "Mozgovoi Elected Ukrainian Secretary for Agriculture," ibid., RL 197/80, May 29, 1980; and Roman Solchanyk, "Change in Kiev City Party Leadership," ibid., RL 23/80, Jan. 14, 1980.

[72] Roman Solchanyk, "In Ukraine: Leadership Changes in the KGB, MVD," *Ukrainian Weekly*, July 18, 1982, p. 3.

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veteran CC industrial secretary Tytarenko, from the Donetsk group, and Donetsk *obkom* first secretary Kachura was taken into the Secretariat as a replacement for Tytarenko. At the same plenum, Mukha became a candidate Politburo member and El'chenko was promoted to full Politburo membership.[73] The selection of Tytarenko returned an ethnic Ukrainian to the sensitive post of cadres secretary. On the other hand, Tytarenko, at 68, is three years older than Shcherbytskyi and may only be an interim appointment. Nevertheless, he may temporarily weaken Shcherbytskyi's control of the Ukrainian party.

Shcherbytskyi and Andropov

In reviewing his political position in mid-1982, Shcherbytskyi must have felt himself persona non grata insofar as his former patron Brezhnev was concerned. Brezhnev was obviously not bolstering Shcherbytskyi's position in the Ukrainian party, nor was he promoting him in Moscow. Thus, Shcherbytskyi must have thought hard about the implications for himself of Andropov's return to the Secretariat. It was already clear in May 1982 that Andropov was challenging Konstantin Chernenko, Brezhnev's favorite and apparently only candidate to succeed him.[74] Under the impact of the 1980 Polish events, Chernenko had made intra-party democracy his platform in the maneuvering for succession, most notably in his Lenin anniversary speech of April 22, 1981. In the same speech, Chernenko also made a very eloquent and comprehensive statement on the catastrophic nature of nuclear war and the need for détente, implying presumably arms reduction.[75]

In challenging Chernenko, Andropov brought to bear wider party and government experience and the increased political weight acquired by the KGB under Brezhnev.[76] On April 22, 1982, it was Andropov who was selected to deliver the Lenin anniversary speech. That address was remarkable as a counterstatement to Chernenko's 1981 speech. Implicitly, Andropov repudiated Chernenko's demands for intra-party democracy and thus appealed to the established party leaders, who must have regarded Chernenko as stirring up the young rebels against their "elders and betters."[77] While blowing hot and cold on détente, Andropov promised the Soviet armed forces "the proper level of support" to defend both the Sovet Union and the entire socialist alliance. A shrewd politician, Andropov also alluded to former "very difficult problems connected with deviations from Leninist norms"—a euphemism for Stalinist terror—in a bow toward the moderates. A month later Andropov was back in the party Secretariat, and his chosen replacement, Fedorchuk, was taking care of the KGB.

With Andropov's appointment to the Secretariat, Shcherbytskyi must have realized that his own chances of succeeding Brezhnev as general secretary had become virtually nonexistent. Yet, there were other posts that the ambitious Shcherbytskyi might well covet—e.g., the premiership of the Soviet Union, or appointment as a secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

How many supporters could Shcherbytskyi count on among the full members of the CC CPSU, who formally would have to vote on any all-Union-level office he might want? An analysis shows that among the full members of the 1976 CC CPSU there were 50 ethnic Ukrainians; by mid-1982, the figure had declined to 45, even though the total of full Central Committee members had increased from 287 to 319 at the 26th CPSU Congress in 1981.[78] The relative numerical weight of Ukrainians on that body has been declining for some time: at Khrushchev's last congress in 1961

[73] *Radyans'ka Ukraina*, Oct. 23, 1982, p. 1. Sokolov was a Russian born in the Ukraine, who had come up through the Kharkiv party organization. On Oct. 1, 1982, he suffered a fatal cerebral hemorrhage at the relatively young age of 55. Ibid., Oct. 3, 1982, p. 2.

[74] Arkady Shevchenko, a high-ranking Soviet defector, stressed that Chernenko was the "secretary of the Politburo and kept the only record of its proceedings ... he conducted polls of Politburo members on questions that had to be resolved outside its formal meetings." See Robert Kaiser, "Defector Terms Kremlin's Infighters 'Political Pygmies'," *The Washington Post*, June 6, 1982, p. A/29. See also Heinz Brahm, "The Career of K. Chernenko," *Berichte des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien* (Cologne), No. 29/1982, August 1982, pp. 11 ff. That report and his earlier memorandum, "Questionable Laurels of Success for Andropov," in *Aktuelle Analysen des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien* (Cologne), No. 15/1982, June 16, 1982, constitute a useful antidote to the outpouring of encomiums to Andropov in the West, especially those after May 24, 1982, some of which appear to have been inspired by Andropov's friends. For a vivid description of the subtle—and effective—public relations buildup of Andropov see John F. Burns, "The Emergence of Andropov," *The New York Times Magazine*, Feb. 27, 1983, pp. 24 ff. Burns is the newspaper's Moscow bureau chief.

[75] *Pravda*, Apr. 23, 1981.

[76] Amy W. Knight, "The Powers of the Soviet KGB," *Survey* (London), Summer 1980, pp. 138–55, esp. p. 144.

[77] Yu. V. Andropov, "Leninism—Inexhaustible Source of the Revolutionary Energy and Creativity of the Masses," *Pravda*, Apr. 23, 1982. (Cynically, Andropov calls upon the Soviet people to seek democracy in the soviets, not—by implication—within the party.)

[78] The best source on the composition and current offices of Central Committee members is Herwig Kraus, comp., "The Composition of Leading Organs of the CPSU (1952–1982)," *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin*, (Munich), Supplement, 1982—see p. 7 for totals of full CC members in 1976 and 1981. Author's nationality calculations based on data in *Deputaty Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR*, op. cit. A good starting point for the analysis of the nationality composition of the 1981 CC is Table 2 in Sergei Voronitsyn's "The Social Structure of the Newly Elected Central Committee's Voting Membership," *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 159/81, April 13, 1981. It should also be noted that with the dismissal of Politburo member and chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, Nikolay Podgornyy, the Ukrainians lost a high-ranking patron. See *Pravda*, May 25, 1977.

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it stood at 20 percent, and by 1981 it had dropped to 14.4 percent. (The proportion of Ukrainians in the total CPSU membership was 14.7 percent in 1961 and 16 percent in 1981.)[79]

The Ukrainians on the CC CPSU are also a varied lot. Of the full members in both 1976 and 1981, more were in all-Union government positions (18 in 1976 and 17 in 1981) than in positions in Ukraine (16 in both years). A sizeable contingent were *obkom* secretaries in the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (9 in 1976 and 7 in 1981). Some did not even disclose their Ukrainian origins. Some are undoubtedly called upon by their positions to act against the interests of Ukraine. In short, under normal circumstances the Ukrainians on the CC CPSU are far from being a cohesive group.

Even if all of them would draw together to support a fellow countryman maneuvering for a top party or government office, in December 1982 they were a minority of 46 to 218 Russians (the other nationalities have only token representations totaling 49, and the nationality of six members is not known). In sum, if Shcherbytskyi wanted a promotion to Moscow, he would need many more allies than would be available if he relied solely on fellow Ukrainians—even in the unlikely event that all of them gave Shcherbytskyi their support. In this context, it is interesting to speculate on what role, if any, Shcherbytskyi and the Ukrainian party organization played in Andropov's accession to the general secretaryship.

According to an unconfirmed but very plausible account by Leo Wieland, Shcherbytskyi did support Andropov, but his role was secondary. Both Wieland and John F. Burns of *The New York Times* agree that Andropov's key move was the winning over of Defense Minister Dmitriy Ustinov and the Soviet armed forces. Furthermore, Andropov still retained control of the KGB.[80] Among the civilian members of the Politburo one of the earliest to support Andropov was reportedly Foreign Minister Andrey A. Gromyko.

It is generally known that the CC CPSU met on November 12, 1982 and that Chernenko less than enthusiastically presented the consensus recommendation of the Politburo (which had met at an unspecified time between November 10 and 12) to elect Andropov General Secretary, which the CC CPSU members did unanimously.[81] Andropov thus became Brezhnev's successor at age 68. Since Andropov is in less than perfect health, perhaps his selection should be considered an interim appointment.

What is not so widely known is that the crucial Poliburo meeting was chaired by Shcherbytskyi. Shcherbytskyi called on Ustinov to speak first, and it was Ustinov who argued for the election of Andropov. Gromyko supported him, and so did Viktor Grishin, Grigoriy Romanov, and Mikhail Gorbachëv. This persuaded the other Politburo members to follow Ustinov's lead.[82] While this sequence could indicate that Shcherbytskyi may have been neutral in the succession struggle, a more plausible interpretation of his role would be collusion with the Andropov camp, perhaps including delivering up to 50 votes at the November 12 CC CPSU meeting.

If it is correct to assume that Shcherbytskyi has been trying hard to obtain a promotion to Moscow since about 1977 and that in November 1982 he attempted to ingratiate himself with Andropov, his efforts by mid-1983 show little success. In the context of the November 12, 1982, plenum and Brezhnev's funeral, Shcherbytskyi made only slightly perceptible gains in protocol ranking.[83] At the November 22, 1982, plenum of the CC CPSU Andropov paid a gracious public tribute to the party services of Andrey Kirilenko, who was relinquishing his Politburo post and secretaryship. Nikolay Ryzhkov, a 53-year-old Russian industrial administrator, possibly specializing in heavy or armaments industry, has been appointed a party secretary, apparently in Kirilenko's place.[84] Ryzhkov seems eminently qualified to continue Kirilenko's old responsibilities, but his appointment filled another vacancy that would have been attractive

[79] For 1961 see Yaroslav Bilinsky, "The Rulers and the Ruled," *Problems of Communism*, September–October 1967, p. 23. Figures for 1981 are the author's calculations from a list in *Pravda*, Mar. 4, 1981, p. 2. Nationality identification was from the volumes of *Deputaty Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR*.

[80] Leo Wieland, "The End of the 'Dnipropetrovsk Clan'," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, Dec. 7, 1982, p. 8.

Burns neatly illustrates the joint support of the military and the KGB for Andropov: "The outcome was foretold for one group of Westerners who filtered past roadblocks to the vicinity of the Central Committee headquarters on Moscow's Old Square. Reporters whose experiences went back to the 1950's could not recall an occasion when that forbidding block had been surrounded by such a web of steel. Several rows of KGB and army troops barred a close approach, with armored personnel carriers idling at the curb." Loc. cit., p. 29.

For an intriguing suggestion of a possible close relationship between Andropov and Chief of General Staff, Nikolay Ogarkov, see Archie Brown, "Andropov: Discipline and Reform," *Problems of Communism*, January–February 1983, pp. 24–25.

[81] *Pravda*, Nov. 13, 1982.

[82] Wieland, loc. cit.

[83] In the group photo after the November 12, 1982, CC CPSU plenum, Shcherbytskyi stands fifth to the left of Dinmukhamed Kunayev, a Brezhnev protégé. *Pravda*, Nov. 13, 1982. At the funeral, Shcherbytskyi was apparently allowed to move up a notch: he stands on the Lenin Mausoleum on the right side of Andropov, next to Ustinov who stands immediately to the right of Andropov, but before Kunayev. (On Andropov's honorific left side are Tikhonov, Chernenko, Gromyko, Grishin, Gorbachëv, and others). Ibid., Nov. 16, 1982.

[84] Ibid., Nov. 23, 1982. Biographical information on Ryzhkov is from *Deputaty Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR ... 1979*, p. 385; and Kraus, op. cit, p. 39. It is fascinating that in 1974 Ryzhkov's nationality was given as Ukrainian whereas in 1979 it is Russian. Was it a printer's error or did he assimilate between 1974 and 1979?

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to Shcherbytskyi.

But it was another appointment in November 1982—the promotion of Heydar Aliyev, first secretary of the Communist Party of Azerbaydzhan, from candidate to full member of the Politburo and, two days later, his appointment to first deputy premier of the USSR[85]—that must have given Shcherbytskyi a real jolt. Aliyev is young (59 years old at the time of his appointment), energetic, a former KGB executive, and apparently a good economic administrator to boot. While his non-Slavic ethnic origin might preclude his future promotion to Tikhonov's post as chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, he is nevertheless blocking Shcherbytskyi's opportunity to gain high-level central administrative experience. Premier Tikhonov, a Ukrainian, became 78 on May 14, 1983. His Brezhnev-appointed first deputy chairman, Ivan Arkhipov, a Russian, turned 76 on April 18, 1983. Shcherbytskyi is an experienced administrator. And now this surprise from Baku! When Gromyko too was appointed a first deputy premier,[86] the field became even more crowded. Gromyko has no experience in economic administration, and he turned 74 on July 18, 1983. Furthermore, 60-year-old Grigoriy Romanov, party leader of Leningrad, became central committee secretary on June 14, 1983.[87] While these appointments might indicate to Shcherbytskyi that there is no viable candidate for the Soviet premiership as yet, it must meanwhile worry him that he is being deliberately kept away from the logical stepping stone of first deputy on the way to the premiership.

For whatever reasons—be it disenchantment with Andropov's early promotions or a belated sense of national dignity—at the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the establishment of the USSR on December 21, 1982, Shcherbytskyi alone among the non-Russian republic party leaders avoided the use of such ritualistic formulas as "elder Russian brothers," "great Russian people", and the like.[88] Interestingly enough, Shcherbytskyi had referred to the "great Rus-

[85] On Nov. 22 and 24, 1982. See *Pravda*, Nov. 23, 1982; and *Radyans'ka Ukraina*, Nov. 25, 1982. See also analysis by Elizabeth Fuller, "Aliev Gains Full Membership in the Politburo and a First Deputy Premiership," *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 471/82, Nov. 24, 1982.

[86] John Burns, *The New York Times*, Mar. 25, 1983, p. A/3.

[87] *Pravda*, June 15, 1983.

[88] Ibid., Dec. 22 and 23, 1982. Shcherbytskyi's speech is in ibid., Dec. 22, 1982.

The pecking order as Leonid Brezhnev lies in state on November 12, 1982. His successor, Yuriy Andropov stands fourth from left. To the right of Andropov in the picture are Premier Nikolay Tikhonov, Konstantin Chernenko, Dmitri Ustinov, Dinmukhamed Kunayev, Volodomyr Shcherbytskyi, Mikhail Gorbachëv, Mikhail Solomentsev, and Vladimir Dolgikh; to the left of Andropov, Viktor Grishin, Andrey Gromyko, and Grigoriy Romanov.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

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sian people" in his speech on the 50th anniversary in 1972,[89] and he used a similar complimentary formula ("fraternal help of the great Russian people") at preliminary celebrations of the 60th anniversary in Kiev on October 1, 1982.[90]

Does Shcherbytskyi have any chance to get a major all-Union position in the near future? Who are his friends in Moscow? It would seem that Shcherbytskyi's most useful contacts in Moscow may now be Fedorchuk and Viktor Chebrikov, Fedorchuk's successor as chairman of the KGB. Shcherbytskyi has had a fruitful political collaboration with Fedorchuk extending as far back as Fedorchuk's appointment to the top KGB post in Ukraine in June 1970. At the same time that Shcherbytskyi and Malanchuk were trying "to convince Moscow's Politburo that P. Shelest was a nationalistic deviationist," Fedorchuk was reportedly complaining to Moscow "that the leadership of the CPU (i.e., Shelest) was not helping the KGB in carrying out its work effectively."[91] Thus Fedorchuk seems to have helped to unseat Shelest and install Shcherbytskyi. Shcherbytskyi, in turn, left Fedorchuk a free hand to deal with dissident Ukrainian intellectuals and politicians and to gain valuable field experience.

In May 1982, Fedorchuk appears to have been very much Andropov's man—since Andropov trusted him sufficiently to appoint him as KGB head, thereby passing over his two first deputy chairmen, General Georgiy Tsinev, and Col. Gen. Viktor Chebrikov, both of whom are full Central Committee members. In this post, Fedorchuk scored a big "success"— suspension of the activity of the Moscow Helsinki Group on September 8, 1982—although he may have ruffled the feathers of the Soviet elite by what one observer described as "a peremptory style."[92] Then, this major job accomplished, Fedorchuk was ordered to take over the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) from Brezhnev's aging (72-year-old) crony Nikolay Shchëlokov, on December 17, 1982, and Chebrikov was appointed chairman of the KGB.[93] Fedorchuk was evidently named to replace the unreliable Shchëlokov in order to carry out Andropov's promised wholesale campaign against official corruption. A signed article by Fedorchuk on the front page of *Literaturnaya gazeta* on March 23, 1983, announced his intent to battle corruption. Politically, this is a very risky promise to make, especially since Fedorchuk's political

Vitalii Fedorchuk, former Ukrainian and all-Union KGB chief and now USSR Minister of the Interior, addresses a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet on November 24, 1982.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

standing is still unclear. To sweeten his transfer—and probably demotion—Fedorchuk was given full general's rank,[94] but he has still apparently not even achieved candidate membership in the CC CPSU. Thus, even if Fedorchuk wanted to help Shcherbytskyi, his assistance might be of doubtful value.

Chebrikov had once been Shcherbytskyi's political subordinate in Ukraine. According to Joel Moses, Chebrikov was second and then first secretary of the Dnipropetrovsk party city committee between 1958 and 1963; from 1963 to 1967, he served as industry and second secretary of the Dnipropetrovsk oblast (incidentally, the personnel work of a second secretary frequently overlaps with KGB control functions).[95] Since Shcherbytskyi headed the Dnipropetrovsk *obkom* as first secretary from 1963 until November 1965, Chebrikov was his subordinate. While I do not

[89] Ibid., Dec. 22, 1972.

[90] *Radyans'ka Ukraina*, Oct. 2, 1982.

[91] Cf "Ethnocide of the Ukrainians in the USSR," p. 127 with V. Fedorchuk, "Great Political Vigilance," pp. 10–26, and idem, "Ideological Diversions . . .," pp. 10–17.

[92] See Serge Schmemann, *The New York Times*, Sept. 9, 1982.

[93] *Pravda*, Dec. 18, 1982.

[94] Ibid.

[95] Moses, "Regional Cohorts. . .," p. 67. On the second secretaries' role, see Peter Deriabin, *Watchdogs of Terror: Russian Bodyguards from the Tsars to the Commissars*, New Rochelle, NY, Arlington House, 1972, pp. 344 and 347.

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know about the nature of the relationship between Chebrikov and Shcherbytskyi at the time, I find Dimitri Simes's suggestions intriguing that it was Shcherbytskyi, and not Brezhnev, who would have been the logical sponsor for Chebrikov's deputy job under Andropov in the KGB in 1967.[96] If so, Chebrikov—especially after he is inducted into the Politburo—may be able to help Shcherbytskyi.

Republic Leaderships and the Center

To understand Shcherbytskyi's problems in Ukraine, it is instructive to glance briefly at the situation in two neighboring republics—Byelorussia and Moldavia. The Byelorussians have been subjected to even greater Russification pressures than have the Ukrainians.[97] Byelorussian patriots have defended themselves in a rather imaginative way. In 1975, Byelorussian cosmonaut Col. Piatr Klimuk took with him into space a book of verse by Yakub Kolas, which he proceeded to read to his Russian fellow cosmonaut Vitaliy Sevastyanov. Another Byelorussian cosmonaut, U. Kavalenak, recited the verses of V. Zuenko. Both events were proudly noted at the 8th congress of the Writers Union of Byelorussia in 1981.[98] In July 1979, respected philologist and educator Fedar M. Yankousky defended the use of the Byelorussian language in a periodical for teachers by citing a Slovak (!) colleague.[99] In the samizdat publications, there was a defense of Byelorussian in the moving and passionately argued anonymous "Letter to a Russian Friend" of 1976–77 and the witty and also anonymous poem "Tale of Bald Mountain."[100] A fair assessment of Byelorussian dissent is contained in an English-language source:

Current leaders of the Byelorussian and Moldavian Communist parties, respectively, Nikolai Slyun'kov and Semën Grossu.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

So far dissent in Byelorussia has been fairly sporadic. But the republic occupies a strategic position, lying between the Lithuanian and Ukrainian republics, both of which have strong dissident movements and underground presses. Development of dissent in Byelorussia could mean a zone of disaffection from the Baltic to the Black Sea, right down the western frontier of the Soviet Union.[101]

If national-cultural dissent does not appear a dangerous problem in Byelorussia as yet, the fluidity in leadership positions definitely is. Between 1965 and 1978, when the Byelorussian Kirill Mazurov was a full CPSU Politburo member and first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, it appeared as if he had a good chance of becoming Kosygin's successor. His associate Mikhail Zimyanin was elected propaganda secretary of the CC CPSU at the 1976 congress, the only non-Russian in the Secretariat at the time. Mazurov's protégé Piatr Masherov, first secretary of the CP of Byelorussia since March 1965 and candidate Politburo member of the CPSU since April 1966, rounded out the top leaders of the so-called Byelorussian "partisan group," who had fought together in World War II.

Mazurov is rumored to have successfully resisted Suslov's proposition in December 1973 to improve the

[96] Simes, "National Security under Andropov," *Problems of Communism*, January–February 1983, p. 36.

[97] In the 1972–73 school year as many as 51.4 percent of all pupils in Byelorussia were taught in Russian—in the cities, as many as 97.6 percent. K. Kh. Khanazarov, *Resheniye natsional'no-yazykovoy problemy v SSSR* (Solving the National Language Problem in the USSR), Moscow, Politizdat, 1977, p. 138. According to the 1979 census, Russians made up 11.9 percent of the population of Byelorussia.

There is not a single school in Minsk, the capital of the republic, that uses Byelorussian as the language of instruction. *Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR* (Moscow), No. 5, 1979, p. 10, as cited by Solchanyk, "Russian Language and Soviet Politics," p. 37.

In 1980, only 12.3 percent (or 370) of all books published in the republic were in Byelorussian. *Pechat' SSSR v 1980 godu* (Publishing in the USSR in 1980), Moscow, Kniga, 1981, p. 140. In January 1982—the centenary of the birth of two great Byelorussian poets Jakub Kolas and Janka Kupala—the number of copies of three Byelorussian literary journals in Byelorussian was cut by an average 14.2 percent, the number of copies of a journal in Russian increased by 15.0 percent. Author's calculations from "Decreasing the Circulation of Byelorussian Journals," *Bielarus* (Jamaica, NY), No. 299, April 1982.

[98] By Anatol' Viartsinski, Secretary of the BSSR Writers Union. See *Literatura i mastatstva* (Minsk), Apr. 17, 1981.

[99] Fedar Yankousky, "The Heart's Memory," *Nastaunitskaya hazeta* (Minsk), July 11 and 14, 1979.

[100] *Letter to a Russian Friend: A "Samizdat" Publication from Soviet Byelorussia*, London, Association of Byelorussians in Great Britain, 1979; "The Tale of Bald Mountain," *Bielarus*, Nos. 287–91, March–July 1981.

[101] Economist, *Foreign Report* (London), June 10, 1982, p. 6.

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Soviet economy by abolishing Union republics.[102] In November 1978, for unknown reasons, he was dismissed from both the Politburo and the USSR Council of Ministers.[103] This left Tikhonov as the only first deputy chairman and eventual successor of Kosygin. Another Byelorussian, Tikhon Kisilëv, who is not a member of the "partisan group," was taken into the USSR Council of Ministers, but only as one of several deputy chairmen.[104]

On October 4, 1980, Masherov was killed in an automobile accident, the circumstances of which are somewhat suspect.[105] What does appear clearly from the press is that whereas the Byelorussian leaders behind *Sovetskaya Belorussiya* tried to pay respectful homage to Masherov (he had been awarded *seven* Orders of Lenin, and was made a Hero of the Soviet Union for his service in World War II, as well as a Hero of Socialist Labor), other Soviet political leaders studiously sought to humiliate him after death. Not a single full or alternate member of the Politburo attended his funeral.[106]

Masherov was replaced by Kisilëv, who had to give up his post as deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers.[107] At the 1981 Congress of the CP of Byelorussia, unprecedented publicity was given to the speech of Ivan Polyakov, Chairman of the Byelorussian SSR Supreme Soviet, who discussed Kisilëv's report almost as if he, Polyakov, and not Kisilëv was first secretary.[108] On January 11, 1983, Kisilëv died after "a serious, long illness."[109] This time the coverage of the funeral in the republic newspaper was rather restrained, but Andropov's Politburo sent a relatively high-ranking representative, veteran secretary for party organization Ivan Kapitonov (his colleague Zimyanin, an ethnic Byelorussian, did not come; nor did Mazurov). Kapitonov's trip also served another purpose: in his presence the Central Committee of the Byelorussian party elected as Kiselëv's successor Nikolay Slyun'kov.[110] Slyun'kov is young (born in 1929); an agricultural engineer by profession, he was director of a Minsk tractor factory and held a number of party positions in Byelorussia before becoming a deputy chairman of the Gosplan in Moscow in 1974.[111]

Given this fluidity among Byelorussian leaders, their abrupt exclusion from the Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers, and the decline in the number of ethnic Byelorussian members in the CC CPSU from ten in 1976 to eight in 1981, the Byelorussian leadership is unlikely to play a strong role in all-Union politics even though, as representatives of the fourth largest nationality in the USSR, they really deserve to do so.[112]

Moldavians seem to have done better than the Byelorussians—thanks apparently to the patronage of Brezhnev and Chernenko, both of whom spent several years in that small republic. Because there is a question whether there is a Moldavian nationality at all or whether the republic's inhabitants are ethnically Romanian,[113] and because Moldavia has an important geographic location, the republic has not been subjected to very strong Russification pressures.

With regard to the Moldavian leadership, in December 1980, party first secretary Ivan Bodyul was transferred to Moscow to become a deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers.[114] He had been implementing in Moldavia, with variable success, the experiment with so-called interkolkhoz associations, an agro-industrial approach favored by both Brezhnev and Mikhail Gorbachëv.[115] Bodyul—because of his inexperience with industry—is hard to envisage as chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. In Moldavia, Bodyul has been replaced by young (born in 1934) Semën Grossu, former chairman of the Moldavian Council of Ministers and a trained agricul-

[102]"K. Masurov Dismissed from the CC of the CPSU," *Bielarus*, No. 287, March 1981, p. 2.

[103]He was released from the Politburo "because of his health and at his own request." *Pravda*, Nov. 28, and Dec. 1, 1978.

[104]TASS, Dec. 5, 1978.

[105]"Just a month before, while Masherov was away from Minsk, the KGB chairman in Byelorussia was replaced after 10 years in that post and other personnel shakeups followed." See Knight, loc. cit., p. 155 fn. See a most interesting letter to the editor by an anonymous Byelorussian émigré claiming that Masherov's accident with a military truck—the third involving a high-ranking Byelorussian politician in 10 years—was ill-disguised murder. Name withheld, "Minsk Puzzles," *Novoye russkoye slovo* (New York, NY), May 23, 1981, p. 8; also *Bielarus*, No. 290–91, June–July 1981.

[106]Shcherbytskyi sent his second secretary Sokolov; Grishin sent his deputy Borisov; Romanov sent Leningrad city first secretary Solovev. Only the CP's of LIthuania and of Latvia had the decency to send their top men (Petras Griškevičius and August Voss). Zimyanin, however, did come; and so did Mazurov—as a private citizen. *Sovetskaya Byelorussiya* (Minsk), Oct. 6, 1980.

[107]*Pravda*, Oct. 17, 1980.

[108]*Sovetskaya Byelorussiya*, Jan. 29, 1981.

[109]Ibid., Jan. 13, 1983.

[110]Ibid., Jan. 14, 1983.

[111]Ibid., Jan. 18, 1983, gives his official biography.

[112]To date (July 1983) the second secretary of the CC of the republic party has remained a Byelorussian, Vladimir Brovikov. This was an exception in the non-Russian republics until the election of Tytarenko in the Ukraine in October 1982.

[113]Stephen Fischer-Galati, "Moldavia and the Moldavians," in Zev Katz, Ed., *Handbook of Major Soviet Nationalities*, New York, NY, Free Press, 1975, p. 415. Then first secretary of the Moldavian CP Ivan Bodyul, in addressing the 1971 Moldavian congress and—less so—the 1976 congress, sharply commented on foreign attacks on the national identity of Moldavians, thereby admitting that it was a sensitive question there. See *Sovetskaya Moldaviya* (Kishinëv), Feb. 26, 1971, p. 4, and Jan. 30, 1976, p. 6.

[114]*Pravda*, Dec. 20, 1980, p. 2.

[115]For an early positive evaluation see Robert F. Miller, "The Future of the Soviet Kolkhoz," *Problems of Communism*, March–April 1976, pp. 34–50, esp. pp. 40 ff.; for a later critical view see Andreas Tenson, "How Successful Has the Moldavian Experiment Been?" *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 104/81, Mar. 6, 1981.

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tural specialist.[116]

It seems fairly obvious that the Ukrainian Communist party leadership under Shcherbytskyi—not to speak of the Byelorussian and Moldavian leaderships—had a minimal role in Andropov's accession to the CPSU general secretaryship. However, given the age and health of Andropov, his tenure is not likely to prove of long duration. Within five to ten years, a new general secretary will have to be found, and the drama of the struggle for succession will be played anew. Fluidity in leadership in the CP of Byelorussia and the small size of the CP of Moldavia, coupled with Chernenko's defeat, precluded both republics from a meaningful participation in the struggle for succession in 1982 and are likely to rule out a significant role for them in the next round. A development that should be watched, however, is the promotion of Aliyev of Azerbaydzhan. Will he be successful in his post, and will he then open the door for other Soviet Muslims? Khrushchev and initially Brezhnev had largely relied on the more or less voluntary cooperation of Slavic peoples. Will Andropov, by contrast, rely on an alliance between the numerically declining Russians and the rapidly increasing Soviet Muslims?

The role of the Ukrainian party leadership in the next succession is more problematic. Shelest had tried to defend what he conceived to be Ukrainian national interests—and was brusquely removed from power. Shcherbytskyi has been "ultraloyal" to Moscow for years, and what has this brought him? The humiliation in 1978 of having to share an award ceremony with Brezhnev's personal physician and exclusion from a major post in Moscow by both Brezhnev and Andropov. Perhaps it is just as well that Shcherbytskyi has been mending his relations with the Ukrainian cultural intelligentsia since 1979. If he will have to stay in Kiev permanently—now a distinct possibility—his remaining years there might at least be more pleasant.

What about the Ukraine as such? For years the development of Ukrainian mining and industry has been slowing down: partly as the result of diminishing natural resources and aging capital equipment, partly in consequence of a growing shortage of labor, and partly due to Brezhnev's decision to concentrate resources on developing Siberia and—to a far lesser extent—Central Asia. After decades, even centuries of assimilationist pressures, some Ukrainians—probably a small minority, but one which is concentrated in the cities—have developed a problem of national identity, as have some Byelorussians. These processes are being further complicated by a decision, apparently made after Andropov became secretary of the Central Committee in May 1982, to heat up again the concept of the "merger of nations," which had been so popular in the last years of Khrushchev but which Brezhnev had wisely put on the back burner.[117]

It would seem that to stem the threat of a long-term political, economic, and social decline of Ukraine, Ukrainian party leaders will have to pool political resources. The development of the Ukrainian republic—as well as the European part of the RSFSR, Byelorussia, Moldavia, and the Baltic states—is increasingly threatened by Moscow's investment of resources in Siberia and Central Asia, and in the military. Thus, it is in the interests of all the republic leaderships in the European part of the Soviet Union to advocate policies for the central government that would ease demands on local resources and, ideally, allow for more investment in their republics. In the meantime, politicians in the European USSR cannot afford to exacerbate their local situations by policies such as the "merging of nations," "abolition of republic boundaries," and the like. For all his ambitions of going to Moscow, Shcherbytskyi appears to be realizing this.

[116]Kraus, "S. K. Grossu Elected Party Chief in Moldavia," ibid., RL 492/80, Dec. 23, 1980.

[117]For documentary sources see: (1) Editorial, "We—The Soviet People," *Kommunist*, No. 12, August 1982, pp. 3–12; (2) Konstantin Chernenko, "60 Years of the Peoples' Fraternal Friendship," *Problemy Mira i Sotsializma* (Moscow), December 1982, pp. 6–14; (3) Yuriy V. Andropov, "Sixty Years of the USSR," *Pravda*, Dec. 22, 1982, pp. 1–3. Some analytical sources are: (1) Yaroslav Bilinsky, "The Concept of the Soviet People and Its Implications for Soviet Nationality Policy," *Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the US, Inc.*, Vol. IV, Nos. 37–38, 1978–80, pp. 87–133; (2) Roman Solchanyk, " 'Merging of Nations' Debated," *Soviet Analyst*, Nov. 10, 1982, pp. 5–6; (3) Ann Sheehy, "Andropov Speaks on Nationalities Policy," *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 510/82, Dec. 21, 1982; and (4) idem, "Andropov and the Merging of Nations," ibid., RL 516/82, Dec. 22, 1982.

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Polish Echoes in the Baltic

By V. Stanley Vardys

What impact did the revolutionary events since August 1980 in Poland have on that country's Baltic neighbors in the Soviet Union? Social science tools for measuring the flow of influence over national borders are imprecise at best, and in the present case the task is complicated by difficulties in obtaining empirical data. Lacking both survey data and "in-depth" reports or analyses, we are left to seek answers largely in a Kremlinological reading of Soviet sources, supplementing these with reports by Western journalists and travelers, samizdat publications of Soviet dissidents, and direct telephone communication with individuals in the Soviet Union (the last guaranteed by the Helsinki Agreement but practically cut off by the Soviets in 1982). These limitations regarding sources and access call for caution in arriving at judgments, and our conclusions must be general and tentative at best.

Yet the importance and usefulness of such an inquiry is beyond doubt. If Soviet boundaries—barbed wire, mine fields, border zones and all—can be pierced not only by Western rock music but also by ideas of ongoing social experimentation in Communist Eastern Europe, then such ideas might spread to the Soviet Union, or more precisely, to diverse Soviet national societies and groups, thus triggering or at least contributing to a Soviet search for domestic reforms or "inner self-renewal."[1] If such is not the case, then expectations of peaceful domestic Soviet evolution toward a more humane and politically tolerant society must dim, and the intractable nature of the conservative Soviet regime would tend to be reaffirmed. To be sure, in its current groping for new gimmicks to increase economic efficiency, the Kremlin has adapted to its use certain Eastern European ideas and practices.[2] However, so far none of these influences has altered either the structure or the exercise of power, changes without which meaningful domestic social or economic reform is not possible.

In attempting to assess what spillover effect the 1980–81 Polish reform movement has had in the Baltic republics of the USSR, this essay will examine three broad topics. The first is the availability to the Baltic peoples of information concerning events in Poland, and Baltic receptivity—or, if one prefers, vulnerability—to the ideas and élan of the Polish revolution. The second is the response of the Baltic societies to the upheaval across the border. The third is the reactions by Baltic Communist leaders.

Communication Environment

Geographically, the three Baltic republics—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—are better situated than are eastern Byelorussia, eastern Ukraine, or the Caucasus republics to receive uncensored information from Poland itself and from the West about Polish events. Estonians in Tallinn and adjacent coastal areas can tune in to Finnish TV (since Finnish and Estonian are related languages, the Estonians can understand Finnish telecasts and radio broadcasts). Moreover, in 1980–81, Tallinn had a direct-dial telephone line to Stockholm, installed for the Olympic

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[1] The possibility is discussed in Boris Meissner, "The Baltic Question in World Politics," in V. Stanley Vardys and Romuald J. Misiunas, Eds., *The Baltic States in Peace and War, 1917–45*, University Park, PA, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1978, p. 148.

[2] See, for example, Roman Szporluk, Ed., *The Influence of East Europe and the Soviet West on the USSR*, New York, NY, Praeger Publishers, 1976.

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games; this was disconnected sometime in November 1981.[3] Polish TV signals can be received in at least one-third of Lithuania, and hence the Lithuanians, especially during the days of virtually uncontrolled communications in Poland, could view the unfolding Polish events, beginning with Pope John Paul II's first visit and going through the discussions at the 9th Extraordinary Congress of the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR) in July 1981. Beyond Lithuania's sizable Polish minority, a good number of ethnic Lithuanians also speak or understand Polish. Latvians had somewhat less access to broadcasts concerning Polish events, but like the Lithuanians and Estonians they could listen to the Voice of America (although Soviet jamming was reintroduced in August 1980[4]) and to Radio Liberty in their native languages, or they could turn on the well-liked BBC in Russian. Polish newspapers and magazines, too, were available, popular, and easily understood not only in Vilnius, but also in Riga. Finally, the flow of Western tourists of Latvian, Estonian, or Lithuanian origins to their respective lands of ancestry remained largely undisturbed. Even some scholarly exchanges continued—providing still another avenue of communication.

A society's receptivity to outside events, ideas, suggestions, or simply political reality is influenced by a number of factors. Three seem particularly important in the context of the present discussion: (1) economic conditions; (2) the degree of political satisfaction or disaffection; and (3) traditional historical ties with the country which supplies information or where events are unfolding.

Poland's political crisis caught the Soviet Union, including the Baltic republics, at a moment of economic slowdown. Industrial production rates had slowed in the Baltic, and in addition, housing construction there in 1981 did not reach the level of 1980. Generally, a combination of bad harvests and bad management had caused a perceptible slump in meat and butter production and—somewhat differently in each republic—a decline in food processing activity.[5] In the period in question, workers in the Baltic—who have traditionally enjoyed some of the highest standards of living in the Soviet empire—were experiencing shortages of various goods, including (rather unusually) food. Large segments of the working population could empathize with the Poles' complaints about economic mismanagement by the Communists. Food shortages increased even more as the Polish crisis progressed: for example, there was frequently no butter in stores in Vilnius, or meat in Tallinn or Riga. Cynically, the Soviet regime attempted to blame local difficulties on the necessity of helping the "blasted Poles who do not want to work."[6]

In political terms, Estonia seemed the most troubled. Estonians perceived their national identity threatened with extinction by a relentless Russification, and they were in a mood to resist. The census of 1979 had revealed that the share of Russians in the population of Estonia had increased to 27.9 percent, and the share of Estonians had sunk to 64.7 percent. Although the danger of inundation by the Russians was even greater in Latvia—with 32.8 percent of the population Russian and only 56 percent Latvian in 1979—the mood of uneasiness was less intense.[7] At least outwardly the political climate was quietest in Lithuania, despite the tenacious and deeply entrenched religious, human-rights, and nationalist opposition which has over the years produced, according to one observer, "the greatest flow of samizdat material per head of population" of any republic in the Soviet Union.[8] The Russian minority still constituted less than 9 percent of the population (virtually unchanged since 1959). An intensive Russification of education, which began in 1975 and reached Lithuania's kindergartens in the 1980/81 school year—as it did in the other Baltic republics—was universally disapproved of, but feelings of helplessness (some might say, socialization into the system) plus—as in Latvia—the desire not to endanger current status or living standards, left things rather calm. This was in contrast to the early 1970's, when the republic was seething with discontent.[9]

Historically, the Baltic nations have an uneven record of political and cultural contact with Poland. In past centuries, Latvia and Estonia were dominated by the Baltic Germans, who kept close ties to their mother country, provided diplomatic, military and managerial talent for the Russian tsars, or served apprenticeships in the Baltic provinces before moving on to high positions in the German states. Polish influence, by and large, did not penetrate these areas, ex-

[3] *Dagens Nyheter* (Stockholm), Apr. 22, 1982, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-SOV*), Apr. 29, 1982, p. R/1.

[4] Noted in US Congress, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, *Implementation of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Findings and Recommendations Seven Years After Helsinski*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, November 1982, p. 14.

[5] *Liaudies ukis* (Vilnius), No. 3, 1982, pp. 26–27.

[6] This Soviet tack is noted in reports from the Baltic region in *Baltic News* (Sandy Bay, Tasmania, Australia), December 1981, p. 1.

[7] USSR Central Statistical Administration, *Naseleniye USSR* (The Population of the USSR), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo politicheskoy literatury, 1980, pp. 29-30.

[8] *Soviet Analyst* (London), Aug. 16, 1982, p. 5.

[9] See V. Stanley Vardys, *The Catholic Church, Dissent and Nationality in Soviet Lithuania*, Boulder, CO, and New York, NY, East European Quarterly and Columbia University Press, 1978, pp. 168–81.

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cept during a short period in the 16th and 17th centuries when Livonia (on the Gulf of Riga) belonged to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Polish cultural influence from this period has lingered only in a few Catholic-dominated areas of Latvia—primarily in Latgale (Eastern Latvia) but also in Kurzeme (Courland)—which in the 19th and 20th centuries were served by many Lithuanian Catholic priests. In all, only a little over one-quarter of the ethnic Latvian population of the republic is Catholic.

Estonia did not develop close relations with Poland until after World War I, when it had the friendliest ties of the three independent Baltic states with independent Poland. Symbolically, this was acknowledged by the Poles as well when their lone submarine *Orzel,* fleeing the German chasers after the Nazi attack on Poland in 1939, sought refuge not in the ports of geographically closer Latvia, but in Estonia.[10] Generally, however, the Poles and Estonians have remained only distant friends.

The Lithuanian case is altogether different. Lithuanian-Polish ties have been more intense, dating from the end of the 14th century, when the Lithuanian Grand Prince Jagiello (in Lithuanian, Jogaila) accepted the Polish crown and Latin Christianity. Like German language, customs, and way of life in Estonia and Latvia, Polish language and customs were gradually adopted by a Lithuanian nobility concerned with maintaining and improving their own status in the united kingdom. Polish civilization gradually penetrated the towns, the petty nobility, and to some degree even the peasantry, especially through Catholicism, which for years, even in modern times, was known in Russia as the "Polish" religion. Lithuanian letters were neglected since Polish was the dominant medium even in religious affairs. Indeed, it was the Lithuanian Protestants who started the cultivation of written Lithuanian in the 16th century and gave the country its first theological writers and later its first poet of international distinction. (Interestingly enough, these developments occurred in German-dominated East Prussia rather than in Polish-ruled Lithuania). Already in the second half of the same 16th century Lithuania's Catholic intellectuals found a critical decline in the use of Lithuanian by the nobility and the educated commoners. By the beginning of the 19th century various observers voiced opinions that the Lithuanian language would disappear altogether—to be replaced by Polish or Russian in the Russian Empire, or by German in East Prussia.[11]

Lithuania's annexation by Russia's Empress Catherine II during the final partition of Poland in 1795 brought the Russians on the scene as competitors for the assimilation of Lithuanians—in this case, into Orthodoxy and the Russian nation. Twice in the 19th century (in 1831 and 1863) not only Lithuania's nobility but also its peasantry sided with the Poles in bloody and costly insurrections against tsarist rule. However, in this competition between the Russians and the Poles for Lithuanian allegiance and assimilation, the movement of Lithuanian national awakening helped to restore Lithuanian national consciousness and historical identity. This triggered not only a political struggle against the tsars—since the Russians ran Lithuania's political life—but also a competition with the Poles over Lithuania's social and cultural institutions, which had fallen largely under Polish domination. The foremost institution over which this latter competition developed was the Catholic Church.

This acrimonious conflict reached a tragic climax in the struggle over the Vilnius territory in the years of early modern statehood, 1918–20. Polish seizure and annexation of the Lithuanian capital in October 1920 led to a complete break of relations between the two historical partners and to the erection of a "bush curtain" between Poland and Lithuania. Only birds could fly freely over the border, which the Lithuanians insisted on calling a mere demarcation line. Railroad tracks grew grass and moss. In social life, Polish influence in Lithuania was suppressed and gradually eliminated. A semblance of cultural exchange was initiated after the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1938—which Poland forced on Lithuania by an ultimatum—but until that time there existed no cultural or other interactions except confrontations in the League of Nations.

The Nazi attack on Poland on September 1, 1939, brought a sudden change: officially as well as informally, the Lithuanians gave comfortable (for those times) refuge to the defeated Polish military forces, which were interned in Lithuania but were allowed either to go home, if they were from the Vilnius region—a portion of which was allotted to the Lithuanians by the Kremlin—or to go on to Western Europe to continue the war against Germany. One who followed the latter course was Poland's diplomatic representative, Minister Franciszek Charwat, who just a year earlier at a private embassy party celebrating Poland's constitution day had expressed his heartfelt

[10]August Rei, *The Drama of the Baltic Peoples.* Stockholm, Kirjastus Vaba Eesti, 1970, p. 255.

[11]See Pranas Cepenas, *Naujųjų laikų Lietuvos istorija* (History of Lithuania in Modern Times), Vol. 1, (Resurgence of the Independence Movement), Chicago, Griniaus Fondas, 1976, pp. 20–21.

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wish that Lithuania become a Polish province.[12]

The shared fate of postwar occupation by Soviet forces smoothed over many ethnically inspired disagreements among ordinary citizens of Poland and Lithuania and sobered politicians and intellectuals on both sides as well. The somewhat greater freedom of Polish society, albeit under Communist rule, became the envy of many a Lithuanian, who specifically learned Polish, which his parents had not taught him, to be able to read the more open Polish books and papers. The Lithuanian Catholic Church aspired to the situation enjoyed by the Polish Church. Visits to Poland, even for shopping, became a coveted prize in the 1960's, and exchanges were welcome. In short order, Poland became again—as in the Middle Ages—a transmitter of current West European culture to Lithuania. Events in Poland became again of considerable interest and seemed to affect everyday existence.

Lithuanian receptivity to ideas from Poland is affected by several other factors. First, there are lingering misgivings about the Polish national character and aspirations. Second, a sizable Polish minority inhabits regions close to Lithuania's capital city of Vilnius. Finally, there is a small Lithuanian minority in Poland. Let us examine each of these briefly.

While Lithuanian attitudes toward the Polish people and their aspirations for a better and freer life are reported to be generally very positive, anxieties still exist regarding Polish acceptance of Lithuania's control of the Vilnius territory. This ambivalence shows through in Lithuanian dissident literature.[13] There is the suggestion that the Poles seek friendship with Lithuanians in the face of the common threat of Moscow but that if Moscow were out of the picture, Poland might seek to recover the previously disputed lands. (In a way, these fears are comparable to Polish fears that German acceptance of the loss of Pomerania and other territories is only feigned or temporary.) Lithuanians note that neither the Vatican nor the Polish Catholic Church has even formally recognized the current boundaries of Vilnius archdiocese in Lithuania and, moreover, that the Polish Church still maintains contacts in some territories of the archdiocese which the postwar boundaries left on the Soviet Lithuanian or Byelorussian side. There is also a distrust of the perceived Polish impetuousness, which might cause the Poles to create great political troubles for themselves that might suck in Lithuanians, provoking Moscow's revenge.

Lithuania's Polish minority, though shrinking, constitutes the second largest ethnic minority after the Russians in the republic—247,000, or 7.3 percent of the total population in 1979.[14] The republic government maintains an extensive network of Polish schools which are mostly very small and uneconomical to operate but which enable most Polish children who seek to do so to acquire a secondary education in their native language. The government also provides for the training of teachers for these schools and publishes books and periodicals in Polish. This policy—which contrasts with assimilationist policies toward Polish, Hungarian, or German minorities in other Soviet republics—has allowed the Poles in Lithuania to retain their national identity, or at least has slowed down assimilation. (On the other hand, these Poles do not possess influence commensurate with their numbers— their percentage representation in the local Communist party or in the government is considerably smaller than their share of the population.[15])

In our context, it is important to note that many of Lithuania's Poles have family ties in Poland, and have always maintained a very keen interest in Polish affairs. This qualifies them for a role in two-way, cross-cultural communication. If an opinion poll were conducted, it most likely would indicate a great sympathy in this minority for Poland's Solidarity. The Kremlin has been sensitive to such proclivities and since August 1980 has tried to court the favor of Lithuania's Poles by awards, recognition, and reminders of Soviet contributions to the minority's survival in Lithuania.

The Lithuanian minority in Poland is considerably smaller, estimated to be only some 10–30,000 strong.[16] Its bulk lives rather compactly in the Punsk-Sejny (Punskas-Seinai) area, near the Lithuanian bor-

[12]See Leon Mitkewicz, *Wspomnienia Kowienskie* (Reminiscenses About Kaunas), London, Veritas, n.d., p. 60.

[13]See *Aušra* (Lithuania, samizdat), No. 18, October 1979, pp. 18–24; and No. 22, May 1980, pp. 33–40.

[14]Recent Soviet censuses show the following trend in the Polish population of Lithuania:

	1959	1970	1979
Polish population	230,107	240,203	247,022
Share of total, in percent	8.5	7.7	7.3

SOURCES: USSR Central Statistical Administration, *Itogi vsesoyuznoy perepisi naseleniya 1970 goda* (Results of the 1970 All-Union Census), Moscow, Statistika, 1973, p. 14; idem, *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR 1922–1982* (The USSR National Economy, 1922–1982), Moscow, Finansy i statistika, 1982, p. 36.

[15]For example, in 1980 only 4.17 percent of Lithuanian Communist Party members were Polish, while the percentage of this ethnic group in the total population of the republic was 7.3 percent. See *Lietuviškoji tarybine enciklopedija* (Soviet Lithuanian Encyclopedia), Vol. 6, Vilnius, Mokslas, 1980, p. 545.

[16]The estimates refer to the indigenous Lithuanian population. Since the Polish government does not keep statistics on national minorities, the exact number of Lithuanians there cannot be arrived at. *Aušra* (Sejny-Bialystok), No. 1, 1982, p. 8.

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der, which is rich in yet unexploited natural resources. It, too, has either Lithuanian schools (including a secondary school) or Lithuanian-language instruction in the primary-school curriculum. A society for the furtherance of Lithuanian culture has been allowed to operate by Warsaw, with branches not only in the Punsk area but also in other areas where small pockets of Lithuanians live. Some cultural exchanges with Lithuania have been permitted, and Lithuanians from Poland have been able to pursue studies in Lithuania's institutions of higher education.

However, the Lithuanians in Poland are not likely to have helped transmit the Polish contagion across the border into Lithuania. For one thing, their contacts with Lithuania remained rather narrow and limited. Moreover, no Lithuanians are known to have been drawn into the whirl of Solidarity activity; on the contrary, some organized Lithuanian groups perceived themselves as experiencing unexpected difficulties. It is true that Solidarity's bulletins occasionally mentioned the fate of Lithuania and the other Baltic states, that an English-language pamphlet on Lithuania with a reprinted article by Czeslaw Milosz came out of alleged Solidarity sources, and that the second Polish TV channel on November 22, 1981, ran a frank and critical discussion of the minority question in Poland. In 1981, in addition, Lithuanian cultural activities in Poland increased in scope. Yet the Solidarity movement remained deeply ethnically Polish in orientation. The editors of the Lithuanian-language journal in Poland (*Aušra*) even claimed that Poland's Lithuanians stayed on the sidelines of the Polish revolution because of a conspicuous tendency of "some people" after August 1980 "to glorify Józef Pilsudski and his ideas." The journal stated that Poland's Lithuanians could not support a movement that raised "the flag of Polish nationalism and even chauvinism."[17] These explanations, however, need to be taken with a grain of salt because they were published in May of 1982, thus leaving it unclear how much the need to please General Wojciech Jaruzelski's censors had to do with their publication. It appears, however, that after August 1980, local branches of the Lithuanian cultural society experienced difficulties with the Warsaw government. Lithuanians, furthermore, continued to have problems with Catholic Church authorities in Sejny over their decades-old request for permission to hold a Lithuanian Sunday mass service in the city's cathedral. The cathedral and the adjacent theological seminary had an important historical significance in Lithuania's cultural and political life during the period of national awakening at the end of the 19th century. All of this, especially the sharpening conflict with the local church hierarchy which was identified with Solidarity, may have clouded the otherwise positive reaction to Polish events that Poland's Lithuanians might have transmitted to Lithuanians in the USSR.[18]

The Impact of Polish Events

Despite these qualifications, it can be stated that the Polish drama of 1980 attracted eager attention in all three Baltic republics. In Riga, Polish newspapers sold out instantly. In September 1980 a group of 20 dissidents representing all three Baltic national groups sent a greeting to Solidarity leader Lech Walęsa.[19] In Lithuania and Estonia, dissident publications carried unadulterated, matter-of-fact news about the Polish workers' revolution. A new underground publication in Lithuania commented that "the right won by the Poles to maintain free labor unions" had breached the system of totalitarian dictatorship and might have "serious consequences not only for Poland, but also for the other socialist countries."[20] A year later, 36 human-rights activists (35 Lithuanian and 1 Latvian) sent Walęsa another greeting on Solidarity's first anniversary, declaring that "this historical movement of Poland's working people . . . is significant for the Baltic nations as well."[21] While visiting Lithuania in the summer of 1981, S. Zawodzinski, First Secretary of the PZPR's provincial committee in Bialystok, was plied with questions about the Polish situation,[22] and a Western correspondent confirmed the impression that the Lithuanians were "fascinated by Poland's heretical path."[23] In 1981 the Estonian dissident periodical *Lisandusi mõtete ja uudiste vabale levikule Eestis* (Some Additions to the Free Flow of Ideas and News in Estonia) published the full text of the Gdansk agreement concluded between the Polish authorities and the Interfactory Strike Committee on August 31, 1980.[24] (There are no known Lithuanian or Latvian translations of this document.)

It was indeed in Estonia—the Baltic republic most

[17] Editorial in ibid.

[18] From private communications to the author.

[19] *The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston, MA), Sept. 22, 1980.

[20] *Tautos kelias* (Lithuania, samizdat), No. 2, November 1980, pp. 55–56.

[21] *Aušra* (Lithuania, samizdat), No. 29 (69), p. 3.

[22] See his interview in *Tiesa* (Vilnius), Sept. 17, 1981, p. 3. Zawodzinski stressed shortages of food and industrial goods and charged that "extremist elements of Solidarity" were "further sharpening the political situation." As noted above, this line served Soviet purposes by providing a convenient scapegoat for growing food shortages in Lithuania.

[23] *Newsweek* (New York, NY), Aug. 3, 1981, p. 48.

[24] Jaan Pennar, "Tenth and Eleventh Issues of Estonian Samizdat Periodical," *Radio Liberty Research* (Munich), RL 74/82, Feb. 16, 1982, p. 4.

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distant from Poland—that the Polish drama seems to have left the deepest imprint. This impact can be seen in work stoppages, a youth rebellion, and a particularly bold assertion by Estonian intellectuals of Estonian national identity in the face of Russian encroachment.

In October 1980—less than two months after the Gdansk strikes—1,000 workers at a machine tractor factory in Tartu went on strike.[25] Tartu is also a university town, and youth rebellions there have been registered in the past, especially since the rebirth of the Estonian opposition movement in the late 1970's. But now youth seemed to be on the offensive elsewhere in Estonia. Already on September 22, the police of the capital city of Tallinn had incurred the wrath of young Estonians by obstructing the concert of a popular music group, "The Propeller." This anger exploded in massive demonstrations that began on October 1 and continued through October 8. From the capital city, the upheaval spread to the port city of Pärnu and other towns. In Tallinn alone, more than 2,000 (some say 5,000) high school–age youth marched, complaining about poor meals, blighted facilities, and lack of heating at their schools. Unlike the striking workers of Tartu, however, they also carried old Estonian flags, demanded "freedom for Estonia," and exhorted the Russians to "go home." On October 11 the republic's minister of internal affairs went on TV to warn against further disturbances. Parent meetings were called at schools to demand that parents discipline their children.[26] On October 14, the Russian-language *Sovetskaya Estoniya* (published in Tallinn) informed its readers that the republic procurator's office had initiated criminal proceedings "against the firebrands and instigators who had caused these disturbances, and against malicious hooligans." Hundreds were reportedly arrested, although only the leaders were kept for trial. Others were punished by suspension from school or by other disciplinary measures, as had been the case with the Lithuanian youths demonstrating during the mini-rebellion in Kaunas in May of 1972.[27] The Estonian youth rebellion was apparently considered serious enough for KGB chief Yuriy Andropov to pay an immediate, if quiet, visit to Tallinn.[28]

However, the Estonian story did not end there. In an unprecedented action, some 40 Estonian writers, artists, and actors—many of them members of the artistic or scholarly establishment—submitted to the principal Communist dailies in Tallinn and Moscow "An Open Letter from the Estonian SSR," in which they tactfully but directly suggested that youth revolutions would continue until the Estonian nation, language, and culture were assured a future. They indicted Soviet nationality policy for the troubles, warning that unless the situation were corrected, relations between Russian and Estonian communities would worsen, with possible "dire consequences to Estonia and to all who live here." The list of sore points included the rapid decline in the percentage of Estonians in the population, severe limitations on the use of the Estonian language, an "immoderate" development of industry, an inordinate pushing of use of the Russian language, and refusal to promote bilingualism among the Russians while forcing it on Estonians. Although the letter was, of course, never published by either *Pravda* in Moscow or *Rahva Hääl* in Estonia, it became widely known in educated circles. Some of the signers were questioned by the authorities, but no arrests followed. This was as unusual as the remarkable document itself.[29]

Estonian activism, however, did not end with the appearance of the letter of the artists and intellectuals. At the end of 1981, just before the imposition of martial law in Poland, a group calling itself the Democratic Front of the Soviet Union reportedly distributed leaflets in Estonia and the other Baltic republics calling for workers' strikes to demand a change in a number of Soviet policies.[30] According to a subsequent account by Karl Vaino, First Secretary of the Communist Party of Estonia, letters circulated in Tallinn stated:

If you are for justice and democracy, participate in a "quiet half hour" strike, starting on December 1. And do the same on the first day of each subsequent month.[31]

The demands were both political and economic: the recall of Soviet armies from Afghanistan, an end to interference in Poland's internal affairs, stoppage of exports of food from the Baltic republics at a time of shortages there, an end to "discriminatory forms of

[25] *Le Monde* (Paris), Oct. 25, 1980.

[26] See *The Economist* (London), Oct. 11, 1981, p. 51; and *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 384/80, Oct. 17, 1980.

[27] See Vardys, op. cit., pp. 173–81.

[28] Andropov's visit was reported by Peter Reddaway in "Recent Ferment in Estonia," in *A Chronicle of Human Rights in the USSR* (New York, NY), October–December 1980, pp. 35–42. Reddaway states that Andropov fired the chief of Estonia's KGB on the spot. However, it appears that Major General August Porte, chairman of the Estonian State Security Committee since 1961, was pensioned off with honors on June 15, 1982, at the age of 65. See *FBIS–SOV*, July 22, 1982, p. R/3.

[29] For text and comment see V. Stanley Vardys, "Human Rights Issues in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania," *Journal of Baltic Studies* (Mahwah, NJ), Fall 1981, pp. 283–84, 292–96.

[30] On this episode, see *The Christian Science Monitor*, Jan. 28, 1982; and *Le Figaro* (Paris), Dec. 2, 1981.

[31] K. Vaino, "With an Accurate Understanding of the Situation," *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 4, March 1983, p. 52.

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Heads of the Communist parties in the three Baltic republics in the Soviet Union: from left to right, Karl Vaino, First Secretary of the Estonian CP; August Voss, First Secretary of the Latvian CP; and Petras Griškevičius, First Secretary of the Lithuanian CP.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

trade," release of political prisoners, and abolition of punishment by exile. In Estonia, this appeal led to scattered partial strikes on December 1, 1981, and January 4, 1982. In Tallinn alone, these strikes were said to have resulted in the detention of at least 150 people.

However, workers and youth in both Lithuania and Latvia failed to join the Estonians in the events of October 1980 and December 1981. The voluminous and usually well-informed Lithuanian dissident press, it must be said, has so far mentioned neither the allegedly distributed leaflets nor any strikes on Lithuanian territory. Why so little activity? Perhaps it is because the Lithuanians had already made a major attempt to assert their rights in 1972, and because—after the purge of Latvian national Communists in the late 1950's—Latvian opposition had only begun to surface in the mid-1970's and was not yet ready to go to the barricades.

Party Leaderships on the Defensive

Nevertheless, the official Soviet press made it very clear that in all three Baltic republics Communist authorities were very much concerned with the effect that the Polish crisis might have on local populations and with the pressures it could generate on them to resolve various local economic and social problems. Concern seemed greatest in Lithuania; indeed, Lithuanian party First Secretary Petras Griškevičius openly mentioned the Polish developments in his speech to the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in early 1981.[32] As the Soviets saw things, the Polish turmoil was inspired and sustained by "that nefarious Polish Pope,"[33] i.e., John Paul II, and by the Catholic Church that he leads. The convergence of nationalism and religion that threatened to overthrow Poland's socialist system seemed most likely to be replicated in Lithuania, where a widespread and strong movement sought such rights as recognition of the Catholic Church (and other denominations) as legal entities, church access to the communications media, and an easing of antireligious legislation. In all three republics, party and security officials claimed to perceive an additional threat from Baltic émigrés in the West and from Western intelligence services.[34]

The response of Communist authorities took a variety of shapes: They (1) attempted to insulate people in the Baltic republics from the Polish contagion; (2) attacked dissident groups and their alleged Western supporters; and (3) tried to redress at least some of the grievances fueling dissident activity. By and large the emphasis has been on "prevention"—an ap-

[32] See Griškevičius's Feb. 24 address, reported in *Pravda*, Feb. 26, 1981, and trans. in *FBIS–SOV*, Mar. 4, 1981, Supplement, "Proceedings of the 26th CPSU Congress: Volume VII," p. 34. He was the only republic party chief to mention Poland at this gathering.

[33] Quote from an official speech, reported by the *Chronicle of the Catholic Church of Lithuania* (Lithuania, samizdat), No. 52, 1982, p. 25.

[34] See e.g., Vaino, loc. cit.

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Leading Lithuanian dissidents arrested during 1980–81: from left to right, Vytautas Skuodis-Scott, a professor at Vilnius University involved in publishing Perspektyvos *and* Alma mater, *and three members of the Lithuanian Helsinki Monitor Group, Vytautas Vaičiūnas, Mečislovas Jurevičius, and Rev. Bronius Laurinavičius.*

—Lithuanian Information Center.

proach that has characterized Soviet internal security policy at least since Andropov became chief of the KGB in 1967—although repression and punishment have also been used where deemed necessary.

Insulating the populace. The first Soviet step was to restrict the flow of information from the West and from Poland. Already in August 1980, as noted above, the Kremlin resumed jamming of the Voice of America. By October, only party-line news publications from Poland could be found at Soviet newsstands. Travel to Poland was severely restricted, causing much unhappiness among intellectuals and artists, especially Lithuanian Poles with family ties in Poland. In addition, the Baltic peoples were warned very loudly to beware of contacts with émigrés. Although tourism was not curtailed, and Balts continued to be allowed to visit relatives in the West, discussions of current affairs became much more inhibited, both in the West and in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and tourists began experiencing more difficulties on their visits. (Scientific exchanges, it might be noted, were not affected.)

Attacks on the dissident groups and their supporters. After thus circumscribing communications, the authorities sought to contain the activities of various groups in the Baltic republics considered capable of instigating difficulties of the nature experienced by the Polish government. The KGB intensified supervision and quickened the pace of arrests.[35] In September 1980, two Lithuanian sponsors of the "Baltic Charter," signed in 1979, were sentenced by a court in Vilnius, and three collaborators on the *Chronicle of the Catholic Church of Lithuania* were arrested.[36] In December, Professor Vytautas Skuodis-Scott of the University of Vilnius and two other intellectuals were sentenced for publishing two dissident journals, *Perspektyvos* and *Alma mater.* Further sentences were meted out to two supporters of the Catholic *Chronicle.* Arrests continued in 1981, the victims now not only supporters of the *Chronicle* but also the remaining members of the Lithuanian Group for Monitoring Compliance with the Helsinki Agreement: Vytautas Vaičiūnas, Mečislovas Jurevičius, and Father Bronius Laurinavičius, a Catholic priest. This priest perished in November 1981 in a truck accident, which dissidents were convinced had been arranged by the KGB.[37] For all practical purposes, the Lithuanian Helsinki group was destroyed.

The only other publicly identified and still functioning civil rights group in Lithuania remained the Catholic Committee for the Defense of the Rights of Believers. During the period of the Polish crisis some of its members were warned by the procurator's office and denounced in the press, but otherwise left free. However, with Andropov's ascent to power in November 1982, the situation grew worse. In January 1983 the Soviet news agency TASS announced initiation of "criminal proceedings" against the Committee's lead-

[35]For information on arrests of Baltic dissidents, see reports in *The Christian Science Monitor, The Economist, Soviet Analyst, Khronika tekushchikh sobytii* (Moscow), and the Estonian and Lithuanian samizdat press.

[36]The "Baltic Charter," signed by 37 Lithuanians, 4 Estonians, and 4 Latvians, demanded the reversal of the consequences of the Hitler-Stalin nonaggression pact of 1939, which created conditions for the occupation of the Baltic states by the Soviet Union. For a text, see *Congressional Record* (Washington, DC), Sept. 28, 1979, pp. S13722–23; also in Vardys, "Human Rights Issues in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania."

[37]*Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Lithuania,* No. 50, 1981, p. 5.

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ing member, the Rev. Alfonsas Svarinskas, for allegedly using his sermons to "systematically" instigate his listeners to wage "an open struggle against Soviet power."[38]

During the period of Solidarity's ascendancy in Poland, Soviet security forces were active in Estonia and Latvia as well. On September 20, 1980, in Pärnu the KGB arrested a leading Estonian dissident, Veljo Kalep, charging him with various crimes of thought, including an attempt to set up a Social Democratic party in the underground. He was sentenced to four years in prison on March 18, 1981.[39] In January 1981 a Tallinn court sentenced to a 15-year term ornithologist and translator Mart Niklus, who for years had maintained close relations with Lithuanian dissidents and who probably had been one of the main sponsors of the Baltic Charter.[40] At the same time, authorities imprisoned the already-dismissed professor of Tartu University Jüri Kukk, a former Communist who had revolted against the establishment. Kukk did not survive two months of his two-year sentence at a Vologda labor camp.[41] Estonian authorities also moved swiftly to deal with the organizers of the December 1, 1981, strike; in April 1982 a Tallinn court sentenced Dr. Endel Rose to a year in a labor camp for having distributed leaflets promoting the stoppage.[42]

Perhaps the highest pitch of public hysteria was reached in Latvia, where in a court trial lasting from May 25 to June 5, 1981, two Latvians, Juris Būmeisters and Dainis Lismanis, received severe sentences (15 and 10 years) as "traitors to the homeland." Although charged with espionage for foreign powers, their main crime appears to have been communication with Bruno Kalninš's Latvian Social Democratic group in Sweden (the Foreign Committee of the Latvian Social Democratic Workers' Party). Soviet Latvian media referred to Sweden as a major international espionage center, and authorities alleged that a US Central Intelligence Agency agent of Latvian nationality in Sweden was involved in the affair.[43] This was not the first time that Latvian sympathizers of expatriate Social Democratic groups had been sentenced, but the Būmeisters-Lismanis case was given unusually wide publicity.

[38] *The Washington Post*, Jan. 27, 1983. According to this account, TASS had claimed that Svarinskas had been officially warned by the republic's general procurator but had "continued fomenting animosity and strife among believers, issuing and spreading slanderous, illegal anti-state publications, in pursuing the aim of changing the established state and social system."

[39] *FBIS–SOV*, Mar. 19, 1981, p. R/9.

[40] *The Economist*, Feb. 21, 1981, p. 41.

[41] *The New York Times*, Mar. 29, 1981, p. 5.

[42] *Dagens Nyheter*, Apr. 22, 1982, trans. in *FBIS–SOV*, Apr. 29, 1982, p. R/1.

[43] See, e.g., Radio Riga, June 14, 1981, trans. in *FBIS–SOV*, June 17, 1981, pp. R/2–3.

Two leading Estonian dissidents: at left, Veljo Kalep, arrested in September 1980 and sentenced in March 1981 to four years in prison for allegedly trying to set up an underground Social Democratic party in Estonia; at right, Mart Niklus, reputedly one of the principal sponsors of the Baltic Charter of 1979, who was sentenced to 15 years in January 1981.

—Estonian American National Council.

Indeed, after August 1980 there appeared to be an open hunting season in all three Baltic republics aimed at exposing "ideological subversion" by emigrants. This went so far that *Kodumaa*, an Estonian publication aimed mainly at the Estonians in the West, accused Ants Kippar and Alex Milits, Estonian journalists in Sweden, of having been the real criminals responsible for the death of Jüri Kukk. Kippar allegedly had been conveying news from Estonia to Western journalists. *Kodumaa* claimed that other arrested or sentenced Estonian dissidents—Mart Niklus, Veljo Kalep, Viktor Niitsoo, Tiit Madisson—had been "duped" by their two compatriots in Sweden.[44] At the 26th CPSU Congress in early 1981, Estonian party chief Karl Vaino made an unusual attack on various foreign centers of alleged anti-Soviet propaganda, including "the émigré rabble." (Estonian Communist leaders have generally refrained from criticizing the émigré community from such forums.) Vaino assured the Congress, moreover, that Estonia had implemented "a whole range of measures to impart greater militancy and combativeness to our propaganda and mass agitation work. . . ."[45]

The Lithuanian Communist Party at its 8th Conference (held on January 29–30, 1981) adopted a resolution demanding suppression of "any expressions of

[44] *Dagens Nyheter*, June 8, 1981, trans in *FBIS–SOV*, June 8, 1981, p. R/15.

[45] *FBIS–SOV*, Mar. 2, 1981, Supplement, "Proceedings of the 26th CPSU Congress, Vol. V," p. 57.

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Juris Būmeisters, a Latvian dissident sentenced by a Riga court to 15 years in prison in 1981 for alleged espionage. Press accounts suggest his "crime" was to maintain contacts with Latvian Social Democratic groups in Sweden.

—Briviba (Stockholm, No. 5, May 1981.

nationalism, chauvinism, and zionism." The resolution continued:

It is important that through educational work it would be learned that national consciousness and pride must organically harmonize with the all-national Soviet pride and that socialist internationalism must harmonize with Soviet patriotism.[46]

The resolution further looked to atheist education to help in the struggle against "religious extremism." This preoccupation has persisted. A year later, at the 5th plenum of the Lithuanian party's Central Committee, First Secretary Griškevičius insisted that "religious extremists" be isolated from ordinary Catholics and that greater efforts be undertaken "to show how disgusting and hopeless are the attacks by those extremist clerics who attempt to use religion for reactionary political purposes, namely, to undercut the friendship of Soviet nations and to revive bourgeois and nationalist sentiments."[47] And Lithuania's chief "scholar of atheism," Jonas Aničas, formerly a division chief in the Lithuanian party Central Committee Secretariat and now president of the Pedagogical Institute in Vilnius, has mobilized the republic's philosophical establishment to denounce the idea that there is a historically grounded symbiotic relationship between Lithuanian nationality and the Catholic faith.[48] At the 23rd Conference of the Latvian Communist Party in early 1981, First Secretary August Voss presented Latvia's problem in a somewhat similar way. He called on the party both to "reject firmly any attempt by bourgeois nationalism to penetrate society" and to intensify atheist education.[49] This indicated a concern with growing religiosity and its political potential in Latvia, where the larger denomination is the Lutheran Church and where the much smaller Catholic Church has so far been rather quiet and docile.

Redressing grievances. To paint a more complete picture, it must be added that Soviet authorities also have attempted to deal with some of the grievances raised publicly by religious and nationalist dissidents. Thus, in Estonia, the official reaction to youth disturbances and to the intellectuals' list of complaints not only was relatively mild but also included new policies designed to deal with at least one articulated complaint, namely, the disregard for the Estonian language by Russian immigrants. *Molodëzh Estonii,* apparently with Moscow's approval, openly called for more instruction in Estonian at Russian-language schools.[50] More than a year later, after martial law had been imposed in Poland, Latvian CP First Secretary Voss picked up the issue in Riga, at an all-Union conference on issues of patriotic and international education. He called for equality and "greater consideration" for the languages of various nations in Latvia.[51] It is important, he said, for Russians and other non-Latvian nationalities to learn the language of the republic of their residence in its schools. (The issue of language equality has been particularly acute for more than two decades in Latvia, where it has been the practice to have Russian and Latvian schools under the same roof.) Echoes of this discussion have also reverberated in Lithuania. For example, it was brought up in September 1982 by republic party Second Secretary Lionginas Šepetys, who reported on the Riga

[46] *Tiesa*, Feb. 11, 1981, p. 3.
[47] Ibid., Apr. 18, 1982, p. 2.
[48] *Švyturys* (Vilnius), No. 11, June 1982, pp. 14–15.
[49] *Sovetskaya Latviya* (Riga), Jan. 30, 1981, pp. 2–3.
[50] See "Why Shouldn't Russians Learn the Vernacular?" *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 18/82, Jan. 14, 1982; "Estonian-Language Olympiad Instituted for Pupils of Russian Schools in Estonia," ibid., RL 66/82, Feb. 10, 1982; and "Problems of Teaching Estonian in Tallinn's Russian-Language Schools," ibid, RL 135/82, Mar. 23, 1982.
[51] *Sovetskaya Latviya*, June 29, 1982, reported in "Latvian Party Leader Discusses Language Policy," *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 297/82, July 23, 1982.

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Lithuanian bishops (from left to right) Antanas Vaičius, Liudas Povilonis, Vincentas Sladkevičius, and Julijonas Steponavičius in Kaišiadorys Cathedral on August 8, 1982, several weeks after Sladkevičius's reinstatement as apostolic administrator of the diocese of Kaišiadorys, from which the Soviets had banished him a quarter of a century earlier.

—Lithuanian Information Center.

conference to a meeting of propaganda activists. He stressed the need for Russians and others to learn the republic's language especially if they are still attending school.[52] It does not seem, however, that this wish for a new, more evenhanded policy will be sustained under Andropov.

In religious matters, too, the authorities have used the carrot as well as the stick. After a long and vigorous lobbying by Soviet Lithuanian and Latvian clerics, in the summer of 1982 Pope John Paul II finally appointed two new Lithuanian bishops, Vincentas Sladkevičius and Antanas Vaičius, and one new Latvian bishop, Jūlijāns Zondaks.[53] What was important here, however, was not so much the fact of the appointments per se as Soviet acquiesence in the Papal rejection of two Lithuanian prelates who were regarded as "Soviet candidates" and hence were vigorously opposed by the clergy and their organ, the underground *Chronicle of the Catholic Church of Lithuania*.[54] The Vatican apparently agreed with the dissident priests, and the Soviets conceded, without obstructing the appointment of the two other prelates. It was also remarkable that one of those appointed, Bishop Sladkevičius, had been banished from his diocese for a quarter of a century, but now was allowed to return officially to his administrative duties.

Half a year later the Soviets accepted still another unusual Papal appointment, namely the elevation of Riga's Bishop Jūlijāns Vaivods to cardinal, thus giving Latvia and the Soviet Union their first cardinal in history.[55] However, Vaivods's investiture in the College of Cardinals on February 3, 1983, brought extreme disappointment to Lithuania's Catholic dissidents. The *Chronicle of the Catholic Church of Lithuania* pronounced the appointment "shocking" since it was interpreted as Papal acceptance of the Latvian church's passive and accommodating policies and thus rejection of the principled and persistent Lithuanian militancy for religious rights, which had required many sacrifices.[56] Furthermore, the Lithuanians became newly concerned with the fate of the internally exiled Bishop Julijonas Steponavičius, whom the Soviets had

[52] *Tiesa*, Sept. 23, 1982, p. 2.
[53] *L'Osservatore Romano* (The Vatican), July 16, 1982.
[54] *Chronicle of the Catholic Church of Lithuania*, No. 52, 1982, pp. 1–3.
[55] "Cardinal Jūlijāns Vaivods and the Catholic Church in Latvia," *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 72/83, Feb. 8, 1983.
[56] *Chronicle of the Catholic Church of Lithuania*, No. 56, Feb. 14, 1983, pp. 1–3.

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removed from office in 1961. Since 1978, Steponavičius has been prominently mentioned as cardinal *in pectore,* that is, a secret cardinal known only to Pope John Paul, who was alleged to have appointed him.[57] In view of Bishop Vaivods's elevation, new doubts arose whether Steponavičius was ever chosen by the Pope. These doubts dealt another blow to Lithuania's Catholic protest movement.

In regulating Lithuanian church affairs thus, the Pope found himself dealing not only with the Kremlin but also with the Lithuanian church undergound. The Lithuanians felt hurt by the overall moves of Papal policy toward Soviet Catholics. They were nevertheless placated by the Vatican's removal of Bishop Romualdas Krikščiūnas of Panevežys diocese, who was accused of too close a collaboration with Soviet authorities, including the KGB.[58]

The Soviets did not visibly object to Krikščiūnas's dismissal, which occurred in April 1983 during an unprecedented *ad limina* visit to Rome by Lithuania's bishops (except for Bishop Steponavičius). This was the first such visit since World War II and was viewed in Rome as signifying "a notable advance in the relationship between the Vatican and Moscow."[59] Occurring just two months before the Pope's planned second visit to Poland, it most likely was related to the Pope's Ostpolitik. Indeed, Bishop Liudas Povilonis of Kaunas, speaking for the Lithuanian delegation, invited the Pope to visit Lithuania.[60] After the Pope's return from Poland at the end of June, the Western press reported that "well-placed Roman Catholic Church sources in Poland" confirmed the Vatican's "preliminary" contacts with the Kremlin on the question of the Pope's journey to Lithuania next year to celebrate the 500th anniversary of the death of Saint Casimir (patron saint of Lithuania) and other dates related to Lithuania's Christianization and union with Poland 600 years ago.[61]

However, while entering into conspicuously better understanding with the Pope, the Kremlin made it very clear that it would not tolerate the Lithuanian Catholic dissident struggle for religious rights. On May 6, 1983, TASS announced that Rev. Alfonsas Svarinskas, a leading member of the Catholic Community for the Defense of the Rights of Believers and organizer of written and oral protests and petitions, was meted a severe 10-year sentence of prison and exile.[62] In Lithuania it was also announced that Svarinskas's associate, Rev. Sigitas Tamkevičius, had been arrested.[63] Thus the Soviets are sending loud signals to the Vatican that as a price of improved relations with Moscow the Pope will have to accept the eventual destruction of Lithuania's Catholic underground. The Kremlin is evidently intent on preventing the Lithuanian church from growing in importance to the threatening proportions of the Roman church in Poland.

Rev. Alfonsas Svarinskas, a leading figure in the Catholic Committee for the Defense of the Rights of Believers, arrested by Lithuanian authorities in January 1983.

—Lithuanian Information Center.

During this period, Baltic authorities showed a greater concern for at least three other social problems than they might have, were it not for their disruptive potential in light of Poland's crisis. These were lagging worker productivity and the poor functioning of Soviet labor unions; the restlessness of youth; and

[57] Craig R. Whitney, "In Lithuania, Too, Catholics Look Hopefully to New Pope," *The New York Times*, July 26, 1979.

[58] *Newsweek*, June 27, 1983, p. 19.

[59] *The New York Times*, Apr. 7, 1983.

[60] *Darbininkas* (New York, NY), May 20, 1983, p. 1.

[61] Dan Fisher, "Lithuania Visit Hinted for Pope," *Chicago Sun Times*, July 5, 1983.

[62] "The Trial of Reverend Alfonsas Svarinskas," *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 186/83, May 9, 1983.

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the question of the loyalty of Lithuania's Polish minority.

The first official Baltic reactions to Polish events in the area of labor relations came in Lithuania. In contrast to the Latvian party's Central Committee plenum of July 31, 1980, which had discussed the "further strengthening of labor discipline" and the reduction of "cadre turnover in the national economy,"[64] the Lithuanian party plenum of August 26, 1980, was almost wholly dedicated to the problem of political integration of the workers into the power structure and to responding to worker needs and complaints. First Secretary Griškevičius concentrated his speech on how "to strengthen the worker nucleus in the party's ranks." He noted that over half of new members admitted in the period 1975–79 were workers, but added that more attention had to be paid to the quality and loyalty of the new recruits. Possibly referring to the unfolding Polish drama, Griškevičius further urged party organizations "to offer a timely rebuff to hostile ideological subversion and bourgeois propaganda. Rumors and idle talk of various kinds cannot be tolerated." Party second secretary Nikolay Dybenko warned that there exist many instances of "an indifferent, inconsiderate—in short, formal and bureaucratic—approach toward working people's signals, vital interests, proposals, and criticisms." He cited many cases of illegal dismissal from work and failure of labor unions to protect the workers, and he demanded that "leaders must be penalized much more severely for a disdainful attitude toward working people's opinion" as expressed in letters and other forums.[65] In the autumn of 1980 all Baltic newspapers featured stories of workers abused by managements of factories or other state enterprises, always adding that some labor unions have insufficiently cared about such cases, but that government institutions protected the workers. In an unusually frank article, Lithuania's public procurator Alfonsas Kairelis, for example, revealed that in 1980, as a result of protests by his office, 58 workers dismissed from work in violation of labor laws had been returned to employment. During the previous five years, he said, 383 officials had been reprimanded for such violations, 333 illegal decisions by local soviets and commissions had been overturned, and criminal prosecution had even been initiated in some cases of administrative violations.[66]

Early in 1981, party conferences in all three republics stressed the need to strengthen the labor unions, improve harmonious relations at the workplace, and observe labor discipline. Such reminders are routine in the Soviet Union, but they seemed to gain in urgency against the background of the Polish turmoil. Did the new emphasis help? The sporadic Estonian strikes at the end of 1981 cast doubt on the success of this campaign.

Expressions of concern with violations of labor laws by employers slackened after the introduction of martial law in Poland in December 1981. Already in early 1982 Lithuanian party chief Griškevičius was chiding the workers for increases in absenteeism, job turnover, and poor work. The stress was now on youth: "I would like to ask," he said, "whether the educational work under such conditions is effective, whether the young workers will become good masters of their own factories when they now see such disorder at the working place. We should not appease the lazy idlers, shirkers, slipshod workers." The party leader spoke of juvenile crime, even among Komsomol members, and called for understanding of the need for rapprochement and flourishing among Soviet nations, appreciation of the Leninist nationalities policy, and specifically, strengthening of "military-patriotic" education and training. Finally, he warned against all manifestations of nationalism, chauvinism, national isolationism, and national conceit, and against acts of civil irresponsibility which imperialism wants to inspire "as a diversion against our homeland."[67] Similar complaints about the behavior of young workers were registered in Latvia.[68] And in Estonia, a penitent Tallinn City Party Secretary Nicholas Juhanson devoted his entire speech at the republic's 1981 party conference to the "tasks of Communist education of youth."[69]

Finally, in Lithuania's case, the Kremlin showed concern with the Polish minority. This was demonstrated by sudden recognition and awards: for example, Leonid Brezhnev conferred the Order of the Red Flag on a Vilnius factory whose manager and representative workers—honored at public ceremonies—all had Polish names.[70] In addition, the Polish-languge daily *Czerwony Sztandar* (published in Vilnius) during this period reminded its readers how much the Soviet government, in the newspaper's view, had done to further and support Polish education in Lithuania. (The

[63] *Tiesa*, May 7, 1983, p. 2.
[64] *Sovetskaya Latviya*, Aug. 1, 1980, in *FBIS–SOV*, Aug. 8, 1980, p. S/5.
[65] *Sovetskaya Litva* (Vilnius), Aug. 27, 1980, trans. in abbreviated form in *FBIS–SOV*, Sept. 5, 1980, pp. R/3–6.
[66] *Tiesa*, July 25, 1981, p. 2.
[67] Ibid., Mar. 27, 1982, p. 1.
[68] See I. Anderson, "Urgent Tasks of Ideological Work in the Current Stage," *Kommunist Sovetskoy Latvii* (Riga), No. 9, 1981, pp. 18–28.
[69] *Sovetskaya Estoniya* (Tallinn), Jan. 30, 1981, p. 3.
[70] *Tiesa*, Mar. 14, 1981, p. 1, and Mar. 18, 1981, p. 1.

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Lithuanian-language press published news about the factory honors, but was completely silent on the government's support for Polish education.)

Some Conclusions

Despite the currency and sensitivity of our topic and the possibility that new evidence may still be discovered, one can venture some preliminary judgments. Generally, it can be said that the echoes of Polish events did reverberate through the Baltic region and that these reverberations can be documented. There is also strong evidence of concern among Baltic Communist leaders regarding possible spillover effects. Analysis of official texts and events shows rather clearly that the leaderships considered it necessary to adopt preventive measures and also to placate or appease certain social groups in order to contain the potentially very contagious spirit and ideas of the peaceful Polish revolution.

It is, however, much more difficult to trace causal relationships between the Polish revolutionary August, on the one hand, and the Estonian upheavals of 1980–81, the Latvian spy trial, or the prolific Lithuanian dissent publishing activitiy, on the other. For example, it is misleading to speak of the "Roman Catholic revival in Soviet Lithuania" as merely "an echo of Poland's."[71] Lithuania's dissident movement— whether religious or nationalist—has its own long and independent history, and is not merely a product or reverberation of the waves made by the Polish August of 1980, even if the example of the postwar Polish church may have contributed to the rise of Lithuanian Catholic militancy beginning in 1968.

Moreover, Lithuanians—while sympathetic to the Polish workers' movement—proved unwilling to risk their own standard of living and relatively peaceful situation by emulating the Poles with demands for radical reform. In this reluctance, one might also discern symptoms of insecure nationalism. Along with fascination with the spectacle of the unraveling of the Communist system in Poland and envy of the freer Polish society, most of Lithuania's politically-conscious population were taken aback by a strong injection of Polish nationalism into the Solidarity movement. Fears of revanchist nationalism—whether independently perceived or possibly planted and exploited by the Soviet regime—seem to have dulled the enthusiasm of Lithuanians over Polish developments after August 1980.

The Estonians, uninhibited by such attitudes, were inspired probably more than other Balts by the Poles' daring in challenging the Kremlin's party-oriented system. Republic party leader Vaino came close to admitting the linkage when he referred to the letters circulating in Tallinn prior to December 1, 1981, as "vile instigations to strike, similar to those voiced by Solidarity in Poland."[72] But, again, it was local circumstances, not events in Poland, that seemed pivotal in the Estonian dissidence of 1980–81. The Latvians, as has been the case generally since the destruction of their national Communist faction, have been less articulate and also too suppressed to undertake broader defiance or to challenge the regime.

On balance, one finds in the Baltic republics strong forces of opposition to Russification, to anti-religious policies, to food shortages, to graft and corruption, and to the KGB's "preventive" suppression of human rights. But—leaving aside the issue of Lithuanian-Polish tensions—events such as the Polish August are not likely to galvanize the Baltic peoples to action unless the latter were faced with an indecisive or ineffective regime such as Edward Gierek's in pre-August Poland. The Soviet system still seems too disciplined, too repressive to permit revolutionary ideas in Eastern Europe to trigger a spontaneous movement for reform in the Soviet Union itself.

[71] *The Wall Street Journal* (New York, NY), Mar. 5, 1982.
[72] Vaino, loc. cit., p. 52.

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Andropov, Kohl, and East-West Issues

By Elizabeth Pond

Soviet-West German relations are dominated by two triangular relationships: Moscow-Washington-Bonn and Moscow–East Berlin–Bonn. The trigonometry here is especially tricky; since neither Moscow nor Bonn regards the other as the most crucial actor in either triangle. To the Soviets, the United States and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) are both far more important than is the Federal Republic of Germany; to the West Germans, the US and the GDR are more important than is the USSR.[1]

There have been times in the postwar period, of course, when Germany was the main object of superpower rivalry, as in the Berlin blockade of 1948 or in the years preceding the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961. Since the détente of the 1970's stabilized the borders in central Europe and the status of West Berlin, however, German issues as such have become less critical in both superpower and Soviet–West German relations. And with the breakdown in East-West détente in recent years—and the vanishing of the more fluid atmosphere that had allowed East European countries to be drawn to West German and other European consumerist and pluralist models—West German opportunity for discretionary maneuver has been reduced. This reduced West German scope was disguised for a time by the personal prestige of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and his signal role in getting the otherwise noncommunicating superpowers to the Euromissile negotiating table. Basically, however, Soviet–West German relations remain the stepchild of superpower politics.

Any analysis of the relationship between the USSR and the Federal Republic thus depends heavily on one's premises about Soviet-American relations and their effect on future arms control negotiations; general Soviet foreign policy aims and options (and the impact on them of the uncertainties of succession and domestic economic troubles); relations among the members of NATO; West German domestic politics, including an interest in eventual reunification; and the most urgent immediate issue, namely, the planned deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles in NATO countries.

Continuity in Bonn

Consideration of the various factors at play should perhaps start with the most obvious point: that the basic role of the Federal Republic in superpower relations remains unchanged despite last fall's shift from Social Democratic Party (SPD) Chancellor Helmut Schmidt to Christian Democratic Union (CDU) Chancellor Helmut Kohl. This role consists of nudging the superpowers to continue the East-West dialogue, with elements of cooperation as well as confrontation. At

[1] One simple measure that helps illustrate this priority is the relatively small number of significant Soviet commentaries about the Federal Republic since the successions (October 1, 1982, in Bonn; November 12, 1982, in Moscow) as compared to those about the United States and about the GDR in the same period. Soviet press articles about the Federal Republic focused especially on: the Kohl government's confirmation of West German adherence to the decision to deploy Pershing II and cruise missiles; the potentially great loss to West Germany of economic and political "fruits of détente"; and warnings that the deployment of NATO missiles in West Germany would sharply increase the "danger of war on our continent," isolate West Germany "from its eastern neighbors," lead to countermeasures "in arrangement with other members of the Warsaw Treaty," and "drive the final nail into the coffin of 'national hope.'" See, for example, the articles by Leonid Zamyatin, in *Literaturnaya gazeta* (Moscow), Sept. 29, 1982; A. Grigoryants, in *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Oct. 20, 1982, and June 23, 1983; Yevgeny Grigor'yev, in *Pravda* (Moscow), Oct. 31, 1982; V. Korionov, in *Pravda*, Jan. 14, 1983; statement of the Soviet government, in *Pravda*, May 28, 1983; and Vladimir Mikhaylov, in *Pravda*, May 29, 1983.

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the same time, the government in Bonn hopes to avoid any gratuitous import of tensions from other parts of the world that might upset the hard-won stability of postwar Europe.[2]

To be sure, the Christian Democrats (including Kohl himself) were not averse to suggesting in the 13th year of Social Democratic rule that Bonn's role in East-West relations would in fact change if only the Reagan administration would help them dump the Social Democrats. The Reagan administration refrained, however, and when the euphoric Kohl replaced Schmidt in the chancellery in October 1982—the beneficiary of the Free Democratic (Liberal) Party's shift of alliance from the SPD to the CDU—this was solely the result of domestic politics. Thus, the Kohl government, for all of its leader's genuine pro-Americanism and empathy with Ronald Reagan, was not beholden to the Reagan administration for its rise to power. And, after a decade of SPD Ostpolitik and popular approval of increased contacts between East and West Germans, the moderate wing of the CDU easily overrode the revisionist enthusiasms of its fellow conservatives in Bavaria and continued Ostpolitik. "Continuity" (with the previous government's foreign policy) even became something of a codeword.

After the election in March 1983 had legitimized his leadership, Kohl moved quickly to preempt any misunderstanding in Washington about the significance of the vote. Within a week of receiving his mandate, he gave a carefully calibrated interview to only one American newspaper *(The Washington Post)*, saying in effect that he was as interested as Schmidt had ever been in serious arms control negotiations and that he would now like to see the United States move off its "zero option" arms control proposal—as, he noted carefully, President Reagan was already doing.[3]

Kohl then repeated this message in April on his maiden voyage to Washington as elected chancellor. On that occasion, he stopped short of making the delicate recommendation his aides had previously hinted at—that the President give a free hand to intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) negotiator Paul Nitze, the most prominent of the embattled two or three Rea-



Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, during his trip to Washington, DC, to confer with US President Ronald Reagan.

—Poly-Press/Katherine Young.

gan administration officials who were urgently seeking an arms control agreement with the Soviets. But he did weigh in on the critical issue of East-West trade, persuading the President to downplay at the forthcoming Williamsburg economic summit the administration's controversial precept of compelling America's allies to exert as much economic pressure as possible on Moscow.

Kohl thus succeeded in his efforts to soften American arms control and East-West trade policies—rather more fully and certainly less contentiously than Schmidt had ever done in his similar efforts. This success can be explained in part by American relief that Schmidt would no longer have to finesse approval of Euromissile deployment through a mutinous Social Democratic Party, and that Kohl's parliamentary majority would clearly endorse NATO's deployments in December 1983 if there were no prior arms control agreement. The increased harmony between the United States and West Germany can also be explained in part by the personal compatibility of Chan-

[2] This attitude led the Bonn government to object to the Soviet military buildup in Europe—for example, back in the days when Washington was still optimistic about détente—and to insist that a NATO cruise option not be barred in the SALT II treaty. This attitude also led to Schmidt's doggedness in impressing on Brezhnev at every meeting just how seriously Western Europe regarded the threat from the Soviet SS-20's. And it led the Bonn government—in a period when the United States was reacting with an emphasis on sticks rather than carrots to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, to the taking of American hostages in Iran, and to American global diffidence following the Vietnam war—to press for Western incentives as well as disincentives in dealing with the USSR.

[3] See William Drozdiak, "Kohl Urges US To Make Offer on Missiles," *The Washington Post*, Mar. 13, 1983.

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cellor Kohl and President Reagan: both are committed conservatives; both are deliberate nonspecialists; both are proselytizers for all the homespun virtues of optimism, hard work, private initiative, and anti-intellectual common sense.

Kohl's victory thus allayed the American suspicion of latent German nationalism and "self-Finlandization" that had so dogged Bonn-Washington relations during Schmidt's tenure. Key actors in the White House now trusted and heeded Kohl in a way they had never quite trusted or heeded the Social Democrat Schmidt.

Contradictions in Moscow

A considerable degree of continuity marks the Soviet attitude toward West Germany as well. The accessions of both Kohl and Yuriy Andropov have made little difference in the Kremlin's expectations for bilateral relations or for the Federal Republic's role in East-West relations. The Leonid Zamyatins of this world may edge out the Valentin Falins in bureaucratic power struggles. But the provisional decline of a Falin and the cyclical rise in Soviet saber-rattling no more signal a basic policy realignment (or controversy about one in the Politburo) than they do a resolution of the enduring Soviet policy dilemmas in Europe. Indeed, "contradictions" are inherent in Soviet dealings with Western Europe—courting favor, while making threats; trying to exclude the United States from Europe, while seeking to prevent the rise of West German dominance; trying to loosen the postwar European structure to weaken American–West European ties, while keeping the structure rigid to prevent a weakening of Soviet–East European ties.

Thus, the Kremlin's choices in 1983 are essentially the same—and are limited—whether Kohl or Schmidt is at the helm in Bonn. And the Federal Republic's choices in 1983 are essentially the same—and are limited—whether Leonid Brezhnev or Andropov is at the helm in Moscow. Soviet policy toward West Germany might be summarized irreverently as wooing Bonn away from Washington—so long as the wooing cannot really succeed.

This at least seems to be the consensus in both the West German Foreign Ministry and the US Department of State.[4] According to this interpretation, in the last quarter-century—ever since Nikita Khrushchev decided that war between capitalist states was not inevitable after all, or at least since NATO recovered from French withdrawal from the military alliance—Moscow has not really expected tensions between capitalist states to build to a breaking point. Nor, in this view, has Moscow realistically expected West German peace activists and left-wing Social Democrats to be able to block NATO deployment of missiles in Europe.[5]

To be sure, Moscow does its best to exploit and foster West European and West German antimissile sentiment, on the outside hope that such efforts might stop the stationing of missiles, and on the sure conviction that any increased political polarization among Western publics will make the next Western arms decision that much harder. In the same way, although it has little power of its own to drive "wedges" between the United States and Europe, the Soviet Union does seek whatever short-term profit it can gain from wedges the United States and Europe manage to drive between themselves.

In a more positive vein, in recent years Moscow has regarded the Federal Republic as a fallback partner in preserving at least some remnants of détente, and it has hoped that Bonn might serve as a moderating influence on American policy in the present period of superpower confrontation. Soviet leaders have also valued West Germany as a major supplier of Western technology and an economic prop for the GDR.

In the consensus view of the West German and American foreign policy establishments, the distinction sometimes drawn by Westerners between Soviet hopes of separating the Federal Republic from the United States and of using the Federal Republic to affect American policy is regarded as artificial and irrelevant to Soviet perceptions of policy options. As for

[4]Some outside analysts vehemently disagree with this viewpoint. The litmus test here is probably interpretation of the Soviets' role in undermining the 1973 Mansfield amendment which called for unilateral withdrawal of 40 percent of all American forces overseas. By its willingness to enter the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks for multilateral troop reductions in the European theater, Moscow took the ground from under the amendment, and it was defeated in Congress. The consensus explanation for this is that the USSR pulled back from agitating for American withdrawal from Europe as soon as it realized that this might actually happen and that West Germany would then dominate Europe. The dissenting view is that the Soviet move was instead only a grudging concession to get the Kremlin's cherished Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe launched.

[5]On this issue, there is less consensus among Western diplomats. Many believe that the Soviets really thought they had a chance to forestall the NATO missile deployments so long as the Social Democrats held the chancellery and might be responsive to pressure from antinuclear public opinion and their own alienation from Reagan's hard line on the USSR. In this view, the Soviets hoped to carry the unexpected success of the antineutron warhead campaign over to the new INF missiles. They were thought to be encouraged especially by the pacifist potential among young West Germans spoiled by a lifetime of peace and prosperity into resenting personal sacrifice and taking their security for granted. The countercultural, neo-Romantic, antimodern, back-to-nature, leftist, neutralist, anti-American mood among many young West Germans, combined with angst, cultural despair, pessimism, and susceptibility to a new myth of a *Kulturnation*, were seen as providing especially fertile ground for the growing antinuclear movement. For a discussion of this thesis, see William E. Griffith, "Bonn and Washington: From Deterioration to Crisis?" *Orbis* (Philadelphia, PA), Spring 1982, pp. 117–33.

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Bonn's goals in relations with Moscow, these too offer few alternatives. Over the short run, the Federal Republic wants to keep the Soviet–West German dialogue publicly audible, at least until the initial deployment of missiles in December, in order to demonstrate to domestic protesters that the USSR really does not take the stationing all that seriously. Over the longer run, the Federal Republic would like to preserve as much of European détente as can honorably be preserved, primarily in order to maintain contacts between East and West Germans, and secondarily to provide a climate in which liberalization might proceed in Eastern Europe. And if, along the way, it can get some contracts for pipe orders to help keep Ruhr steel mills rolling, so much the better.

All of this is so unremarkable as to be axiomatic. Yet, it is worth noting simply because the current norm in Soviet–West German relations is so different from what it was before détente. In 1959, Khrushchev was threatening the Federal Republic (as well as Great Britain, France, Italy, and Greece) with nuclear devastation unless West Berlin was turned over to the GDR and various other European adjustments were made in the Soviet Union's favor. On the other side, West Germany, though with considerably less bluster, was still claiming a large portion of postwar Poland as rightfully belonging to Germany. And even in 1969, with five new Soviet divisions sitting in Czechoslovakia, the USSR was still loudly blaming "revanchists" in the Federal Republic for the ferment of the Prague Spring and was condoning a new East German squeeze on access to West Berlin.

It was only with the series of détente treaties in the early 1970's that West German land access to West Berlin was fully assured and regularized, and that the Federal Republic formally pledged never to change postwar East-West borders by force.[6] It was only with these treaties that visits by millions of West Germans and West Berliners to East German friends and relatives became possible and that 70,000 ethnic Ger-

[6]Among the important détente treaties were the Soviet–West German nonaggression (but not peace) treaty of 1970, the West German–Polish border and repatriation treaty of 1970, the Berlin Quadripartite Agreement of 1971, the normalization agreement between East and West Germany of 1971, the West German-Czechoslovak normalization treaty of 1973, and the Helsinki Final Act of 1975.

Documents of visitors are checked before they cross the bridge in Berlin Kreuzberg on their way to the Eastern sector of the divided city.

Sven Simon/Katherine Young.

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mans were allowed to emigrate from the USSR to the Federal Republic (along with many more thousands from Poland and Romania). It was only with Chancellor Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik that German reunification was denatured from a potentially explosive political yearning to a more manageable and far less hazardous desire for apolitical human contact. And it was only with the loss to the Soviets of the convenient German bogeyman that Polish workers became sufficiently casual about the Soviet guarantee of Polish borders to defy the Soviets and form the free Solidarity trade union. Indeed, détente's most lasting achievements may well turn out to have been the very tangible six to eight million annual visits by West Germans to the GDR and the more intangible laying to rest of the West German incubus in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

The Missile Debate

The Bonn and Moscow successions have taken place at a time when short-run pressures are crowding out long-term considerations in bilateral relations. The most pressing issue in Soviet–West German relations at present is NATO's planned stationing of a land-based INF in Europe in December of this year. Until this issue is settled, little else is likely to be resolved.

The specific military aspects of the superpower strategic parity of the 1970's, the perennial Soviet conventional superiority in Europe, and the recently acquired Soviet nuclear superiority in Europe need not concern us here. Suffice it to say that the Soviet deployment of 243 mobile, three-warhead SS–20's (with a range of 5,000 kilometers and accuracy of 200 to 300 meters)[7] from 1977 on, plus a steady increase over 15 years in Soviet conventional hardware superiority,[8] convinced NATO that the USSR was striving for a politically usable offensive margin in Europe.

Analysts generally agree that a Soviet nuclear attack on Western Europe is highly unlikely in this very stable theater. In the view of NATO officials, however, the shifting military balance, if left unchallenged, could have had serious consequences. It could have undermined the credibility of "extended deterrence" (Washington's willingness to underwrite Europe's defense with a last-resort strategic retaliation against the USSR for any otherwise unstoppable Soviet attack on Western Europe). It might also have undermined the credibility of the NATO doctrine of "flexible response," under which any unstoppable conventional Soviet invasion of Western Europe could trigger Western retaliation with a first use of nuclear weapons. And this in turn might have weakened deterrence of any conventional Soviet attack. As the non-nuclear frontline state most dependent on American deterrence, the Federal Republic was the first country to become concerned about the new trend, as Chancellor Schmidt indicated in his famous warning at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in 1977.[9]

After some debate, the Western allies decided in 1979 to redress the Soviet military buildup by deploying for the first time in two decades NATO land-based INF capable of reaching Soviet territory. The planned stationing of 108 Pershing II's and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles would yield a total of 572 single warheads; this would not by any means match the Soviets' 1983 arsenal of 729 warheads on the 243 Europe-targeted SS–20's.[10] NATO's new INF would, however, mount a threat of short-warning attack on Soviet command and control centers to the west and south of Moscow. Although the new NATO missiles would not be able to disarm Soviet central or even European-theater systems—given Soviet command redundancy and the geographic depth of Soviet central systems—they would be able to delay and disorganize part of the Soviet Union's western-deployed military establishment. The newly deployed INF would also fill the opening gap in "escalation control" and

[7] Weapons data are from International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1982/83*, London, IISS, 1982; and H. J. Neuman, *Nuclear Forces in Europe: A Handbook for the Debate*, London, IISS, 1982; and oral updates from US Department of Defense and West German Defense Ministry sources.

[8] Representative force-ratio increases on the central front include Warsaw Pact superiority in number of tanks over NATO of 2.3 to 1 in 1965 up to 2.7 to 1 in 1980; armored personnel carriers and infantry-fighting vehicles up from 1.1 to 1 to 1.7 to 1; antitank guided missiles up from Warsaw Pact inferiority of .6 to 1 to a superiority of 1.9 to 1; and artillery up from 1.2 to 1 to 2.6 to 1. See Phillip A. Karber, "To Lose an Arms Race: The Competition in Conventional Forces Deployed in Central Europe '65–'80," in Uwe Nerlich, Ed., *The Soviet Asset: Military Power in the Competition over Europe*, Cambridge, MA, Ballinger Publishing Co., forthcoming.

[9] Strategic parity, Schmidt suggested, "magnifies the significance of the disparities between East and West in nuclear tactical and conventional weapons." See Helmut Schmidt, "The 1977 Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture," *Survival* (London), January–February 1978.

[10] The Pershing II's have a range of 1,750 kilometers, accuracy of 10 to 40 meters, and flight time comparable to that of the SS–20 (about 12 minutes). The ground-launched cruise missiles have a range of up to 2,500 kilometers, accuracy of under 80 meters, and flight time of about 2 to 4 hours.

At present, the full European theater INF missile balance would have to include (in addition to the 243 SS–20's) the 280 Soviet SS–4's and SS–5's and the 18 French SSBS S–3's; if less accurate submarine missiles are included, there would be an additional 18 Soviet SS–N–5's and 144 British and French Polaris and MSBS M–20's. According to International Institute for Strategic Studies counting rules, this makes a total of 162 West European warheads targeted on the Soviet Union and 1,027 Soviet warheads targeted on Western Europe. Moscow insists that the British and French missiles be included in any INF arms control agreement. The West rejects this demand, arguing that the independent French and semi-independent British weapons are not at the disposal of NATO planners and that the Federal Republic in particular cannot rely on them for its defense.

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The December 12, 1979, meeting in Brussels of the ministers of defense and of foreign affairs of NATO member states that decided on a two-track decision to install cruise and Pershing II missiles on West European territory while pursuing arms control agreements with the Soviet Union.

—Diego Goldberg/SYGMA.

enhance the credibility of a NATO nuclear retaliation. This would most likely prevent Warsaw Pact conventional forces from grouping in the kind of concentrations that could swiftly punch through any less-than-fully-prepared defense.

Along with its 1979 decision to deploy new missiles, NATO proposed an alternative "second track": it would seek to negotiate mutual reductions of projected NATO missile forces and the already deployed SS-20's. The Reagan administration inaugurated in January 1981 was reluctant to enter the arms control negotiations called for by NATO until a major new American military buildup was under way; and the twilight Brezhnev leadership refused to enter INF negotiations so long as the NATO missile plans stayed on the books. Schmidt cajoled both superpowers out of their reluctance, however, and the Soviet-American INF talks began in Geneva in November 1981 with Paul Nitze and Yuliy Kvitsinskiy serving as chief negotiators. With strong West German encouragement, the Americans opened the negotiations by proposing the "zero option," under which NATO would deploy none of its new Pershing and cruise missiles if the Soviet Union dismantled all its SS-20's. Again with strong West German encouragement, the United States softened this position somewhat in the spring of 1983 as Washington declared its readiness to consider an "interim solution," trading off a reduced number of SS-20's for a reduced number of the planned Pershing and cruise missiles.

The NATO missile plans distressed Moscow, though Western analysts vary in their assessment of the precise reasons (and the corollary Soviet incentive for arms control). Clearly, the deployment of the new missiles would neutralize the very costly Soviet SS-20 program and its hoped-for political impact on Europe. Clearly, the Soviet Union would lose considerable prestige if its four-year campaign against NATO missiles were now to fail. Obviously, the Soviet Union would like to fuel West European (and especially West German) antinuclear protests to the point of making new deployments impossible politically. Certainly Moscow does not like the idea of intermediate-range nuclear weapons on German soil—even if these missiles are solely in American hands.

But just what priority the USSR puts on nondeployment is much more obscure—as is the relative priority it assigns to the nondeployment of each type of missile. The Soviet response in this regard is important for the Federal Republic and for Soviet-West German

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relations. The Federal Republic is the focus of Soviet efforts to forestall the NATO stationing not only because of Germany's historical significance for the USSR, its strategic position in central Europe, its role as the strongest European member of NATO, and its vigorous Protestant antinuclear movement. The Federal Republic is also important to the Soviets because it will be the only nation to take the Pershing II's. One battery of nine Pershing II's is to be emplaced in Schwäbisch Gmünd in December as the West German counterpart to the simultaneous stationing of cruise missiles in Italy and Great Britain, and the prelude to later cruise deployments in these three countries, as well as in Belgium and Holland.

Moscow's Two Tracks

Moscow's moment of truth on these issues, it was long thought in the West, would finally have to come in the summer and fall of this year. The Kremlin would have to decide, especially in its dealings with West Germany, between propaganda from below and real negotiation from above if it is to keep NATO deployments to a minimum. But with the summer of 1983 now upon us, there are strong indications, as Western diplomats see it, that the Soviets are postponing that moment of truth until next year (thus incidentally sparing Kohl any hard choices in the near future). They appear unready as yet to address the central question—so far as Western Europe and especially the Federal Republic are concerned—of how much of a right to security they are willing to grant their continental neighbors. So far, the USSR has insisted on seeing NATO's new INF only in terms of an impermissible "strategic" threat to the Soviet Union; it has been unwilling to acknowledge that NATO's missile force might be a response to a regional threat to Europe posed by the SS-20's. This, according to both West Germans and Americans, is a relegation of West European security to second-class status. The Soviet litany of "equality and equal security" is applied at this point only to superpowers, it seems, and not to lesser entities.

Not surprisingly, the delay in current Soviet decision-making appears to have less to do with Soviet–West German relations per se (or even with a Soviet evaluation of whether or not the United States is now negotiating "seriously") than it does with overall superpower relations. The Soviets seem to be waiting to see if Ronald Reagan looks as if he will be reelected in 1984—and until they are certain that this is the case, they have no desire to boost Reagan's campaign with an early arms control agreement.

The implication of this delay for the Federal Republic is that Moscow is likely to persist with its own "two tracks" of negotiation and propaganda for another year at least. On the first track, of negotiation, Soviet leaders—while periodically stepping up threats aimed at the Federal Republic (and NATO)—will probably not shut any doors to the Kohl government, which they expect to deal with for the next eight years. Just such a mixture marked the Soviet reception of Dr. Kohl this summer as the first Western leader to visit Moscow since the declaration of martial law in Poland—and the first conservative West German chancellor to visit Moscow since 1955. Dr. Kohl's interlocutors expressed disappointment at the West German determination to deploy and warned that there would be a "sharp deterioration of the situation in Europe and all over the world" if deployments proceed. Yet the Soviets indicated that they want to continue the dialogue with West Germany—perhaps especially at a time when they have no such dialogue with President Reagan, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, or President François Mitterrand.

On the second track, of propaganda, Soviet leaders will continue to make peace appeals to those German youths who view the Soviet Union as unthreatening but do fear both American belligerence and a kind of no-fault nuclear holocaust. The Soviet stable of fluent German speakers will broadcast throughout Europe every old (and any new) statement by Reagan administration spokesmen demonizing the Soviet Union, or calling for American military superiority over the USSR, for nuclear war-fighting capability in Europe, or for prolonged nuclear war-fighting capability in strategic weapons. The Soviets will also be quick to place all blame for failure of the Geneva talks prior to the December deployments on the United States and on Western refusal to count British and French nuclear forces in the West's INF tally[11]—and they will most likely walk out of the Geneva negotiations for a time once the NATO deployments begin.

Such ambivalence requires a delicate balancing act by Moscow. Too peaceful an image could allow the Kohl government to tell antinuclear protesters that the new NATO missiles do not matter all that much to the

[11] The Soviet position on the British and French missiles seems to be a part of the bargaining at the Geneva talks rather than a ploy to split the Federal Republic from Britain and France. Non-nuclear West Germany depends far too much on America's nuclear deterrence to trust its defense to the much smaller British and French forces—or to tolerate a reduction in American INF to compensate for British and French missiles. The issue of the British and French missiles will increasingly complicate arms control negotiations, however, as ongoing modernization plans could lead to more than a thousand British and French warheads, with the new British Trident acquiring for the first time a hard-target kill accuracy.

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

A conversation in the Kremlin on July 5, 1983, between visiting West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl (far left) and Soviet party and state leader Yuriy Andropov (far right). Seated next to the two leaders are their respective foreign ministers, Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Andrey Gromyko.

—TASS from Soviets.

Kremlin; too threatening an image could unite West Germans against the USSR, as Khrushchev's threats did in the years preceding the building of the Berlin Wall. In this respect, the consensus of West European diplomats seems to be that the Soviets will avoid any revival of pressure on West German access to West Berlin that would call into question the Berlin Quadripartite Agreement of 1971[12]—and will certainly avoid any hint of German reunification even as a lure to West Germans to distance themselves from the United States.[13] On the threat side, this basically leaves Moscow with two possibilities: turning up the rhetoric on installing more short-range missiles in the GDR, and diminishing contacts between East and West Germany. On the inducement side, it leaves Moscow with the rather weak tool (in any sense of specific political leverage) of offering trade opportunities to the West Germans.

So far, Moscow has preferred turning up the rhetoric on installing more short-range missiles or even more Europe-targeted SS-20's.[14] The impact of this threat has been somewhat blunted, however, since there is no evidence that Moscow is actually accelerating its ongoing short-range missile program or its

[12] The lone Soviet threat here came when outgoing Soviet Ambassador to the GDR Pëtr Abrasimov said that deployment of the Pershing II on West German soil would "not leave untouched" the Berlin Quadripartite Agreement. See Reuters report from West Berlin, June 13, 1983.

[13] The consensus among diplomats is based not only on the absence of any such real hint since Stalin's time, but also on Moscow's presumed fears that the prospect of reunification could destabilize the German Democratic Republic. One senior European diplomat adds that the Kremlin would not want reunification even if the GDR were guaranteed to be stable and to dominate the united Germany, since this would threaten to establish a "Third Rome" to challenge Soviet leadership of the world Communist movement. There is considerable dissent from the diplomatic consensus, however. Uwe Nerlich of the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (Foundation for Science and Policy), for example, argues that the USSR might well seek German reunification once it had so changed the European balance as to control that emergent Germany.

A different kind of dissent from the diplomatic consensus is also frequently voiced by French, British, and American politicians and media in suspecting the West Germans of a subliminal urge for reunification so strong that it could lead to West German *Schaukelpolitik* (seesaw politics) between East and West and appeasement of the one nation that could grant it reunification: the Soviet Union. The burden of proof of an assertion that so flies in the face of surface evidence of apathy about reunification should normally rest with the asserter. The West Germans are in a no-win situation on this one, however, since German history is assumed to place the negative burden of proof on any German to show that he is *not* a nationalist—an impossible task. For analyses minimizing pan-German yearnings, see Gebhard Ludwig Schweigler, *National Consciousness in Divided Germany*, London, Sage, 1975; and Elizabeth Pond, "German Reunification, Neutralism, Nationalism: How Deep the Yearning?" *The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston, MA), Mar. 3, 1983.

[14] The first wave of implicit Soviet threats to station shorter range nuclear systems in East Europe coincided with the election in March and the antinuclear Easter marches in April in West Germany. The current, continuing wave began a month before the first official visit to Moscow by Chancellor Kohl, July 4–7. (See footnote 1 for a brief overview of Soviet articles on West Germany.) According to sources in the West German Defense Ministry and in the US Defense Department, the Soviet Union actually began stationing SS-23 missiles and their warheads (with a range of 350 kilometers) in the GDR last year as part of a modernization program planned some years back. (Evidence of the presence of warheads is more ambiguous and controversial than evidence about missiles, however, and is in any case very closely held.) There have been some hints that the next Soviet move might entail the introduction of SS-22's (with a range of 1,000 kilometers) into Hungary, where these weapons could target all of Italy, including cruise missile sites in Sicily. According to the sources, older missiles capable of being retrofitted with nuclear warheads have already been issued not only to forward-based Soviet forces, but also to East German, Polish, Czechoslovak, and possibly Hungarian troops. Nuclear warheads for these systems are said to be kept under Soviet custody, command, and control. Nuclear-capable older missiles are also said to have been issued already to Bulgarian and Romanian troops, but there is no question of deploying nuclear warheads in these countries now or in the near future.

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continuing SS-20 program. The impact of Soviet rhetoric on West Germans has also been deflected by the USSR's repeated twinning of a threat to target more Soviet missiles on Europe with a threat to target more Soviet missiles on the United States. To a degree, West German officials welcome such equal Soviet stress on retaliation against America, since it counteracts the peace movement's accusation that Washington wants the new INF in order to limit a nuclear war to the European continent.

As for Soviet pressure on East/West German relations, this remains only a hypothetical possibility so far. The cooling of inter-German relations in the early 1980's—measured in the more than doubling of the visa fee for Western visitors to the GDR in 1980, and in party and state chief Erich Honecker's postponement in spring of 1983 of his prospective trip to the Federal Republic—seems to have been decided on by East Berlin itself, independent of the skirmish over the INF issue. Similarly, the West German government's unprecedented guarantee in June of 1 billion deutsche marks (US$400 million) private untied credits for East Germany—and East Germany's glad acceptance of the offer—imply that East/West German relations are not going to worsen.[15]

In any case, since the Soviets are realists—especially in evaluating European politics, which they understand better than they do America's less predictable politics—it is doubtful that they really expect at this stage to prevent the December deployments in the Federal Republic, Britain, or even Italy. The conservative governments in all three countries are determined to implement these deployments, and they have the political and police power to do so.

Despite its apparent inability to ward off the stationing of the Pershings and cruise missiles, the Kremlin will hardly stop its propaganda efforts to encourage public opposition to NATO missiles in Western Europe. Soviet leaders have no interest in legitimizing by default the deployments, or in simplifying the Kohl government's task in pushing the deployment through what is likely to become an increasingly polarized society in the next half-year. Moscow may be resigned to the new missiles, but it will certainly ensure that the Kohl government pays as high a domestic political price as possible. This will mean a voluble Soviet campaign against NATO missiles and a corollary flow of East German money westward[16] to help defray the costs of organizing and subsidizing transportation for the mass antinuclear demonstrations planned for October 22 in three West German cities. For the Communist Party of [West] Germany this will mean continued assiduous organizational and financial work on rally-planning committees.

Promoting all this antinuclear activity will be child's play for the Soviets and the West German Communists, since antimissile sentiment is already widespread in the Federal Republic. Opinion polls suggest that a majority of West Germans would like to avoid the new deployments if possible (though this issue weighed far less in voters' minds in March than did economic issues, and Kohl won a resounding victory on a platform that included staunch support for deployments should arms control talks fail).[17] In the election, almost 6 percent of the voters were sufficiently moved by protest to elect the omnibus counterculture, antimissile, anti-NATO Green Party to the Bundestag for the first time. This past June's lay Assembly of West German Lutherans, like its forerunner two years ago, concentrated on opposing the deployment of the new NATO missiles. And the October 22 marches are expected to muster between 1 and 2 million demonstrators—an impressive increase over last year's peace demonstration of 600,000 in Bonn.

So far as is known, the Soviets—or more pertinently, West German Communist rally organizers—have no interest in promoting violence at these demonstrations. In fact, at previous marches, Communist marshals have been as exemplary as young Lutheran peace activists in averting any resort to force. Insofar as violence would increase polarization, however, it should be mentioned that there is real concern that violence may erupt at one or more of the protests. Some

[15] The postponement of Honecker's coveted visit to the Federal Republic is regarded by West German analysts as the GDR leader's own decision within the general autonomy granted by Moscow to East Berlin on East/West German relations. It is further taken as a tactical decision in response to the controversy stirred up by the Christian Social Union over the death by heart attack of a West German traveler who died while being questioned by GDR border guards. After the polemics had died down, Honecker signaled his wish to continue civil East/West German relations. Most surprisingly, he even hinted that the compulsory currency-exchange payments by West German visitors to the GDR might again be lowered.

[16] According to West German intelligence sources, the Soviet bloc channels some US$30 million to antinuclear movements in West Germany, the Benelux countries, and Scandinavia, with much of this going to West German peace movements, largely through GDR funding of the Communist Party of [West] Germany (DKP). West German Communists have been instrumental in organizing the very successful Krefeld appeal against NATO missiles (with a reported 4 million signatures by now), the June 1982 Bonn peace rally, and the forthcoming October demonstrations. Much of the DKP activity is overt rather than covert, in a deliberate effort to gain respectability in a society in which the party has been notably unrespected ever since the uprising of East German workers in 1953.

[17] Opposition to the new missiles should not be confused with opposition to NATO, even though leftist peace activists and NATO spokesmen both tend to do so. For its part, the West German general public views the missile issue as a simple policy question about which reasonable men may differ. It does not (yet) regard the deployments—as do the US, West German, and most other NATO governments by now—as a bedrock test of alliance loyalty and determination. Opinion polls in the Federal Republic regularly show support for NATO above 70 and often even as high as 90 percent.

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activists are already arguing that peaceful demonstrations, no matter how large, are never going to block the INF deployments, and that more drastic measures—such as self-immolations—are needed. Furthermore, the 1,000-odd apolitical "chaotics" who have attached themselves to other protests as an excuse to do battle with the police are likely to seize the opportunity again, as are the still well-armed and well-financed leftist-anarchist Revolutionary Cells and third-generation Baader-Meinhof gang. In addition, there are extremists on the right who already have experience in bombing American installations.

There is also a risk of violence against demonstrators—especially under the hard-line Interior Ministry, which is now led by the Christian Social Union—by police frustrated by the injuries they have sustained in past brawls from cobblestones, slingshot projectiles, and gasoline bombs.

Of even greater political significance than the demonstrations, however, will be the polarization that occurs if the SPD breaks with consensus foreign policy (as it is generally expected to do) at the party's convention on November 1 and 2. With the toppling of Schmidt from the chancellorship and the falling away of the discipline and restraints of government responsibility, the SPD left wing has already moved the party well away from its original "yes but" position on missiles. The left wing is further expected to dominate the convention and to win a majority endorsement of a moratorium on new NATO missiles in an effort to press the United States to make concessions at the Geneva arms control talks.

Amid the turmoil of West German politics of the next half-year, Soviet bilateral policy can run on automatic pilot. The more difficult decisions will have to be made once it is clear that domestic polarization has failed to halt the deployment of those nine Pershing II's in Schwäbisch Gmünd in December. But here again the most decisive factor in Soviet decision-making is likely to be Ronald Reagan rather than Helmut Kohl.

Bilateral Trade

No major new bilateral trade deals seem to be in the offing at the moment, though the Soviets have been bruiting a multibillion-dollar Siberian coal-exploitation, liquefaction, and pipeline project. Under current conditions this project is financially and technologically unattractive to West German firms, and as far as the Bonn government is concerned, it would probably not be worth the ire it would draw from the Reagan administration. Similarly, the once envisaged "second strand" Siberia-to-Europe gas pipeline, while not dead, now looks less interesting to German suppliers than it did a few years back. For now, the combination of European energy conservation, decelerating energy demand, and anticipated stable (or even falling) oil prices over the next three years has reduced

West German groups opposed to further deployment of nuclear missiles: at left, an antinuclear demonstrator during the June 1983 gathering of West German Protestants in Hannover; at right, police are confronted by members of the Chaotics during a September 1981 "peace" demonstration in West Berlin.

Patrick Pihl/Gamma-Liaison; Mervan/SIPA PRESS from BLACK STAR.

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incentive for gas conversion and led to slack in the already existing and planned Soviet gas lines to Europe.

In any case, there has been something of a disillusionment on both sides as to the utility of trade as lever, panacea, or even symbol. The signing of a vague 25-year economic cooperation pact—the highlight of Brezhnev's visit to Bonn in 1978—would be unthinkable today. And the Soviet leadership apparently no longer hopes (as it did in the early 1970's) that it can avoid painful decisions about management reform simply by infusing Western technology into the ailing Soviet economy. Nor is there any West German policy that the USSR might hope to change today (as in the pre-Ostpolitik days of the 1960's) by tantalizing Ruhr capitalists with visions of huge Soviet markets.

On the West German side, too, those Social Democrats who even after the outlawing of Solidarity in Poland championed East-West trade as the inevitable inducer of Soviet-bloc liberalization are now out of office. (On the obverse side of the coin, however, the old skepticism about economic sanctions still prevails in a nation dependent on the export of a quarter of its GNP and on the reliability of its deliveries abroad. Thus, West German businessmen argue that in the most pertinent experience to date—the American-led Western embargo on large-diameter pipe exports to the Soviet Union in 1962—the only lasting effect was to spur the Soviet development of domestic capability for producing large pipe.)[18]

The existing Soviet–West German contracts for the Siberia-to-Europe gas pipeline will of course be implemented. The Kohl government considers itself fortunate not to have been involved in the US-European feud last year in which Washington tried to enforce on non-American licensees and importers of American components its unilateral embargo on compressor rotors. Nonetheless, the Bonn government—like all affected West European governments—rejects any such American right to "extraterritoriality."

This does not mean that Bonn is unresponsive to US policies. The West Germans are ready (even if the French are not) to endorse Washington's proposal that no Western government subsidize credits for exports to the USSR. In any case, Bonn officials argue that the Federal Republic's state credit guarantees (which are administered by the Hermes credit insurance company, a private corporation that acts on behalf of the government[19]) pay for themselves and thus represent no subvention. The West Germans are also ready to go along with tightening CoCom (the consultative group coordinating export control policies of industrialized Western states) restrictions on the export to the East of technology that can be used for military purposes—so long as this does not turn into a fishing expedition. West German leaders are willing further to expand substantially the number of specific items on the ban list of high-technology exports. They refuse, however, to accept restrictions that are so broad as to prohibit the export of energy or other civilian technology. In general terms, the Kohl government simply does not agree with the Reagan administration's reasoning that virtually all large-scale Western industrial exports to the USSR should be avoided because they free Soviet domestic resources for military uses. While the Kohl government may not call the American zeal an attempt to wage economic warfare on the Soviet Union—as some Social Democrats do—it does take a dim view of political restraints on trade.

* * *

The near-term prognosis, then, for the Soviet–West German relationship is: increased Soviet missile-rattling, though not of Khrushchevian proportions; Soviet resignation to the deployments of the new NATO missiles (along with Schadenfreude over the accompanying turmoil in West Germany); and continued apolitical trade. Also, any basic reconsideration of either an arms control agreement or of the two Soviet-German triangles will be postponed until 1984.

[18] For a discussion of the 1962 embargo, see Angela Stent Yergin, "East-West Technology Transfer: European Perspective," *The Washington Papers*, No. 75, Washington, DC, The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 1980, pp. 10–11; and Angela Stent, *From Embargo to Ostpolitik: The Political Economy of West German-Soviet Relations, 1955–1980*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981, pp. 93–126.

[19] See Yergin, op. cit., pp. 40–41, for a brief explanation of West German credit regulations.

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Books

Castro's Failed Revolution

By Luis E. Aguilar

CARLOS FRANQUI. *Diary of the Cuban Revolution.* Trans. by Elaine Kerrigan, et al. New York, NY, Viking Press, 1980.

CARLOS ALBERTO MONTANER. *Secret Report on the Cuban Revolution.* Trans. by Eduardo Zayas-Bazán. New Brunswick, NJ, Transaction Books, 1981.

ANTONIO NAVARRO. *Tocayo: A Cuban Resistance Leader's True Story.* Westport, CT, Sandown Books, 1981.

MAURICE HALPERIN. *The Taming of Fidel Castro.* Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1981.

REALISTIC OBSERVERS are likely to relish the ironies presented by Castro's Cuba: a country that has only just spawned a mass exodus of "boat people" is held up by the radical Latin American Left as a model of development and social change; a proud, even flamboyant national and "nonaligned" leader finds himself bound to the policies of the Soviet Union and dependent upon its largesse. How did this paradoxical situation develop? Briefly, a leftist revolutionary movement responding to real social ills came up with unrealistic and increasingly autocratic "solutions," legitimized mainly by a pervasive personality cult. The resulting economic pressures and ideological affinity forged a solid bond between Moscow and Havana. In the process, liberal nationalists, literary dissidents, and other "bourgeois" elements who raised objections were—as usual in such cases—quickly cast aside.

The four books reviewed here offer an interesting variety of perspectives on this melancholy progression. In type, they range from scholarly analysis to moral inquest, to historical diary, to semi-autobiographical novel. In terms of time, they collectively cover the period from Castro's earliest days as a guerrilla leader through the first decade of his rule, by which point the revolution's failure to live up to its initial promise was clearly apparent.

CARLOS FRANQUI's *Diary of the Cuban Revolution,* unlike the other books, is neither an analysis of Fidel Castro's personality nor an ethical evaluation of his regime. Instead, it offers something equally if not more valuable: a documentary record of the struggle against the dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista. Franqui, who gathered and selected the documents, was involved with the revolution as both participant and observer. Born of peasant parents, he rejected the role of "intellectual" and joined the anti-Batista forces very early on. Eventually he became editor-in-chief of the underground newspaper *Revolución,* head of public information for the national leadership of the 26th of July Movement, and director of Radio Rebelde in the Sierra Maestra mountains.

After Castro's victory, Franqui continued to head the now semi-official *Revolución,* and remained closely associated with the new revolutionary elite. Indeed, he participated in many of the discussions and decisions documented in his book. As a result, he had ample opportunity to observe the movement of the revolution toward socialism. Opposed to the Communists, and disillusioned with Castro's pro-Soviet policies, Franqui soon marched quietly into exile. He is now living and writing in Italy.

The collection of documents offered in this book begins with several interviews about the childhood of Fidel Castro and of Ernesto Che Guevara, his comrade-in-arms, and follows the rebellion through its victory in 1959. In several cases, the letters and other evidence may actually enhance the reputation of the rebels; but Franqui's careful record also serves to refute some of the myths created and maintained by Castro's propaganda. For example, the documents demonstrate the

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falsehood of the argument (later transformed into dogma by Régis Debray) that a small guerrilla band, alone and practically unsupported, defeated Batista's army. In fact, active support and material aid sent from Cuban cities, and even from Miami, were decisive factors in the guerrilla triumph.

A careful reading of Franqui's book also reveals (with the benefit of hindsight, to be sure) the ambitions and attitudes of rebel leaders that, unleashed by victory, help explain the drastic and violent course of the new revolutionary regime. Prominent among these traits was a tendency toward disingenuous declarations or outright duplicity. Contrast, for example, the numerous reports by underground leaders about shipments of arms and money to the Sierra—and Castro's own acknowledgment of arms received from Miami—with his insistent boasts that "the weapons we have are those we have taken from the enemy" (p. 239). Or take Raúl Castro's statement that he was not a Communist but a disciple of Martí, and contrast it with his vindictive outburst against two genuinely non-Communist anti- Batista leaders, Felipe Pazos and Lester Rodríguez, who had signed a declaration of unity in the 26th of July Movement's name:

Even shooting these two gentlemen would not be enough. . . . I am partial to the scalpel, to slice off the tentacles that are winding themselves around us. . . . (p. 250)

There is also a touch of nihilism in Fidel—already noticeable in his favorite slogan of *"Patria o Muerte"*—that would later reappear on a more formidable scale:

We'll burn down the island from one end to the other. We'll make life impossible for everybody under the boot of this shameful tyranny. We'll make the entire nation confront this choice: either Batista is finished off . . . or the country will be ruined and will perish! (p. 215)

Such unguarded quotations, of which there are many, offer a unique insight into the mentality of today's Cuban elite.

Franqui's book is not without editorial flaws. There are some obvious omissions from the list of documents, like the letter from Frank País to Fidel asking for less authoritarian leadership.[1] The organization of the documents, and the accompanying explanatory notes, are not as clear as they should be. But such quibbles aside, this volume is an outstanding contribution to the early history of the Cuban revolution.

If Franqui is largely content to present the historical record and leave interpretation to others, Carlos Alberto Montaner con-

[1] País, along with many other leaders of the anti-Batista forces in the lowland cities (the *"llano"*), were concerned about the growing control imposed by Castro on the entire 26th of July Movement. In July 1957, País wrote Castro a letter recommending a kind of dual command of urban and rural rebels. Castro ignored this advice, and, according to several other members of the movement, refused to sanction a proposed escape to the mountains by País. The latter was subsequently killed by Batista's police in Santiago de Cuba. Shortly afterward, Castro exploited the failure of an April 1958 general strike in order to assume absolute personal direction of the rebellion.

For the text of the País letter, see *Pensamiento Crítico* (Havana), No. 29, June 1969, pp. 252–57. For an analysis of its meaning, see Ramón L. Bonachea and Marta San Martín, *The Cuban Insurrection, 1952–1959*, New Brunswick, NJ, Transaction Books, 1974, pp. 142–45.

Reviewers in This Issue

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sciously sets out to go beyond bare facts and offer what he calls a "moral balance," an "ethical judgment" on Cuba's revolution. The judgment begins with a comparison of the Batista and Castro eras, and accords special attention to the human dimension of the Cuban drama. The result is a penetrating and at times devastating assessment of the new regime.

Montaner is a gifted writer who decided to leave Cuba at an early age, and who has since maintained a certain "enragé" attitude toward the wall of legends and clichés surrounding nearly every major Cuban historical event. He loves to batter down those walls to show the human misery that usually lies behind them. Like Camus, who once wrote that "every revolutionary ends by being either a heretic or a murderer," Montaner belongs to that category of writers more concerned with the thousands of ordinary soldiers killed or maimed in battle than with the "glory" of the victorious general. Readers fascinated by footnotes and statistics will probably disdain this passionate, convincing, but impressionistic discussion. Those, on the other hand, who have been close to the violent reality of revolution, or who suspect there is more to that reality than can be found in "official" histories, will feel at home with Montaner's *Secret Report on the Cuban Revolution*.

The author first places Batista, the *bête noir* of the revolution, in proper perspective: not as a bloody tyrant (what bloody tyrant would have freed Castro and his group after the attack on the Moncada barracks?) but as a mediocre opportunist whose only talent was a capacity to discern the strongest political wind and immediately place himself at its disposal. With no coherent doctrine and no clear goal except that of remaining in power, Batista transformed his army into an instrument for personal enrichment, incapable of mounting serious military operations. This was the decisive factor behind what Montaner sarcastically terms "the war that was not"—the much-vaunted victory of Castro's guerrillas over a demoralized, corrupt army defending an unpopular regime. Indeed, the rebel offensive was carried out with more propaganda than bullets. Notwithstanding the famous figure of 20,000 casualties created by that propaganda, a rigorous count of combatants killed in seven years of insurgency does not reach 1,200 (pp. 10-13).

With the same merciless realism, Montaner examines some of the "accomplishments" of the victorious rebels. It is true, he concedes, that Castro has put Cuba on the political map, "but one must question the usefulness of being on the front page of the newspaper. Amin has made Uganda popular ... without the Ugandan people getting anything out of the spectacle except headaches" (p. 23). Pointing to the sex and race of those who, more than twenty years after the revolution, are still among Cuba's ruling cadres, Montaner concludes that sexism and racism remain quite prevalent on the island. Homosexuals, too, including well-known ones like the writers Lezama Lima and Virgilio Piñera, have also suffered various forms of harassment and repression. Even the acknowledged expansion of education warrants critical examination, once one realizes that Cuban children learn to read by reciting such slogans as "F is for Fidel. We must have Faith in Fidel."

Perhaps the most dramatic example of unmet expectations is in Montaner's chapter on "Che and the New Man," which contrasts Guevara's idealism with the actual results of his policies. Guevara had an abstract conception of the new socialist man. Trusting that conception, he defended moral incentives for production, and launched Cuba on a disastrous program of industrialization. But Guevara could not understand the force of reality and, like Don Quixote, simply moved his dream on to another region—in this case the mountains of Bolivia, where reality buried him. "The saddest thing," comments Montaner, "is that when the Guevara utopia vanished and Soviet pragmatism was imposed, the only original contribution of the Cuban Revolution to communism disappeared" (p. 63).

Montaner's suggestions about how the United States should deal with Castro, and his speculations about Cuba's possible future course, are interesting but naturally much more open to debate. The strength of this book lies rather in its author's honest and incisive investigation of the terrible price that the Cuban people have had to pay, through two decades and more, for totalitarian control thinly veiled by socialist sloganeering.

A SIMILAR TALE of disenchantment, though more romanticized and personal, is told in Antonio Navarro's *Tocayo*. The author was once an atypical member of Cuba's ancien régime. Educated both at home and in the United States, married to a beautiful young lady of the upper class, professing a sort of elegant but genuine cynicism, Navarro—along with most of his class—at first paid little attention to the history or contemporary problems of the Cuban masses. But, jolted by the revolution, this privileged onlooker was briefly swept away by the exhilaration of belonging to a popular movement, of being part of a radical political wave that was supposed to trans-

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form his country. Faith in Cuba and its leader overcame his inner doubts. Like thousands of his compatriots, Navarro longed to help realize the dream of a better life; like so many others, again, he was not allowed to do so. The rigid revolutionary authorities took account only of class origins, not individual desires.

Bitter and disillusioned, Navarro nevertheless did not follow the example of most of his friends. He did not abandon Cuba. He stayed, joined the counterrevolution, risked his life, landed in prison, and only afterward managed to get to the United States.

Tocayo, a semi-autobiographical novel, derives from this true story. The book begins, appropriately, with ominous symbolism: "I walked into my great-aunt's sickroom. She was dying all right." The old Cuba was indeed dying. From then on, the novel follows the adventures and misadventures of "Tocayo," Navarro's code name, from support for the revolution to underground resistance and escape. Vignettes of prerevolutionary Cuban society, impressions of the revolution's leaders, plus a reasonable quota of sex and suspense all make the story quite readable. There is even a bit of pathos, as the shadowy figures of some of those who fought and died for democratic ideals cross Tocayo's path.

As literature, however, novels written in the midst of revolution are seldom satisfying, and *Tocayo* is no exception to this rule. The intensity of historical circumstance seems to overwhelm the capacity for artistic creation. It is indicative, to take an example from another field, that Wagner composed *Götterdämmerung* when his homeland was actually rich and powerful. Seventy years later, when Germany was perishing in true apocalyptic form under the Allied offensive, Richard Strauss, a witness to the final inferno, composed *Metamorphosen*—not one of his better pieces. In the case of *Tocayo,* the subject matter is simply too vast to encompass in so short a novel. The author has not paid enough attention to historical detail, or to his secondary characters. Such "touches of thin brush," as Ortega once called them, might have transformed this book into a superior novel. Still, as a vivid testimony of personal experience that illuminates the fate of thousands of other Cubans in the revolutionary maelstrom, Navarro's account has accomplished its purpose well.

FOR POLITICAL ANALYSIS rather than personal impressions of the Cuban revolution's disappointing outcome, one would do well to consult Maurice Halperin's *The Taming of Fidel Castro.* A valuable sequel to the author's previous work on *The Rise and Decline of Fidel Castro,* this new book expands upon Halperin's original study of political trends in Cuba during the period 1964–68. The author, now emeritus professor of political science at Simon Fraser University in Vancouver, spent those five years as a lecturer in economic geography at the University of Havana and a consultant to the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Trade. It was precisely during that period, according to Halperin, that Castro metamorphosed from independent revolutionary leader to submissive head of yet another Soviet satellite.

The author, convinced that Cuba's revolution was really Castro's personal crusade, carefully analyzes the Cuban leader's major speeches, identifying and relating their most significant passages to general political trends. What emerges from this painstaking research is an illuminating study of Castro's character, focusing on his extraordinary capacity to inspire the Cuban masses by twisting appearances in his favor and using every possible ruse to salvage his prestige, no matter what the situation. The author, however, is not dazzled by Castro's demagogic virtuosity. With a certain detached amusement, Halperin depicts the Cuban leader's ruthless ambition, detailing how his oceanic egotism and intolerance of criticism led him into blunder after blunder.

CASTRO'S PECULIAR combination of "economic irrationality with political astuteness" (p. 219), in this view, pushed his country into economic chaos—eventually dooming it to Soviet control. The Soviet Union (unlike China, which also tried to coax Castro to its side) learned how to manipulate the mercurial Cuban leader; Soviet leaders, "even when severely provoked by their obstreperous client, were always careful not to ruffle his feathers" (p. 205). In the end, such patience and subtle but relentless pressure richly paid off. By 1970, Castro had become one of the most ardent and loyal pro-Soviet spokesmen on the international scene.

Cuban politics, though quite heavily personalized, are not Castro's exclusive preserve, and Halperin's treatment reflects that fact. There are excellent analyses of other issues and personalities, including Che Guevara's failure in Africa (Chapter 15) and the case of Oscar Lewis (Chapter 17), which help clarify the nature of the Cuban regime. Halperin is also one of the few scholars to recognize (in Chapters 4–7) the importance of the 1964 show trial and execution of Marcos Rodríguez, which was exploited by Castro to purge the

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Cuban Communist "old guard."[2] The book's sections on the Tricontinental Conference and on the Sino-Cuban quarrel are likewise both scholarly and perceptive. Halperin provides additional insight into Cuban foreign policy with his examination of still another issue that has not received the attention it deserves: the reasons behind Castro's evolution from friend of Israel to fiery anti-Zionist.

[2]Rodríguez was a member of the Cuban Communist youth organization who allegedly betrayed some of its leaders to Batista's security forces in 1957. Seven years later, Castro dredged up this case in a political trial reminiscent, as this author wrote at the time, of Arthur Koestler's *Darkness at Noon*.

It is a pity that the author does not devote the same careful attention to events since 1970, but confines himelf to a mere summary of this period instead. A more extensive treatment might have rendered Halperin more cautious in concluding that the Cuban revolution is dead. Not that his arguments are wrong; the fresh new Cuba of the "romantic" 1960's *was* dead by 1970. But that is not the end of the story. Perhaps, as Mark Twain might have quipped, Halperin's announcement of Castro's demise as a revolutionary leader is a little premature.

As far back as 1975, in his early African adventures, Castro discovered that his own desire to rekindle flagging socialist fervor by "exporting revolution" was perfectly suited to Moscow's desire for a suitable proxy in the Third World. The triumph of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua in 1979 opened a new revolutionary horizon for Castro in Central America. Today, faced with a stagnant economy and society at home, Cuban-style communism is searching for brighter prospects abroad. Those tempted by its call might consider the long list of disappointments, so exhaustively compiled by the authors represented here, before committing themselves to follow in the footsteps of Fidel.

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Writing the GDR's History

By Norman M. Naimark

HEINZ VOSSKE. *Otto Grotewohl: Biographischer Abriss* (Otto Grotewohl: A Biographical Sketch). East Berlin, Dietz Verlag, 1979.

ERICH HONECKER. *From My Life.* New York, NY, Pergamon Press, 1981.

HEINZ HOFFMANN. *Mannheim, Madrid, Moskau: Erlebtes aus drei Jahrzehnten* (Mannheim, Madrid, Moscow: Experiences of Three Decades). East Berlin, Militärverlag, 1981.

HERMANN WEBER, Ed. *Parteiensystem zwischen Demokratie und Volksdemokratie: Dokumente und Materialien zum Funktionswandel der Parteien und Massenorganisationen in der SBZ/DDR 1945–1950* (The Party System Between Democracy and People's Democracy: Documents and Materials Concerning Functional Change of Parties and Mass Organizations in the Soviet Zone of Occupation/GDR 1945–1950). Cologne, Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1982.

HERMANN WEBER. *Kleine Geschichte der DDR* (A Short History of the GDR). Cologne, Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, Edition Deutschland Archiv, 1980.

KARL WILHELM FRICKE. *Politik und Justiz in der DDR: Zur Geschichte der politischen Verfolgung 1945–1968* (Politics and Justice in the GDR: Toward a History of Political Persecution 1945–1968). Cologne, Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1979.

KARL WILHELM FRICKE. *Die DDR-Staatssicherheit: Entwicklung, Strukturen, Aktionsfelder* (The GDR State Security: Development, Structures, Fields of Action). Cologne, Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1982.

DAVID PIKE. *German Writers in Soviet Exile, 1933–1945.* Chapel Hill, NC, University of North Carolina Press, 1982.

GREGORY W. SANDFORD. *From Hitler to Ulbricht: The Communist Reconstruction of East Germany 1945–46.* Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1983.

ILSE SPITTMANN and KARL WILHELM FRICKE, Eds. *17. Juni 1953: Arbeiteraufstand in der DDR* (17 June 1953: Worker Uprising in the GDR). Cologne, Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, Edition Deutschland Archiv, 1982.

STALIN DIED 30 years ago this March. Thirty years ago this June, East Berlin and the whole of Soviet-occupied Germany was rocked by the first of a series of revolts against Soviet power in Eastern Europe. Since those traumatic events of 1953, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) has increasingly taken on the aura of permanence. The construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961 certainly helped convince the population of East Germany of this fact; the GDR's acceptance into the international community in the early 1970's helped convince the world. But primarily it has been the ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED),[1] in partnership with the Soviets, that has assured political continuity and socioeconomic stability in East Germany.

First under Walter Ulbricht in the mid-1960's, and even more so under Erich Honecker in the 1970's, the GDR took on the symbols, even content, of nationhood, that process being in part an active (if not completely responsible) reevaluation of its own history. Moreover, Soviet-American détente and Bonn's conciliatory Ostpolitik eased tensions in the area and provided the backdrop for historians in the Soviet Union, East Germany, and the West to examine postwar developments in Germany. Previously, West German scholars had

[1] The SED, as the "new party of the working class," was formed in April 1946 through a merger of the Communist Party of Germany and the Social Democratic Party. For a recent overview of the development of Soviet-East German integration, see Eric Waldman, "The German Democratic Republic: Moscow's Faithful Ally," in Milorad M. Drachkovitch, Ed., *East Central Europe: Yesterday-Today-Tomorrow*, Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1982, pp. 267–75.

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been understandably obsessed by the fall of the Weimar Republic and the rise of Adolf Hitler; East German historians had myopically recounted the development of the Communist Party of Germany (KPD, and later the SED); and American, British, and Soviet historians focused on postwar Germany simply as an unresolved problem of international politics. How could one write the history of a nation that did not exist, of a country that might disappear? The 30th anniversary of the GDR, celebrated in 1979, marked a convenient symbolic moment for the coming-of-age of East Germany. Even Soviet historians understood the anniversary in that context: "Thirty years of the existence of the GDR is a long enough period to speak of the stability and victory of the socioeconomic and social-political system on German soil, ... to view the German worker-peasant state as an historical reality."[2]

Of course, Soviet historians go on to point out that the stabilization of the GDR as a state was dictated by the laws of history, a view eagerly shared by their East German colleagues. However, Soviet studies on the GDR emphasize somewhat more the importance of the Soviet Military Administration in creating "favorable political circumstances" for the social and economic transformation in the East than do East German works, which tend to focus on the initiatives of German Communists and of "class-conscious" Social Democrats.[3] But if some East German nationalism was allowed to creep into the writing of GDR history late in the Ulbricht period, much of it has been erased in the Honecker era in favor of an approach that emphasizes the general East European revolutionary context of transformations in the GDR and thus the critical importance of the Soviet model and Soviet leadership.[4]

Despite the obligatory kowtowing to the Soviets, East German historiography still must create its own heroes, states the publisher in the notices for Army General Heinz Hoffmann's memoirs, in order "to preserve history, to cultivate traditions, and to strengthen [socialist] points of view." In fact, the 30th anniversary of the founding of the GDR prompted the publication of dozens of memoirs, including those of Hoffmann and Honecker, and biographies, including that of Otto Grotewohl, the first Minister President of the GDR. It is difficult to understand, however, how these hagiographic, dull, one-dimensional works are going to bolster the GDR's "point of view."

THE HEINZE VOSSKE biography of Grotewohl is by far the worst. As a party historian (rather than a politician), Vosske apparently feels he can take no chances, explore no real issues, discuss no serious conflicts. A wooden, stylized Grotewohl emerges as leader of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) in Braunschweig in the 1920's. Vosske's Grotewohl makes a number of minor "mistakes" and "errors" early in his career because he does not yet "understand" the necessity for unity with the Communists. There is no mention of Grotewohl's very tough anti-KPD rhetoric in the late 1920's and early 1930's, nor of his later opposition to the Oder-Neisse line, the post–World War II demarcation between Germany and Poland. Most important, Grotewohl's crucial decision to join forces with the KPD after the war is submerged in anti-Schumacher rhetoric (Kurt Schumacher was the West German SPD leader after the war) and platitudes about the inevitability of union between the KPD and SPD. Why *did* Grotewohl lead the SPD in the Eastern Zone down the path of unity despite his earlier hostility to the Communists and their program? Unfortunately, the answer to this important question, and many others, will not be found in this biography.

Readers will get a somewhat better sense of the personalities of Honecker and Hoffmann from their respective memoirs. Both men were born and raised in what is today the Federal Republic of Germany—Honecker is from the Saarland; Hoffmann from Mannheim—and both express great affection for their home regions. Both also came from thoroughly Social-Democratic worker families, and both found their sense of purpose, and felt wanted and needed, in the Young Communist League of Germany (KJVD). But here the similarities end. While Honecker claims that "I do not remember a single moment in my life in which I have doubted our cause" (p. 9), Hoffmann is at least willing to admit vacillations, questions, mistakes. Although Honecker talks of his youthful "Sturm und Drang" period, the account he gives of his life, even of events that should have been exciting—his first trip to Moscow in 1930–31; his three years' work in the underground (1932–35); his imprisonment by the Gestapo (December 1935); his critical role in the building of the

[2] See *Istoriya Germanskoy Demokraticheskoy Respubliki* (History of the German Democratic Republic), Moscow, Nauka, 1979.

[3] Compare, e.g., N. F. Babantsev, *Stanovleniye gosudarstvenno-pravovoy sistemy Germanskoy Demokraticheskoy Respubliki* (Formation of the State Legal System in the German Democratic Republic), Leningrad, Izdatel'stvo Leningradskogo universiteta, 1981, p. 31, with Heinz Heitzer, *GDR: An Historical Outline*, Dresden, Verlag Zeit im Bild, 1981, p. 14.

[4] See *Geschichte der SED: Abriss* (History of the SED: An Outline), East Berlin, Dietz Verlag, 1978, pp. 5–6; *Istoriya Germanskoy Demokraticheskoy Respubliki*, op. cit., pp. 490–501; and Babantsev, op. cit., p. 55.

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Free German Youth (FDJ) after the war—is bland and emotionless. At points, he attempts to appear fair-minded, expressing a debt to Herbert Wehner, once a KPD member but now a Bonn Social Democrat, and generously citing Western historians of interwar Germany. Honecker also broaches for the first time his much-discussed voluntary return to Brandenburg-Görden prison in mid-April 1945 after having escaped five weeks earlier, and he provides a plausible explanation why he was able to avoid Gestapo punishment (he claims the Nazi police apparatus was in such disarray at the end of the war that they bungled his case). But too much is left unmentioned in Honecker's memoir, especially when dealing with the postwar period.

In contrast, Hoffmann's memoirs are fascinating, though the General is not above the kind of obfuscation that pervades the Honecker and Vosske books. Like Honecker, who states that as a first-grader he felt the vibrations of the "Red October in Russia" (p. 7), Hoffmann too claims an early affinity for Soviet Marxism, attributing his understanding of Lenin's importance to the masses of Russian workers to Fëdor Gladkov's novel *Cement*, which he read in 1925 when he was 15 years old (pp. 95-96). (In fact, only later editions of *Cement* said much at all about Lenin.) Still, Hoffmann at least gives us a *person*, a tall, slim, athletic son of a disabled worker, who enjoyed both the duties and the togetherness of the Communist youth organizations. He even relished the street-fighting, the disruptions of Nazi marches, and the sometimes dangerous election campaigns of the late Weimar period.

Once in the Soviet Union, however, Hoffmann apparently had difficulty adjusting to the rigid discipline of the Comintern's "Lenin School," the alma mater as well of Honecker and of Erich Mielke, chief of the GDR's Ministry of State Security. Although subjected to furious criticism and self-criticism, Hoffmann nevertheless followed orders and tried "to understand the core of this critique" (p. 301). He does not mention the Soviet purges of the 1930's, of which he was surely aware, nor does he conceal his fervent admiration of Stalin. (Hoffmann tells the story of meeting Stalin, who offered him a cigarette. He thought about refusing, being an avid nonsmoker, but thought better of it and took the cigarette!)

Hoffmann was clearly thrilled to leave Moscow in July 1936 for the International Brigades and the battlefields of Spain. While he says little about the internecine struggles among leftists in Spain, one can certainly see the "Red" German militarist in his accounts of the battles and the quite serious wounds he suffers. Hoffmann ends his memoir with his long convalescence in Moscow in 1938–41—which may be just as well, since if Honecker's memoirs are any indication, Hoffmann probably would not have said much about the postwar period anyway.

EAST GERMAN historiography has changed radically over the past dozen years. Party historians no longer merely focus on the recent development of communism in Germany, but now venture deep into the German past to claim for the GDR such unlikely antecedents as Martin Luther, Frederick the Great, and Otto von Bismarck.[5] Furthermore, according to Soviet sources, East German historiography has even determined that the division of Germany goes back to the 10th through 12th centuries: "The border between different economic regions of Western and Eastern Europe (in a geographic sense) did not follow along a line dividing Germany from Slavic countries, but one dividing Germany itself."[6] West German scholarship is also changing and has recently overcome its inhibitions about investigating the postwar period. In this regard, the historiography of the GDR is particularly indebted to two authors: Professor Hermann Weber of the University of Mannheim and Karl Wilhelm Fricke, the head of the East-West section of Radio Germany in Cologne.

Weber has put together in Mannheim a team of scholars devoted to studying the development of political parties and mass organizations in the GDR. *Parteiensystem* is the initial publication of the group; presumably, monographs on each party and on each mass organization will follow. There are 14 chapters in the book, each containing a collection of rare documents preceded by an introductory essay. Particularly useful are the documents from Jacob Kaiser's papers, which are appended to Siegfried Sucket's excellent essay on the conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU) in East Germany. This study—together with former CDU leader J. B. Gradl's informa-

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*For an insightful discussion of the phenomenon of "rehistorization," see Timothy Garton Ash, *"Und willst du nicht mein Bruder sein . . ." Die DDR heute* ("If You Don't Want To Be My Brother . . ." The GDR Today), Hamburg, Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag, 1981, pp. 89–142. Ash, who wrote for the *Spectator* (London) and *The Times* (London) on Eastern Europe and Germany, provides a series of fascinating portraits of people and places in the GDR. One hopes it will soon appear in English.

[5]G. E. Sanchuk, "Some Questions on the History of Slavic Peoples in the Early Feudal Period in the Works of GDR Historians," in *Mezhdunarodnyye svyazi stran tsentral'noy, vostochnoy i yugovostochnoy yevropy i slavyano-germanskiye otnosheniya* (International Ties Among the Countries of Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe and Slavic-Germanic Relations), Moscow, Nauka, 1968, p. 264.

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tive, moving memoirs[7]—tells the tragic story of a "bourgeois-democratic" party in the Soviet Zone. Initially, the Christian Democratic Union's leader in the East, Andreas Hermes, was bullied by the Soviet Military Administration to withdraw his opposition to its methods of land reform. When he refused, he was forced to resign and was replaced as head of the party by Jacob Kaiser. Though somewhat more flexible than Hermes in his dealings with the Soviets and the new SED, Kaiser nevertheless insisted that the CDU remain an independent party. Kaiser's resistance to the Socialist Unity Party's "bloc politics"—that is, his attempt to retain the CDU's integrity in the "antifascist" bloc (formally known as the Democratic Bloc of Parties and Mass Organizations) without being subsumed by such SED-controlled mass organizations as the Free German Trade Union and the Free German Youth— represents a major component of the German struggle for democracy in the East. Kaiser's growing popularity and the CDU's increasing strength at the grass roots level in the Eastern Zone prompted the Soviets to move quickly in December 1947; Kaiser, Gradl, and other antibloc CDU leaders were deprived of their positions in their party and forced to leave East Germany.

Professor Weber's *Kleine Geschichte der DDR* tells much the same story, though in greatly abbreviated form. The book is designed to provide a starting point for studying GDR history, and it fulfills this task perfectly. Weber enhances the value of his study by including informative charts, a basic bibliography, detailed chronologies of each stage of the GDR's development, and brief excerpts from relevant documents. The author is also quite judicious in the presentation of material, providing the most up-to-date information available and identifying those points where there are significant problems with his sources. Yet, Weber is too careful here about making judgments, too concerned with simply laying out the facts of East German history. Still, this is a marvelous introductory book and should be translated into English.[8]

Fricke, on the other hand, is more willing to share his observations on the GDR—observations that are based on decades of collecting documents, reports, and memoirs concerning the widespread political use of the judicial and police organs in East Germany. The result is *Politik und Justiz,* a chronological account of political repression in East Germany from 1945 to 1968, interspersed with major portions of 217 legal and personal documents. Fricke's study is also a well-conceived and forcefully argued indictment of the judicial system under the Communists, based above all on the personal recollections of some 4,000 former political prisoners. These memoirs, which were collected in the Federal Republic in 1960, are liberally quoted by Fricke, reminding the reader again and again that political stability in the Eastern Zone was purchased at the price of the suffering or death of over a quarter of a million political prisoners (p. 7).

Fricke's most recent book, *Die DDR-Staatssicherheit,* analyzes the development and structure of the Ministry of State Security (MfS), the organization which, more than any other institution in the GDR except the Communist party, was responsible for maintaining that political stability at any cost. Basing his analysis on a host of printed publications and official pronouncements, as well as on the reports of *Staasi* defectors and the internal memoranda they often brought with them, Fricke has constructed an astonishingly detailed account of the security apparatus and its internal and external functions. His study covers a wide range, from the Comintern's use of German Communists as agents (the *Staasi* chiefs Wilhelm Zaisser, Ernst Wollweber, and Mielke all worked for the Comintern) to the MfS's troubles in the 1950's, when both Zaisser and Wollweber were purged after having made the mistake of identifying their agency with opponents of Ulbricht. Although Fricke does not directly discuss the critical role played by the Ministry of State Security and its chief Mielke in the Honecker era, he makes it clear that the SED and the security apparatus now share state power. MfS agents are pervasive in GDR institutions (as well as in institutions in the Federal Republic), and are firmly integrated into the Soviet intelligence system. Fricke's great service to readers is to demonstrate this with exhaustive documentation and careful argumentation, making his study the best work not only on the GDR's security apparatus but on any state security service in Eastern Europe.

WEBER'S AND FRICKE'S work in these books and elsewhere demonstrates that solid history can be written even if most document repositories are closed to Westerners

[7] See J. B. Gradl, *Anfang unter dem Sowjetstern: Die CDU 1945–1948 in der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone Deutschlands* (Beginning under the Soviet Star: The CDU 1945–1948 in the Soviet Occupation Zone of Germany), Cologne, Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1981.

[8] At present, the best and most up-to-date survey in English of GDR history, politics, foreign relations, and society as a whole is David Childs, *The GDR: Moscow's German Ally,* London, George Allen and Unwin, 1982. Childs's discussions of recent cultural developments, including literature, film, and television, are especially useful.

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and the secondary literature is incomplete. Two recent studies, by the American scholars David Pike and Gregory Sandford, show also that persistent effort (when facilitated by the official US–GDR academic exchange) can turn up important, previously inaccessible archival sources. Pike's study of German writers in exile in the Soviet Union especially benefits from exceptionally productive archival research in Budapest, Moscow, and East Berlin. For example, Pike makes excellent use of Willi Bredel's unpublished wartime diary, in which the famous German "proletarian" writer details his experiences in the Soviet Union. Bredel describes his dangerous and futile attempts—shouting through a megaphone over Nazi lines—to urge German soldiers to desert. He also portrays his comrade Erich Weinert roaming through battlefields cluttered with the corpses of German soldiers—Weinert weeping and moaning aloud at his inability to have convinced them to lay down their arms.

By drawing on this sort of rich documentation Pike is able to illuminate an almost completely unknown chapter in the development of what might be called a "Soviet" German culture, weaving his way through the literary struggles of the 1920's and 1930's, describing the purges of the German exiles in the Soviet Union, depicting the impotence of such notables in the West as Bertolt Brecht to save their friends from these purges. (Even the children of German Communists in the USSR were arrested by Soviet authorities in 1937, Pike tells us, for allegedly attempting to form a Hitler youth group in their Ernst Thälmann Club.)[9] Still, German writers in Russia did their duty to the socialist motherland—the "human fortress," in GDR Minister of Culture Johannes Becher's words, against a "storm of barbarism" (p. 252). They wrote stories and articles in its defense, and they attacked its critics as fascists and Trotskyites. The origins of East German culture can be traced to these writers in the Soviet Union in the 1930's, just as the party was "cleaned up" during that period for the leadership of Wilhelm Pieck and Ulbricht. Yet, as Pike aptly demonstrates, the alternatives on the left to the development of a Soviet German culture were numerous and vibrant during this period, and it was *not* inevitable that Sovietized German writers would rise to power.

In contrast to Pike's broad-ranging study, Sandford's book on the Communist reconstruction of Germany is much narrower in scope, focusing on the sources of internal support for communism in Soviet-occupied Germany in the years 1945–46. Sandford has done important work in the archives of the Free German Trade Union and of the Peasants' Mutual Aid Association, and his examination of land reform in East Germany is especially well-researched and well-documented. The author points out the important economic as well as ideological motivations for the nationalization of industry and for the expropriations in agriculture, a useful exercise that sheds new light on the workings of the Soviet Military Administration of Germany.

Unfortunately, Sandford tends to accept uncritically the judgments of the KPD documents he consults and the GDR informants he interviews. This calls into question some of his conclusions and observations. He describes the SPD on the eve of Hitler's takeover as "a catchall for opportunists of all political persuasions who wanted the presumed shelter of belonging to a socialist party, but shunned the rigid discipline of the KPD" (p. 270, fn. 70). In fact, the SPD's record of resolute opposition to the rise of the Nazis was certainly better than that of the Communists. He badly underestimates the support for and organizational prowess of the two postwar "bourgeois parties," the Liberal Democratic Party and the CDU, and he declares that neither party had a "coherent ideology" (pp. 61–62)—propositions that Gradl would certainly contest.[10] He also maintains that those landowners who anticipated "expropriation" engaged in "sabotage" and that the peasants were "relieved" when the "intimidating presence of their erstwhile masters" was removed as a result of the land expropriations (p. 108). And he insists that the KPD stood in an "invulnerable" ideological position vis-à-vis the Social Democrats, and, in part as a result, exercised "immense psychological leverage" over them (p. 154). That Sandford oversteps his evidence to make such unequivocal judgments mars an otherwise interesting, compact, and important study of the KPD and of the sources of its popular support in 1945–46.

IN WEST BERLIN on June 17 of this year, politicians and citizens alike observed the 30th anniversary of the East German uprising. A conference of historians used the occasion to examine the role of the "nation" in German history. Groups of rightist youth demonstrated on the streets of Berlin, provoking left-

[9]The Ernst Thälmann Club in Moscow was initially organized for foreign workers in the Soviet Union. With some 2,000 members in the mid-1930's, it became a center for German political and literary activity, attracting the unwelcome attention of the Soviet secret police. The club was dissolved in 1938. See Pike's discussion on pp. 322–23 and 325.

[10]See, e.g., Gradl, op. cit., pp. 31–32.

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ist disturbances and police intervention. And in the Bundestag, President Karl Carstens's speech on the occasion of the 17th of June, "the day of German freedom," was boycotted by the Green Party. Against this background of the politicization of the June 17th holiday, it is especially noteworthy that Ilse Spittmann and Karl Wilhelm Fricke published, under the auspices of *Deutschland Archiv*, a fine collection of essays, memoirs of the time, documents, and a selected bibliography to commemorate the struggle of East German workers for a better life.[11] Equally important, *17. Juni 1953* asks serious questions about the background of the uprising. What role did the struggle for succession among Stalin's heirs play in the East Berlin crisis? Why did Ulbricht stubbornly insist on maintaining impossibly high work norms when he made so many other concessions with regard to the "New Course," the party's program for the accelerated construction of socialism in the GDR? What were the exact dimensions of the fighting and of the subsequent judicial repression?

Especially innovative is the contribution by Klaus Ewers and Thorsten Quest on worker attitudes during and after the crisis. The authors focus narrowly on workers in state factories and base their observations primarily on reports by workers who fled to the West. What emerges is a portrait of the party's pathetic lack of influence among the working class. According to the informants, on those rare occasions when the party did allow workers to express their opinions freely, SED officials were put on the defensive and unable to match the arguments of their supposed patrons. "It's all old cheese," a worker is reported to have shouted to a party spokesman at the Potsdam Karl Marx Works, before the assembled workers simply filed out as the official spoke (p. 37). And when Ulbricht appeared before a group of workers at the Berlin Niles Works with a phalanx of police and bodyguards, the workers reportedly shouted, "Ai, ai, look who's here with so many handmaidens," and jeered at him, "long live the king of the workers!" (p. 37).

THE EAST GERMAN government allowed the anniversary of the 1953 uprising to pass without the kind of celebrations, parades of factory brigades, and predictable speeches that accompanied the 20th anniversary of the building of the Berlin Wall—officially heralded in the GDR as the "antifascist defense wall." Despite 30 years of rule, the East German Communists continue to hide from the uncomfortable corners of their own history, a dangerous game given the already severe internal strains on the party's attempt to formulate a specifically East German political culture, one that unquestioningly supports the maintenance of that rule. Christa Wolf, noted author and member of the SED since 1949, correctly lectures her countrymen that such a consensus is impossible until the Germans in the East come to terms with their history: "What is past is not dead; it is not even past. We cut ourselves off from it; we pretend to be strangers."[12]

[11] *Deutschland Archiv* (Cologne) published a similarly excellent volume on the 20th anniversary of the building of the Berlin Wall: Jürgen Rühle and Gunter Holzweissig, *13. August 1961*, Cologne, Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, Edition Deutschland Archiv, 1981.

[12] Christa Wolf, *A Model Childhood*, trans. by Ursule Molinaro and Hedwig Rappolt, New York, NY, Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 1980, p. 3.

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Laboring Under Socialism

By Paul Hollander

LEONARD SCHAPIRO and JOSEPH GODSON, Eds. *The Soviet Worker: Illusion and Realities*. New York, NY, St. Martin's Press, 1981.

ADRIAN KARATNYCKY, ALEXANDER J. MOTYL, and ADOLPH STURMTHAL. *Workers' Rights, East and West*. New Brunswick, NJ, Transaction Books, 1980.

BLAIR A. RUBLE. *Soviet Trade Unions: Their Development in the 1970s*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981.

JAN F. TRISKA and CHARLES GATI, Eds. *Blue-Collar Workers in Eastern Europe*. London, Allen & Unwin, 1981.

MIKLOS HARASZTI. *A Worker in a Worker's State*. Tr. by Michael Wright. New York, NY, Universe Books, 1978.

IT IS HARD to find a better way to assess Soviet and East European routes to socialism than by examining the condition of working classes in the countries concerned. They were, after all, supposed to be the prime beneficiaries and leading social force of the new socialist order, destined to dominate the system by virtue of both their expanded numbers and high level of political consciousness. Workers under socialism were supposed to be substantially better off than workers under capitalism.

The reality, of course, is different. The books reviewed here all prompt reflection on a major issue of our time: What is left of the ideals of socialism, in light of the fate of working classes in avowedly socialist countries? What are the areas of congruence or discrepancy between the theories of socialism and the observable practices inspired by those theories?

There are a number of other important issues these studies address. How, for example, does the status of workers in the Soviet Union compare with their status in Eastern Europe? What are the differences and similarities within Eastern Europe? What, if any, influence do the working classes have on the exercise of political power, and what is the nature of their political participation? Has the size and composition of this class changed? What has happened to social mobility out of and within the working class (e.g., the transformation of agricultural laborers into skilled industrial workers)? What shifts have taken place in the material living conditions and expectations of workers in recent years? What has been the relationship, if any, between workers and the intelligentsia? Have workers in any of these countries been agents of social change? What part is played by trade unions in the life of the workers? Are workers alienated under socialism? And if so, in what ways?

Of course, there are limits to the generalizations that can be made confidently or categorically about the condition of workers in both the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. There are also significant differences within Eastern Europe, including differences in the amount of information available about such matters. We know far more, for example, about workers (and most other things) in Hungary, Yugoslavia or Poland than in Albania or Bulgaria. The five volumes under discussion illustrate, in different ways and different degrees, both the value and the limits of current research in this field.

ON THE CONDITION of Soviet workers, perhaps the single most informative piece in all these volumes is Fyodor Turovsky's essay in the anthology edited by Leonard Schapiro and Joseph Godson. The author is identified as "a Russian jurist, a former legal consultant to *Literaturnaya gazeta* and former chairman of the legal committee of the Moscow Construction Workers' Union," who emigrated from the Soviet Union in 1976. While Western scholarship has made significant contributions to our knowledge about Soviet life—as reflected in the other essays in this collection—it is hard to duplicate the revelatory power inherent in the writings of those with

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an inside knowledge of how the Soviet system works. Such accounts are especially refreshing when the bland generalizations and abstract concepts of Western social science (often permeated by the spirit, if not the letter, of structural-functionalism) are increasingly leaving their imprint on Soviet studies. Moreover, even lately it has not been easy for outsiders, especially Western scholars or journalists, to get close to the ways of life and shared experiences of Soviet workers. This difficulty is illuminated in another contribution to the same volume, by Murray Seeger, which details the problems he faced in attempting to learn about industrial safety and accidents. By contrast, Turovsky's legal experience in defending Soviet workers is particularly helpful in elucidating the gap separating their life, as they experience it, from life as it is supposed to be according to official dogma.

As is often the case, it is the detail that counts. We know that Soviet workers are generally underpaid, both in terms of what they need and expect, and in terms of what industrial workers earn in the West. Yet it is quite another thing to learn the specifics of a frugal daily budget for a family of three (7.30 rubles, according to Turovsky), about other basic expenses that wages do not cover, and about the variety of workers' efforts to supplement their earnings:

People steal their working hours so as to make use of them in a second job. Some do not appear at all, others leave the factory during the working day, or sit idle at work so as to save their strength for working somewhere else in the evenings. (pp. 161–62)

Absenteeism, according to Soviet newspapers, involves 20 percent of the work force. Moreover, according to Turovsky, a "chain reaction of deviousness has developed at every possible level of the socialist economy." Thus, for example,

If the workers were paid what they had really earned, their pay slips would be so small that they would leave at once for another site with an engineer-in-chief willing to pay them a more satisfactory wage. That is why the chief tells his norm calculator to fabricate hundreds of false orders "fulfilled" so as to cover up for the idle days, and to include in the reports of work completed . . . non-existent tasks which the workers have not in fact carried out. (p. 163–64)

Stealing from the work place is another well-known method of supplementing wages, despite the draconian retaliation such thefts may provoke. The author relates the case of a 16-year-old worker he defended for trying to steal from his factory a kilogram of rusty nails "to mend the old shed where his family stored his firewood." He and his family lived "in one rented room in a private house, no more than 3 metres square. . . . Kolya's father was a veteran and invalid of the Second World War. . . . They had been on the waiting list for a flat for more than 10 years. . . ." Incredibly, the defendant was sentenced to fifteen years (p. 167). Stories like this do not often come to the attention of Western students of Soviet working-class life. Small-scale stealing, of course, coexists with large-scale embezzling by those far removed from the workbench.

Not surprisingly, according to Turovsky, unions are hardly effective champions of workers rights, especially since "90% of union officials are workers who receive their orders from the management, are dependent on the latter for their wages, and look to the management for all their 'perks' like bonuses, new flats and subsidised holidays" (p. 172). Thus, for example, laws protecting women from heavy manual labor (such as unloading frozen sand or gravel from freight cars) are often ignored, in part because it is cheaper to use human labor than machines. Other problems experienced by female Soviet workers resemble those of some American women:

There are employers who regard it as a grave disadvantage if a woman is married since there is always the threat that she will leave her work for a few months. . . to have a baby. . . . If she returns to work when she is still breast-feeding she is entitled to extra time off to feed the baby. . . . (pp. 178–79)

Murray Seeger's contribution corroborates Turovsky's case studies. A former Moscow Bureau chief of *The Los Angeles Times,* Seeger characterizes the Soviet labor force as "a collection of sullen, disillusioned, unproductive workers who have little to say in economic decisions and who have no outlet for their grievances" (p. 105). Another interesting chapter, by Max Rallis, presents data obtained from interviews with Soviet workers abroad. For understandable reasons, Rallis does not reveal exactly how these interviews were obtained, and the results are surprising in that the respondents were quite open and willing to criticize working and living conditions. A compilation of "Retail Prices in Moscow and Four Western Cities in March 1979," by Keith Bush, provides a useful and thorough empirical indicator of comparative living standards. The lead chapter by Leonard Schapiro, on the condition of Soviet workers, as well as other essays on "Wage

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and Income Policies" (Peter Wiles), "Planning and the Worker" (David A. Dyker), "The Role of the Trade Unions" (Joseph Godson), and "Welfare and Social Security" (Alastair McAuley), make this collection a most informative update on virtually all important aspects of the life of Soviet workers.

BY CONTRAST, *Workers' Rights, East and West* has a somewhat narrower substantive but much wider geographic focus. It provides useful summaries of the part played by unions in the USSR and individual East European countries in the utilization and control of the labor force. This book continues the story of the deformation of trade unions in that part of the world, adding a number of important documents indicating the desire of some dissenting workers in Eastern Europe to form genuine unions. The first part of the book also presents comparative data on workers' rights and unions in six West European countries and the United States.

A much more detailed look at one crucial part of this subject is offered in Blair Ruble's *Soviet Trade Unions*. While recognizing a long history of insensitivity to workers' demands and persecution of those trying to express them, the author finds Soviet labor unions somewhat improved since the 1960's and 1970's as organizations helpful to workers. He also tells about the emergence of occasional conflicts between unions and management over working conditions. Ruble sums up post-Stalin labor policies by noting that

what Khrushchev and Brezhnev sought, each in his own way, was to end the excesses of Stalinism without dismantling the system that gave rise to them. To do so they were willing to pay off blue-collar workers with more money as long as greater income did not mean greater power. (p. 5)

The author observes, as others have before, that Soviet workers benefited from a shortage of labor and the resulting competition for their services. He regards Soviet unions as "significant institutions" with "a favorable influence on the lives of Soviet workers" at the factory level. Ruble concludes that "pressure exists to narrow the gap between theory and practice in Soviet labor relations" (p. 144).

Ruble's book, while in many ways an impressive scholarly study of certain aspects of Soviet trade unions, suffers from its author's apprehension about becoming judgmental. The desire for objectivity is laudable, but it sometimes leads to blandness, or worse: "The question one should ask is not whether Soviet trade unions represent workers but when, where and how." "Ultimately," writes Ruble in a similar vein, "Western observers must relate the lessons of Soviet labor development to those of their own society" (p. 8). This last is a bewildering proposition, since Western unions developed in a pluralistic political environment in which the government did not seek to set up its own unions or claim to represent the workers' interests.

The book also offers a few euphemisms or understatements that will provoke some unintended amusement among Western students of Soviet affairs (as they surely would among Soviet dissidents): calling the subordination of unions to the party and government "centralizing tendencies"; stating that "Soviet union elections differ from those in the West"; or observing that "Soviet trade unions have neither entirely succeeded nor entirely failed in meeting their dual functions" (p. 104). Perhaps allowances should be made for some of the conditions under which this book was researched (in the USSR on an IREX exchange), and for the presumed desire of the author to resume his research in the Soviet Union one day on such a politically sensitive topic. Notwithstanding these reservations, this is a well-written, clearly organized, and interesting book, especially in regard to plant-level union, party, and management relations.

THE LAST TWO volumes on our list complement Ruble's Soviet focus with an abundance of interesting detail on Eastern Europe. How have the working classes there fared under "developed socialism"? This phase, according to official theory, entails greater socioeconomic differentiation, along with the further growth and increasing complexity of productive forces. In Hungary, it is even acknowledged that limited conflicts can surface between different groups in society, due to a new division of labor. Also, under "developed socialism" social mobility slows down, and hereditary recruitment becomes more common among both elites and working classes.

The search for ways to minimize the resulting social tensions poses an important issue for Eastern Europe's Communist regimes. According to several contributors to *Blue-Collar Workers in Eastern Europe*, the regimes in these countries entered into a kind of "social contract" with the working classes. The latter, writes Walter D. Connor,

will forswear political challenge and organized expression of discontent, will work ... and generally remain quiet. The regime in turn undertakes to avoid broad-scale terror or coercion ... and promises to provide ... moderate

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but steady increases in the living standard, secure employment and to shield workers from the psychological status consequences of a too-evidently differentiated reward system. . . . (p. 165)

Jiri Valenta makes the same point in the Czech context, observing that, "by assuring them of a conspicuously higher standard of living, the regime strives to dull the workers' senses to the political conditions and any notion of class consciousness" (p. 212).

One may question the degree to which this idea applies across the board in Eastern Europe, but it certainly has some validity in countries like Hungary, East Germany and Czechoslovakia. More so than in the West, where Herbert Marcuse intended it to apply, the idea of an apolitical, petty-bourgeois working class, pacified by stability and modest improvements in its standard of living, has become a reality in parts of Eastern Europe. Beyond Marcuse's wildest dreams, in such countries people consume—within the prevailing economic limits—without guilt and with furious determination; they are increasingly privatized, withdrawn from and contemptuous of public affairs; however, they are not brainwashed, as Marcuse's imaginary Western proletariat was supposed to be. And, unlike the West, in the East such resignation derives partly from the experience of several defeated revolts, and from the continued presence of formidable police and military forces ready to enforce peace on the terms of the regimes in power.

Blue-Collar Workers in Eastern Europe is in some ways a counterpart to the Schapiro and Godson volume on the Soviet working class. With 16 chapters, embracing every East European country (though saying little about Albania, Bulgaria, and East Germany), it is probably the most comprehensive recent survey of the condition of workers in the region. Nevertheless, since the essays were written before the crushing of Solidarity in December 1981, some of them illustrate the all-too-familiar limits of prediction by social scientists. There is little to suggest that the authors envisioned the speedy and radical suppression of Solidarity, and especially the manner in which this would be carried out. (To be sure, the inability to anticipate such developments was widely shared by diplomats, politicians, and media people, who also failed to imagine that the Polish security forces themselves would dispatch Solidarity without Soviet help.) Thus one reads with sadness the painfully dated predictions about the Polish situation by Alex Pravda:

. . . the development and interaction of the regional economic, social and organizational trends we have outlined will produce a new set of rules governing the relations between workers and regime, rules which will require more adaptation from the political authorities than from the working class. (p. 66)

George Kolankiewicz, writing about "Poland 1980," likewise anticipated "the restoration of the work ethic" that would follow upon "the retreat of censorship." "A confident working class which has regained its collective self-respect," he added, "should be treated as an asset and not as a threat by the communist leadership" (p. 154)—a proposition with which only the Polish regime would quarrel. As we now know, none of these hopes bore fruit.

ONLY ONE of the books reviewed here deals with what is perhaps the most significant issue in any assessment of workers under socialism, indeed in any discussion of socialism today—alienation. Alienation was allegedly the product and identifying characteristic par excellence of capitalism. The concept has been loaded with so many connotations that, in the end, it has become something of a catch-all for the widest possible array of ills associated with life in modern, urban industrial societies in the West—a label attached to every form of Weltschmerz, ennui, and sense of meaninglessness experienced by educated members of Western society. Often it has been merged, for all practical purposes, with that other venerable conceptual treasure of sociological theory, anomie.

It is the great virtue of Miklos Haraszti's *A Worker in a Worker's State* that it vividly restores the original context of alienation: the place and conditions of work, and the workers' attitudes toward these conditions. In case anyone doubted it before, this book makes it very clear that alienation under socialism is widespread, and closely resembles the species that exists (or is supposed to exist) under capitalism. As with some other features of working-class life and attitudes under socialism, it took a citizen, or former citizen, of a socialist country to tell the tale. Even in the most open and "developed" socialist states, Western experts or exchange scholars will not be in a position to explore such phenomena. Haraszti's book, by contrast, is a personal account of the author's work in a tractor factory, not a generalized treatise on alienation. And it is paradoxical that out of Hungary—probably the least repressive and materially the most prosperous of all East European countries—has come the most explosive exposé of working-

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class life and alienation, written by an intellectual who tried his hand (à la George Orwell) at factory work in an effort to learn about working-class life through personal experience.

Although the type of alienation Haraszti deals with originates at the place of work, its implications go much further. The focal point of the narrative is the system of piece rates, or payment by result. The alienation created by this system has several aspects. Work, to begin with, is most unsatisfying, both intrinsically (it is monotonous and fatiguing) and as a means of making a living: "... here I am, stuck in front of my machine, bound hand and foot by piece rates. . . . Nothing depends on me" (pp. 147, 25). In addition, the cleavage between "we" and "they" is fully experienced, and classically portrayed:

*... **Them** means the same thing: the management, those who give orders and make decisions, employ labor and pay wages, the men and their agents who are in charge—who remain inaccessible even when they cross our field of vision. . . .*

Workers have no idea about the world of the bosses, much as the fish of the sea depths know only those predatory species which sometimes penetrate among them, while the surfaces of the oceans, fresh air, land, and mountains are no more than fiction and myths. (pp. 71, 79)

Alienation is aggravated by the fact that relations among workers, in the time-honored phrase of modern studies of mass society, are "atomized":

Everyone is on his own. Alone he pursues a daily battle against machines and time. Defeat cannot be shared: how could we want a common success? ... We accept the fact of competition and its spirit, and so cannot even pose the question of whether it could be replaced by cooperation in life and in work, or why competition has come to dominate our conditions of life. (pp. 66, 69)

Haraszti raises another fundamental question, one that goes to the heart of the Marxist concept of exploitation: "... what happens to the vast difference between the value of what they produce ... and the payment which they are given ... ?" (p. 38). He concludes with a graphic description of one of the most potent symbols of alienation: the frisking of workers by "socialist" guards at the "socialist" factory gates. This sums up all the cruel hoaxes of the system: the "ruling" status of workers, their developed consciousness, spirit of participation, ownership of the means of production, and "privileged" position.

Since Haraszti's case study comes from Hungary, perhaps the least rigid regime in the entire "Socialist Commonwealth," it is safe to assume that the attitudes and situations portrayed may be found in other socialist countries as well. Indeed, most contributors represented here have few illusions about working-class attitudes toward such regimes. Yet rarely is it noted—perhaps because it is taken for granted—that the ultimate source of social cohesion under "developed socialism" is force. It was left to anonymous East European social scientists quoted in Triska and Gati's book to point out that:

The socialist societies in Eastern Europe ... are closed. They are kept together by force, today as in the past. If force were suddenly removed they would fly apart. p. 277)

Subsequent developments in Poland tend to confirm this conclusion. Under martial law, Solidarity was efficiently decapitated; the Polish workers immobilized and demoralized. Meaningful political participation on their part came to an end, and Solidarity's example has not been emulated elsewhere in the Eastern bloc.

THE IMPLICATIONS of these events for Eastern Europe as a whole are not insignificant, and not pleasant. They suggest that movements toward social change can be arrested, together (literally) with their human representatives. The political stability of East European regimes continues, for the most part, to rest on state security agencies prepared to deal forcibly with popular initiatives, including those of industrial workers, that would disrupt the precarious balance of apathy, coercion, and conformity. Perhaps most telling of all, in the Soviet Union—the model for these so-called workers' states—any such initiatives, beyond the very limited bargaining described by Ruble, are rarely even attempted anymore. Whatever "developed socialism" in its many varieties may mean today, it is not the end of alienation among the working classes.

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Stalin Recalled

By Niels Erik Rosenfeldt

ANTON ANTONOV-OVSEYENKO. *The Time of Stalin: Portrait of a Tyranny*. New York, NY, Harper and Row, 1981.

NIKOLAI TOLSTOY. *Stalin's Secret War*. London, Jonathan Cape, 1981.

WERNER G. HAHN. *Postwar Soviet Politics: The Fall of Zhdanov and the Defeat of Moderation, 1946–53*. Ithaca, NY, and London, Cornell University Press, 1982.

LITERATURE ON STALIN and his era is copious and many-sided, and is still growing. In recent years especially, the flow of Stalin studies has been vigorous.[1] But not all new books contain fruitful new interpretations, nor are all new interpretations based on reliable new evidence. In fact, a number of recently published works simply repeat many of the old weaknesses of traditional research on Stalin.

What then are the possibilities still left open to the present-day historian? Fewer and fewer of Stalin's contemporaries are still alive, and even fewer of these survivors are in a position to offer their testimony. The Soviet archives are hardly likely to be made available in the foreseeable future, and besides, there is every reason to believe that a great deal of material has long since been destroyed. Should we therefore conclude that the paths open to us are all blind alleys? Or does the researcher still have a chance of stumbling on new and better trails? If so, where are these trails to be found? And in which direction do they point?

Questions like these arise when reading the three books reviewed here. They all deal with Stalin and his era, but differ greatly as regards aim, sources, and author's style and method. It is due precisely to these differences, however, that, taken together, these books reflect such a wide range of the challenges confronting the Stalin researcher. As a result, all three volumes are of considerable interest—not only for their accomplishments but also for their shortcomings, which draw attention to several important issues of historical methodology.

THE AUTHOR of *The Time of Stalin: Portrait of a Tyranny* is the son of the famous old Bolshevik, Vladimir Antonov-Ovseyenko, who led the assault on the Winter Palace in 1917 but who later, during the Great Terror, was liquidated by Stalin. The son, Anton Antonov-Ovseyenko, had to spend years in Stalin's prisons and camps because of his father. He was released in 1953, and since 1960 has been engaged in historical studies in Moscow. One of his aims has been to expose the truth about the crimes committed under Stalin, which official sources still cover with a veil of secrecy and distortion. *The Time of Stalin* is thus a tale told by one of the few dissident historians from the Brezhnev era. As such, it continues along the lines set out by Roy Medvedev in his *Let History Judge: The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism*.[2] As one of many victims, Antonov-Ovseyenko speaks with a bitterness akin to that of Alexander Solzhenitsyn. He does not seek truth for the sake of truth alone. The disclosure of what happened under Stalin is primarily, in his mind, a question of justice.

Justified resentment and historical research are not incompatible in principle, but in practice they can be difficult to reconcile. As evidence about the attitudes of a Soviet citizen whose life was ruined by Stalin, and who only later began to understand, Antonov-Ovseyenko's book makes a strong impression. But questions remain about the degree to which the book throws any new light on its subject.

The Time of Stalin is based both on well-known material and on some new written or verbal evidence from people who experienced the Stalin era—either hand-in-glove with the General Secretary

[1] See, e.g., Georg Brunner, "The Essence of Stalinism," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), May–June 1981, pp. 87–90.

[2] Ed. by David Joravsky and Georges Haupt, New York, NY, Alfred A. Knopf, 1972.

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or under his heel. As Stephen F. Cohen points out in his foreword to the book, the author's family background apparently enabled him to get in touch with some highly-placed witnesses (e.g., Anastas Mikoyan) who have not been available to other dissident historians. Among other materials used by Antonov-Ovseyenko, there are said to be unpublished Soviet statistics from 1956 giving the number of victims during the Great Terror.[3] All in all, however, the well-known material predominates. On important events in Stalin's career—like the 17th party congress in January–February 1934 (when many of the delegates apparently voted against the General Secretary's election to the party's Central Committee) and the murder of Leningrad party chief Sergey Kirov later the same year (engineered, from all accounts, by Stalin himself)—Antonov-Ovseyenko tells essentially the same story as Medvedev.[4] We must assume that, at least in part, they shared the same sources.

Much of the evidence used in *The Time of Stalin* cannot be fully verified. Yet one can evaluate the extent to which the author lives up to accepted standards of research, and, unfortunately, this book is not presented as the work of a professional historian. Antonov-Ovseyenko hardly ever discusses the credibility of the sources he employed. He very seldom gives the reader an opportunity to evaluate the combination of new and old evidence. Time and again, the author presents lengthy dialogues between political figures from Stalin's era, apparently without questioning the dubious authenticity of such "verbatim" transcripts. Furthermore, there are several simple errors of fact; even such an important event during the post-Kirov purges as the "exchange of party cards" is wrongly dated.[5]

These shortcomings might have been compensated by a new, well-founded overall interpretation of Stalin's rise to power, based on the insight into Soviet society's cultural background and internal mechanisms that one might expect from a critical Russian historian. Yet a general analysis along these lines is also conspicuously absent. What we get is simply the statement that Stalinism was nothing but "gangsterism enthroned" (p. xv). The Western historian, used as he is to émigré and defector accounts, is thus left with a decided feeling of déjà vu. Once again he is faced with an account whose general relevance and significance cannot be rejected, but whose particulars must be treated only with the utmost care. Is Antonov-Ovseyenko's book simply a reminder that we are stuck with this classic dilemma of Stalinology?

NIKOLAI TOLSTOY'S book about *Stalin's Secret War* certainly does not relieve us of this dilemma. The author makes use of extensive and diversified (though mainly non-Soviet) material, concentrating on secondary sources but also including some official documents, particularly from the British Foreign Office archives. His argumentation, however, rarely takes into account the fact that this large compilation of sources varies greatly in value as evidence. Accounts by ex-Soviet writers, whose insight and credibility cannot be assumed, are often used without reservation or critical discussion as documentation for Tolstoy's categorical views. From a methodological point of view, Tolstoy is still in the Sturm und Drang era of Stalinology.

This applies in other respects as well. Tolstoy has an additional motive for writing his book, a motive that extends beyond pure research. He wants to warn the West of the dangers that threaten from the East. Accordingly, he ends his review of the World War II period by concluding that the "civilized world" has no alternative but "to assume and guard against the worst" today (p. 345).

The author leads up to this conclusion in a number of ways, not least by stressing the theme indicated in the book's title. Tolstoy contends that throughout World War II, Stalin was also carrying on a "secret war" against his own people, and that his behavior during this period can be explained by his fear that the Soviet system was in danger of collapse. Tolstoy supports this thesis by recounting a number of (often very elaborate) horror stories about Stalin's treatment of various groups of Soviet citizens and East Europeans who came within his reach. Added to this are testimonies to other reprehensible characteristics of Stalin and his cronies. Like Antonov-Ovseyenko, Tolstoy seems to find answers to all his questions in the criminal nature of the Stalinist

[3] Antonov-Ovseyenko states (p. 212) that the number of persons who passed through the Lubyanka and other NKVD institutions from 1935 to 1940 was 18,840,000, and that, of these, 7 million were shot in prison, while the rest were sent to destruction camps. These are very high figures compared to many calculations by Western scholars, especially those by Jerry F. Hough but even those by Robert Conquest. See Jerry F. Hough and Merle Fainsod, *How the Soviet Union is Governed*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1979, pp. 176–77; and Robert Conquest, *The Great Terror: Stalin's Purge of the Thirties*, rev. ed., London, Macmillan, 1973, pp. 708–9. There is a real need for a new, systematic comparison of all existing figures, comparing not only numbers of victims but also methods of calculation.

[4] Antonov-Ovseyenko states, for instance, that 292 votes were cast against Stalin at the 17th party congress, whereas, according to Medvedev, the number was 270. Antonov-Ovseyenko has also recorded a number of new details concerning various attempts on Kirov's life before the actual assassination (pp. 80–82, 84–90).

[5] For an interesting discussion of the weaknesses of Antonov-Ovseyenko's book by a fellow dissident, see M. Dovner, "Rustic stories instead of history," *Pamyat': Istoricheskiy sbornik* (Moscow-Paris), No. 4, 1981, pp. 442–55.

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elite. Once again, "gangsterism enthroned."

To this there are three things to be said. First, many of the specific accounts Tolstoy reports may well be true. Precisely for this reason, the lack of any systematic evaluation of sources is very keenly felt. Second, the bulk of the material once more is already known to Western research. But Tolstoy has taken extraordinary care in putting together all the evidence pertaining to the black soul of the General Secretary: we hear not merely of Stalin's brutality, but also of his addiction to gangster films, his fear of assassination, and even his phobia about water. Third, the thesis that, in many situations, Stalin was motivated primarily by the fear that his own system's survival was in danger is certainly worthy of a place in future scholarly debates. Yet by emphasizing specific, detailed descriptions of human failings and brutality, Tolstoy produces an emotional effect rather than a scholarly analysis. Clearly, things were not quite that simple. All in all, if *Stalin's Secret War* illustrates some of the major horrors of Stalinism, it also reflects some of the gravest weaknesses of Stalinology.

WERNER HAHN follows a different trail of research. His book on *Postwar Soviet Politics* is an example of the most sophisticated Kremlinology applied to Stalin's era. Can this approach assist us in breaking new ground?

In general, Kremlinologists arouse skepticism for their allegedly exaggerated focus on the personal struggle for power among Soviet leaders, and their belief that this struggle is reflected directly and immediately in all kinds of "protocol" evidence—for instance, in every change in the ceremonial lineup atop the Lenin Mausoleum in Red Square. But Kremlinologists have also earned the respect of other scholars for managing to wrest useful information from official Soviet sources about complex undercurrents in the Soviet political process.

Admittedly, Kremlinology deals with only a part of total reality. Its more sophisticated practitioners, however, point out that they do not belittle the significance of ideological, economic, and social factors; rather, they consider their own approach a supplement to others. They strive not only to disclose whether this or that Soviet politician is on the way up or down, but also to shed light on the broader mechanisms of Soviet politics. And they remind us that a scholar who has chosen the political struggle as his field of research is not excluded, by definition, from seeking some of the reasons for this struggle in ideological differences or in underlying social and economic factors.

Indeed, Hahn's point of departure is that the political struggle in postwar Moscow "was not solely over posts and power, but also over ideas and policies" (p. 184). His method therefore consists of investigating both the personal ties among Stalinist officials, and the ideological arguments and accusations that marked the great debates of late Stalinism on philosophy, science, and economics. His aim, of course, is to establish a connection between these two areas of research. Hahn is not the first to make the attempt, but very few others have carried out such a consistent and thorough investigation, or presented such a wealth of carefully assembled and ordered data. Because of its abundance of detail, this is not a book for the layman; but it is sure to fascinate the serious student of Stalin.

All this praise notwithstanding, one has to question whether Hahn's major thesis is tenable. His argument is that it is a misconception to label Andrey Zhdanov, who led the ideological campaign of the 1940's on the Soviet cultural front, a hardliner. On the contrary, writes Hahn: Zhdanov's death in 1948 triggered the defeat of the *moderate* elements in the Soviet establishment—a defeat which soon gave rise to Stalin's personal approval for the dogmatic and extremist theories of Soviet biologist Trofim Lysenko, and heralded nothing less than "a historic turn in Soviet political life" (p. 11).

One can agree with Hahn that Zhdanov was hardly a strong supporter of Lysenko, and should not be identified with every "extremist" excess of the later Stalin era.[6] On the other hand, it is difficult to concur with Hahn's claim that a radical and lasting change set in after Zhdanov's death. To mention just one circumstance which points in the opposite direction: In 1950, just two years later, Stalin published his famous "Letters on Linguistics" attacking the "extremist" language theories of N. J. Marr, and indicating that natural science should be exempted from some of the more restrictive ideological fetters. By the same token, Stalin advised Soviet ideologists that henceforth it would be wise to emphasize the nonrevolutionary, unifying, and continuity-creating features of social development.[7] Here we have Stalin suddenly in the role of "conservative" or "moderate." Whatever happened to Hahn's "historical turn"?

[6] As Hahn mentions, Loren R. Graham has convincingly argued in favor of the viewpoint that Zhdanov did not believe in the validity of Lysenkoism. See Loren R. Graham, *Science and Philosophy in the Soviet Union*, New York, NY, Alfred A. Knopf, 1972, pp. 443–50.

[7] Niels Erik Rosenfeldt, "Science and Society in Stalin's Russia," *Historikeren og samfundet. Studier i historisk metode* 9, Oslo-Bergen-Tromso, Universitetsforlaget, 1974, pp. 21–36.

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These reservations are intended to suggest not that moderation was ever one of Stalin's dominant qualities,[8] but that the terms "moderation" and "extremism" should not be used by historians to periodize the later Stalin era. When Stalin gave Lysenko's ideas a monopoly in biology, it was probably because he believed (against all common sense) that those ideas would be of *practical* use in the "Great Stalin Plan for the Transformation of Nature"—not because he was planning, in general, to open the floodgates to a new kind of ideological extremism differing substantially from the path Zhdanov had advocated.

Developments on the biological front, to be sure, did tempt individuals and "schools" in other scientific disciplines to imitate Lysenko in seeking Stalin's approval for their theories as part of universal Marxist-Leninist "truth." But Stalin, the "great coryphaeus of science," was no easy man to convince as to the practical and/or ideological use of all these more-or-less "extremist" capers. This accounts for his "Letters on Linguistics," which Hahn ought to have studied a bit more closely.[9] On this single point, Hahn has sinned against his own principles, by failing to complement the study of power relationships with close analysis of contemporary ideological debates.

Hahn's method has its drawbacks, of course: the constant danger of overstressing the "protocol" evidence, and the constant struggle to avoid arbitrary interpretation (for example, in supposing that one can distinguish when a Soviet dignitary is speaking on his own, and when he is transmitting a message directly from Stalin). One must also recognize that hypotheses arrived at by this method are difficult to verify conclusively. Consequently, the task must be to create such a finely-meshed web of concordant data that one is justified in concluding that it probably reflects real political patterns.

It is not an easy task. But in *Postwar Soviet Politics*, Hahn demonstrates that progress can still be made in this special art, if a discerning, conscientious Western historian sets out on a systematic and detailed examination of official Soviet sources. Future historians, moreover, should not confine themselves to the classic hunting grounds of Kremlinology, but move on to the wider fields of "cultural politics" and "political culture."

ULTIMATELY, the most fruitful new approach to Stalinology may be an eclectic one, combining the selective use of personal memoirs with the more rarefied Kremlinological/ideological analysis pursued so successfully by Hahn. Stalinology can still be furthered by fresh studies of the many dissident and émigré accounts. Nikolai Tolstoy is right to dissociate himself from those who reject the use of such accounts a priori, on the grounds—absurd to a historian—that they are "necessarily biased." Obviously, the material must be taken into consideration, but carefully and critically. Stalinologists must do what neither Antonov-Ovseyenko nor Tolstoy has done: carry out detailed analyses of the credibility of all sources used, adding to the already substantial foundation built by earlier Stalinologists in the field of source criticism.[10] To date, such contributions have usually been an "accidental" by-product of investigations into some specific theme in Soviet history. What is missing, therefore, is a complete and independent examination of the vast (but still manageable) dissident and émigré literature on the Stalin era—followed by systematic, thorough comparison of the more important data, themes, and arguments available in all registered accounts.

To start with, some outright forgeries have yet to be separated from the genuine articles. Those accounts deemed authentic must next be subjected to a careful comparative analysis, including the following questions: How precise are these accounts in their approach to well-known facts? What value do they have as original independent evidence? Is the author a first-hand or second-hand witness? Has some of the evidence been copied from other sources? Can the new testimony be confirmed or disproved by later evidence? Throughout this analysis, each account must be broken down into its separate parts, since it may well contain both true and false, original and derivative reportage. No headway can be made without such a differentiated approach to the available sources.[11] Moreover, the basis for comparison will have to be extensive: other émigré and dissident accounts, official Soviet sources, the Smolensk archive,[12] public and

[8] Admittedly, Stalin did not hesitate to use extreme "combat" methods in the internal political struggle even after 1948; witness all the killings in the so-called "Leningrad affair" of 1949–50.

[9] Our picture of the cultural front in the later Stalin era could perhaps be further refined by comparison with recent research on the mechanisms of the Cultural Revolution around 1930. See especially Sheila Fitzpatrick, Ed., *Cultural Revolution in Russia, 1928–1931*, Bloomington, IN, and London, Indiana University Press, 1978.

[10] See, e.g., Conquest, op.cit., pp. 749–57.

[11] See, e.g., Rosenfeldt, *Knowledge and Power: The Role of Stalin's Secret Chancellery in the Soviet System of Government*, Studier 5, Copenhagen University, institute of Slavonic Studies, Copenhagen, Rosenkilde og Bagger, 1978; and idem, *Stalinstyrets nervecenter* (The Nerve Center of Stalin's Government), Rapporter 2, Copenhagen University, Institute of Slavonic Studies, Copenhagen, Slavisk Boghandel, 1980.

[12] These are the archives of the Smolensk party organization, captured by the Germans during World War II and now in the National Archives in Washington, DC.

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private Western archives,[13] and so on.

No investigation, however detailed, is going to answer all our questions. Yet on many concrete points there will surely be firmer ground ahead, if only in judging degrees of uncertainty. At the very least, this will reduce the burden of having to draw conclusions from sources whose value has not been thoroughly analyzed. This research, it hardly needs to be said, will require considerable human and material resources. It is, therefore, a logical candidate for the kind of international collaboration in the field of Soviet and East European studies that, happily, has shown a significant increase in recent years.

[13]Michal Reiman, for example, has shown that important evidence concerning the Stalin era can be found in Western state archives, like the Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes (Political Archives of the Foreign Office) in Bonn. See his *Die Geburt des Stalinismus: Die UdSSR am Vorabend der "zweiten Revolution"* (The Birth of Stalinism: The USSR on the Threshold of the "Second Revolution"), Frankfurt am Main, Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1979.

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Encyclopedia of Russian Life

By Alexander Kazhdan

ARCHIE BROWN, JOHN FENNELL, MICHAEL KASER, and H. T. WILLETTS, Eds. *The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Russia and the Soviet Union*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982.

BEFORE ME lies the handsome *Cambridge Encyclopedia of Russia and the Soviet Union,* adorned with maps, charts, and photos; filled with statistics, geographic information, and names of princes and scientists, musicians and chess players; and (ironically) edited by an all-Oxford University team composed of Archie Brown, John Fennell, Michael Kaser, and H. T. Willetts. The abundance of information—from 112 distinguished contributors—is grouped around a dozen major topics, ranging from territory and population through the arts and sciences to the Soviet political system, its military power, and its world role. It is unquestionably the last, and the West's need to understand the Soviet superpower in all its dimensions, that account for the publication of such a comprehensive volume.

Russia has produced the worst kind of totalitarianism and built up the murderous Gulag system, but it is also the country that nurtured Pushkin and Repin, that shielded the West from the Tatar invasion, that routed the "invincible" Nazi hordes. In the Soviet Union one finds the tragic confluence of such opposites as efficiency and idleness, exorbitant cruelty and exalting love, illiteracy and the most sophisticated poetry.

This volume manifests the will and the skill to view the Soviet Union in all this bewildering ambiguity. There are no mild words for Stalin's autocracy here, but the paragraph on the pre-World War II years concludes: "Terrifying and destructive though it was, this period still produced achievements" (p. 114). Although Stalin's inadequate preparation for the war is made clear, the author of the chapter is courageous enough to assert that Stalin "showed great psychological acumen in his handling of the Soviet population" (p. 117). I have deliberately chosen the most provocative points. Stalin was obviously a tyrant, a scoundrel, and a murderer; yet his reign should be understood, not merely censured or condemned.

The ambiguities of the Soviet system are particularly evident in the last two sections—on military power and world role. Russia's military history after 1812 is termed a "tale of disasters" (p. 431); on the eve of World War I "the country was poorly prepared and no match for Germany" (p. 105); prior to World War II, the Spanish civil war led "to the false conclusion that massed armoured formations were not viable on the battlefield," Stalin's terror destroyed the Soviet army's senior officers, and the campaign against Finland "highlighted many deficiencies"; and, not surprisingly, Hitler's invasion of the USSR caused enormous losses (p. 436). Nonetheless, the Soviets not only managed to launch a successful counterattack, but also emerged in the postwar period as a superpower of incomparable military prestige.

How are we to understand this phenomenon? Is it evidence of "the legendary endurance and courage" of the Russian population? Or of "occasional genius" among Russian generals (p. 431)? Or, perhaps, of the notorious centralization—that "ruthless force" that cost millions of lives (p. 337)? "Stalin's total control over Soviet life," we are told, "enabled the entire resources of the country to be massed behind the war effort with absolute ruthlessness and singleness of purpose" (p. 436).

The ambiguity of the Soviet system is even starker when it comes to diplomacy: "Soviet Russia . . . urgently needed 'normal' relations with states which, ultimately, it hoped to subvert" (p. 470). Although the author qualifies his perceptive statement with the words "for the immediate future," the duality he discerns has lurked behind Soviet relations with the world from the start: witness the swings from cold war and iron curtain to

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détente and back, the proclamation of a peace policy and the forcible suppression of resistance in Hungary or Afghanistan, participation in international organizations and a penchant for stirring up trouble anywhere, anytime.

DESPITE ITS WORTHY intent to illumine the sphinxlike puzzle of Russian history and reality, this book is not without its weaknesses. For one thing, the basic approach raises questions. Is this in fact an encyclopedia? According to Webster's New International Dictionary, an "encyclopedia" is "a comprehensive summary of knowledge, or of a branch of knowledge, ... a work in which the various branches or fields of learning are treated in separate articles usually arranged in alphabetical order."[1] But the Cambridge "encyclopedia" consists, not of alphabetically arranged entries, but of sections aiming at the presentation of a coherent and consistent pattern. Indeed, one finds little to differentiate the presentation from that of a regular textbook, say Vadim Medish's *The Soviet Union*.[2] They break the subject matter into nearly identical units of discourse, the only radical structural divergence being the location of the index—in Medish's book it follows whereas in the Cambridge volume it precedes the text. Does such a restructuring suffice to transform a textbook into an encyclopedia?

Perhaps the fashionable title of "encyclopedia" is employed here in a less rigorous, more metaphorical sense, meaning something like "comprehensive information." This usage is possible, at least in Russian. It was Vissarion Belinskiy who reverently christened Pushkin's *Yegeniy Onegin* the "encyclopedia of Russian life."[3]

But enough. Names are but tags; content is what matters. There is a Russian proverb: "Call me a pot, but do not put me into the oven." Let us see what sort of information we can acquire about the subjects covered in this encyclopedia.

Biographical coverage of major political figures, for one, is sadly deficient. There is no integrated characterization of any of the significant Soviet politicians. Instead, the information is sketchy, scattered, and often repetitive or contradictory.

Take—for example—Andrey Aleksandrovich Zhdanov, one of the most influential politicians of Stalin's era. The fact that the term "Zhdanovism" appears on eight pages suggests that he was a formidable figure, but what precisely does the encyclopedia convey about the man? On pp. 119 and 313 there are nebulous comments about people connected with Zhdanov in Leningrad. On p. 215 we read that Zhdanov accused poetess Anna Akhmatova of being a "half-nun, half-harlot." On p. 243 we read, "The Zhdanov decrees did not leave jazz unscathed." The sense of intrigue thickens: who was this demon in disguise who so calumnied Akhmatova and damaged jazz? On p. 474 we find him numbered among "orthodox Soviet spokesmen." Another concrete feature emerges on p. 476: "Zhdanov was in frequent telephone contact with Stalin." And on p. 477 he is shown as a man able to give the signal to Communist-led insurrections. There is yet one other entry: on p. 217 we are told that "Stalin's son-in-law, A. A. Zhdanov" launched a virulent campaign against the literary world. Now this is too much! It was A. A. Zhdanov's son Yuriy who (much later) became Stalin's son-in-law, and that young man had nothing to do with the "virulent campaign." Summing up, our voyage in search of Zhdanov did not bring us any useful information—such as the fact that Zhdanov was from 1935 until his death in 1948 a secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (bolshevik), or that he served as the party's chief authority on matters of ideology.[4] Instead, our search yielded a blatant error.

As a second example, take that "enemy of the people," Nikolay Ivanovich Bukharin, a man who found no place in the *Bol'shaya sovetskaya entsiklopediya* (Great Soviet Encyclopedia) or in the *Sovetskaya istoricheskaya entsiklopediya* (Soviet Historical Encyclopedia), even though he was one of the most distinguished leaders of the young Soviet state. Bukharin appears in the Cambridge volume on at least nine pages, and five times out of the nine (pp. 110, 113, 214, 333, and 470) the dates of his birth and death are indicated. Scattered through the text are a number of tidbits—surprisingly uniform in style. Bukharin is seen as "the main advocate" of NEP (the New Economic Policy, p. 110); he "advocated" policies "squarely based on Lenin's thought" (p. 111); he "advocated tolerance of variety" (p. 214); and again, he "advocated" the maintenance of price policies favorable to Soviet farmers (p. 333). In several places Bukharin is described as the leading figure of "the right wing

[1] 2nd ed., unabridged, Springfield, MA, G. C. Merriam & Co., 1944, p. 843.

[2] Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-Hall, 1981.

[3] Vissarion G. Belinskiy, *Izbrannyye stat'i—Pushkin, Lermontov, Gogol'* (Selected Articles—Pushkin, Lermontov, Gogol'), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo "Detskaya Literatura," 1960, p. 72.

[4] *Bol'shaya sovetskaya entsiklopediya* (Great Soviet Encyclopedia), 3rd ed., Moscow, Izdatel'stvo "Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya," 1972, Vol. 9, pp. 127–28.

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of the Party" (pp. 111, 333). Indeed, on p. 111 the encyclopedia speaks of a Stalin-Bukharin alliance directed "against the Left Opposition." But in another place (p. 470) Bukharin suddenly acquires a different label—as a prominent political figure among Left Communists. This is, in fact, no mistake—Bukharin did originally belong to the Left Communists, and only later shifted toward the right wing. However, his ideological evolution remains beyond the scope of the encyclopedia, and hence would elude the grasp of the innocent reader.

Fortunately, writers and scientists fare somewhat better; they are each described in a single place, and although there is some tendency to provide long lists of names without further elaboration, the major figures receive substantial treatment. (I will have a word about the selection of writers later.) Musicians, too, receive good coverage; at the end of the section on musicians and music there is a listing of major figures, complete with concise and helpful biographical notes.

BIOGRAPHIES ASIDE, this encyclopedia—like modern textbooks—teems with statistical data. Such data are a very convenient means of conveying information and permit comparisons. What is the average salary in the Soviet Union? What is the yield of grain, the output of steel? The problem is that Soviet statistics are rarely reliable and often missing, and Western economists must painstakingly try to extract real figures from beyond the iron curtain of misinformation. We should not therefore dwell on such internal inconsistencies in the encyclopedia as the disparity between the figures for average monthly earnings in 1979 given on pp. 366 and 373 (163.5 and 163.3 rubles, respectively).

Unfortunately, there are also some more serious flaws in the statistical data presented in this volume. A good example is the information about differentiation of salaries given on p. 373. Here we learn that a marshal of the Soviet Union earns 2,000 rubles a month. We also learn that "the ratio of the money wages between a factory manager and a worker receiving the average wage has been estimated at about 13 to 1." The average manual worker is said to receive 180.3 rubles a month, and, from this, one would deduce that a factory manager, at 2,343.9 rubles a month, outearns a marshal. This is inconceivable!

Then there is the map on p. 58 showing interregional migration in the period 1959-70. If we total the figures, it turns out that 4,282,000 left various regions, but 4,369,000 arrived at new places. It is hard to believe that 87,000 babies were born in aircraft and trains during this migration.

THE CAMBRIDGE volume has several other serious flaws. If the natural sciences are lavishly presented, the social sciences are woefully underrepresented, even in cases where developments in such fields were tightly interwoven with the political destiny of the country. For example, neither the historian Mikhail Pokrovskiy nor the linguist Nikolay Marr are in the index, nor could I find mention of them in the text. I need not bore the reader with the names of other distinguished pre- and postrevolutionary historians and philologists omitted, ironically, by the historians and philologists so heavily represented among the contributors to this volume. This tragic self-contempt is typical of the West; in Soviet society, titles in such fields enjoy great demand.

Another gap is the lack of discussion of national literatures. Taras Shevchenko, "national poet of the Ukraine," does gain mention in the paragraph on the Ukrainian language (p. 185), but Shota Rustaveli and a host of other classical writers in non-Russian tongues could not worm their way into the pages of the encyclopedia. The "Russian" focus of the volume is no excuse, for this restriction did not apply to discussions of the art and architecture of Western Turkestan, the folk art of Caucasia, or the music of the various Soviet republics.

A FINAL PROBLEM is the uneven quality of the entries, perhaps a natural consequence of the diversity of authors involved. Some presentations are very good, for example, those on the territory and peoples, art and architecture, and the Russian ballet. Others are plainly inferior. An example is that on the history of Russia, especially the portion on the Middle Ages. It is astonishing that some 40 years after the death of the great French medieval historian Marc Bloch we still encounter what is basically a "princely history"—from Rurik to Oleg to Svyatoslav to Vladimir, etc. One searches in vain for any description of social groupings, of economic trends, or of political organization in "the Land of Rus'." There is no mention of the dependent peasants (the *smerds*) or of slavery in Kievan Rus'. Instead, we read of the "great St. Sophia cathedral" and the "impressive Cathedral of the Assumption"—even though there is a separate section devoted to medieval churches (pp. 154–55).

The section on Russian literature is also disconcerting. I for one think that Andrey Platonov (erroneously "Platanov" in the index) deserves more than one line (p. 214)

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and that Yuriy Kazakov—one of the best Soviet short-story writers—should have been included. This is, however, a subjective matter.

More dismaying is the mode of presentation. I understand how difficult it is to write about Boris Pasternak, but I could not help shivering while reading such trite formulas as "the startling freshness and originality of his poems" or "the novelty of his perception." All this is absolutely true, but what great modern poet was not startlingly fresh and original? "His theme," continues the encyclopedia, "is almost exclusively man and nature and their interaction" (pp. 214 ff.). Right again, but what poet has not written about man and nature?

Worse yet, such a treatment conveys the impression that Pasternak did not touch upon major political issues. However, he was actually a very "political" poet, and *Doctor Zhivago* is no random phenomenon. Pasternak's political position was the search for sincerity, as opposed to Vladimir Mayakovskiy's attitude of subservience to the proletarian state. Indeed, for Pasternak, "nature" was ever-boiling and seething—a metaphor for and yet an escape from politics. If he loved the rain, it was as observed from the vantage point of a cozy attic nook—and, moreover as reflected in a looking-glass. The sea was identified with revolution, and he preferred to dream about the sea from afar while stretching his body idly beneath the familiar pine trees somewhere in the Moscow environs.

I HAVE, PERHAPS, been overly critical of this ambitious undertaking. Clearly, the attempt to provide under a single cover a complete portrait of a profoundly paradoxical and complex society is a major task. The result, whatever its flaws, is an essential antidote to the narrow, largely negative renderings that one all too often encounters. The Cambridge encyclopedia will serve the reader seeking to understand not only the terrible deformations but also the brilliant achievements wrought by Soviet Russia.

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Ethnonationalism

By Melvin Croan

JOSEPH ROTHSCHILD. *Ethnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework*. New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 1981.

GEORGE KLEIN and MILAN J. REBAN, Eds. *The Politics of Ethnicity in Eastern Europe*. Boulder, CO, East European Monographs, 1981.

JENS REUTER. *Die Albaner in Jugoslawien* (The Albanians in Yugoslavia). Munich, R. Oldenburg Verlag, 1982.

FRANJO TUDJMAN. *Nationalism in Contemporary Europe*. Boulder, CO, East European Monographs, 1981.

CHARLES R. FOSTER, Ed. *Nations without a State: Ethnic Minorities in Western Europe*. New York, NY, Praeger Publishers, 1980.

ANDREI S. MARKOVITS and FRANK E. SYSYN, Eds. *Nationbuilding and the Politics of Nationalism: Essays on Austrian Galicia*. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1982.

JOHN A. ARMSTRONG. *Nations Before Nationalism*. Chapel Hill, NC, The University of North Carolina Press, 1982.

POINTING to the strident politicization of ethnic identity and to the epidemic proportions of its spread across the globe, Nathan Glazer urged that problems of ethnicity "be placed at the very center of our concern for the human condition."[1] Irrespective of specific area of specialization or individual disciplinary affiliation, most scholars who plough the treacherous terrain of ethnicity would agree with Glazer's recommendation. Few others would care to deny that politicized ethnicity—ethnonationalism, to employ the term given wide currency if not actually coined by Walker Conner[2]—has become a crucial factor in the domestic affairs of multiethnic societies and a major disruptive force in contemporary international relations.

The powerful upsurge of particularistic ethnopolitical loyalties not only mocks prospects for a viable international order—dim enough on other grounds—but also defies expectations, whether Marxist or liberal, of the demise of ethnic identification and a waning of nationalism in the face of global economic interdependence, secular modernization, and the emergence of a single universal culture based on science and technology. Clearly, we are confronted by an unexpected and, at least for some, a thoroughly unwelcome development. But, viewed in the grander historical scheme of things, is today's ethnonationalism utterly unprecedented? Is contemporary politicized ethnicity as qualitatively different from earlier manifestations of ethnic identity as the class formations that crystallized in the wake of the industrial revolution were different from previous social groupings?[3] And, if modern ethnonationalism does constitute something quite new under the sun, can it come as a great surprise that it should have eluded the grasp of stock explanatory theory and, indeed, continues to give rise to no end of terminological as well as conceptual confusion?

Eschewing elaborate definitional distinctions as "counter-productive," Joseph Rothschild in *Ethnopolitics* largely achieves the ambitious objective of providing a "conceptual framework" within which to analyze "the causes, options, and consequences of bringing ethnicity into the political arena" (p. 1). On first reading, the book may strike some as excessively theoretical in content and inordinately taxonomic in method of presentation. If these are faults, they are also, as Rothschild him-

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[1]Nathan Glazer, "The Universalization of Ethnicity," *Encounter* (London), February 1975, p. 17.

[2]See especially Walker Connor, "The Politics of Ethnonationalism," *Journal of International Affairs* (New York, NY), Spring-Summer 1973; and his "A Nation is a Nation is a State, is an Ethnic Group, is a . . .," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* (Henley-on-Thames), October 1978.

[3]See the suggestive remarks along these lines by Glazer and Daniel Moynihan in the introduction to their edited volume, *Ethnicity: Theory and Practice*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1975, pp. 2–3.

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self cautions, standard features of most conceptual frameworks designed to stimulate further research and analysis. Prudently stopping short of postulating any comprehensive explanatory theory of ethnonationalism, he challenges others to pick up where he has left off. Whatever the ultimate prospects for any such grand theory, Rothschild's study contributes a dazzling array of highly illuminating insights. These include but are by no means limited to its treatment of the ways in which ethnicity may transform conflicts that were originally class-based (with specific reference to the cases of Nigeria and Ulster), the role of leaders and various styles of leadership in either exacerbating or else assuaging ethnopolitical conflict (with illustrations drawn from all over the world), and, perhaps best of all, the modes by which ethnopolitics interacts with the interstate system, that is, becomes internationalized, to use more familiar if etymologically imprecise language.

Throughout his far-ranging discussion, Rothschild stresses the role of one specific characteristic of most multiethnic societies, namely, unequal distribution of social and economic goods, as a catalyst for the politicization of ethnicity. But he is neither a deterministic materialist nor a parochial structuralist. To his great credit, Rothschild is fully cognizant that at bottom the issue is one of the activation and mobilization of "affective psycho-cultural energies," whose deepest emotional source springs remain to be uncovered.

As Rothschild sees it, ethnonationalism entails irony and paradox. The politicization of ethnicity, he writes:

... stresses, ideologizes, reifies, modifies, and sometimes virtually re-creates the putatively distinctive and unique cultural heritages of the ethnic groups that it mobilizes—precisely at the historical moment when these groups are being thoroughly penetrated by the universal culture of science and technology. Politicization of ethnicity is thus a dialectical process that preserves ethnic groups by emphasizing their singularity and yet also engineers and lubricates their modernization by transforming them into political conflict groups for the modern political arena. . . . (p. 3)

With all of its contradictions, ethnic mobilization occurs at the hands of political entrepreneurs. While this is a contingent factor, it is nonetheless quite crucial. One wishes that Rothschild had treated it much more extensively than apparently proved possible or desirable within the confines of the typology of leaders and their leadership style that he does offer.

A DISTINGUISHED SCHOLAR of modern East Central Europe, Rothschild has accomplished the rare feat of projecting further afield his area expertise and native analytical prowess both to open up new vistas on other areas of the world and shed fresh light on the complex experience of ethnicity and nationalism within Eastern Europe itself. By contrast, the volume on *The Politics of Ethnicity in Eastern Europe,* edited by George Klein and Milan J. Reban, is not only narrowly focused on a single geopolitical area but also conspicuously bereft of any unifying theme. As a result, some of the country chapters which comprise the first section on "unitary systems" amount to little more than detailed ethnographic compilations and/or sweeping historical surveys. Others, notably those on Hungary (including Transylvania) and Romania are considerably more analytical, but even they do not intermesh with one another. A second section, on "federal systems," contains chapters on Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Both pose the crucial issue of the relationship between ethnic pluralism and prospects for democratization in Leninist-style centralized political structures. The tortuous experience of Yugoslavia, sketched in broad strokes in the chapter by George and Patricia V. Klein, suggests that despite the authors' guarded optimism about Yugoslavia's ability to survive as a multiethnic polity, the intractable dilemmas of ethnicity render that outcome far from certain.

The explosiveness of ethnonationalist tensions within Yugoslavia was dramatically demonstrated by the riots that occurred in the predominantly Albanian Autonomous Province of Kosovo in 1981. The repercussions of the 1981 violence persist to the present day, both in Kosovo and in adjoining areas inhabited by ethnic Albanians, including, of course, Albania itself. Jens Reuter's *Die Albaner in Jugoslawien* provides a highly informative account of the origins and development of the Kosovo question as well as the single best treatment known to this reviewer of the recent turmoil there.

Reuter documents the extent to which the Albanians in Kosovo suffer from growing unemployment and burgeoning overpopulation, two ills, incidentally, that afflicted most of Eastern Europe throughout the interwar period.[4] The palpable sense of economic deprivation experienced by Yugoslavia's Albanians has been inflamed by what

[4]See the discussion in Joseph Rothschild, *East Central Europe Between the Two World Wars*, Seattle, WA, and London, University of Washington Press, 1974, pp. 14–18.

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most regard as the high-handed and discriminatory treatment meted out to them by Belgrade. Sheer weight of numbers would justify Kosovo's elevation to the status of a full-fledged Albanian republic within Yugoslavia. This, however, has been bitterly opposed by the Serbs for whom Kosovo remains the historic core of Serbia's statehood and the very cradle of *their* civilization—a Serbian Judea and Samaria, so to speak. Furthermore, Belgrade has always feared that any upgrading of Kosovo's constitutional status might be only the first step on the road to its eventual secession. Such a development, in turn, would serve to encourage secessionist tendencies in Croatia and Slovenia.

The Yugoslav Communist leaders have demonstrated their readiness to use whatever force may be necessary to quell the kind of disturbances that shook Kosovo. But they seem to be at a loss to know how to cope effectively with the larger phenomenon of Albanian ethnonationalism. Kosovo's economic outlook appears bleak, the majority of its inhabitants remain disaffected, and the demographic predominance of the Albanians continues to grow on account of their birthrate and the steady stream of migration by Serbs and Montenegrins away from the province. As a result of all these factors, Reuter suggests, Kosovo could become a future Piedmont, catalyzing the emergence of a single greater Albanian state. Although irredentist sentiment has not been particularly evident thus far, this could change quite quickly once Enver Hoxha and his minions pass from the scene in Tirana. Should the scenario broached by Reuter actually materialize, the consequences for Yugoslavia might well prove calamitous.

The problems of Yugoslavia figure centrally in Franjo Tudjman's *Nationalism in Contemporary Europe.* Ranging from a broad historical survey through a catalog of selected contemporary cases to a concluding summary of "history's morals and messages," the various parts of this study fit together oddly, to say the least. Even more annoyingly, the book as a whole is marred by misspellings, grammatical lapses, and countless typographical errors. Yet, what the volume may lack by way of editorial care, it makes up for by virtue of its interest as something of a primary source. A former director of the Institute for the History of the Workers' Movement in Croatia, the author was jailed "for nationalism" in the wake of Tito's crackdown in Croatia in 1971. This autobiographical tidbit is supplied by a chance footnote toward the very end of Tudjman's book (pp. 273–74). Well before that point, however, the reader will be only too acutely aware of the author's conviction that Yugoslavia has failed to resolve its "national question" and that the Croatians, in particular, have been victimized by the Yugoslav Communist leadership's preference for "unity" over "brotherhood," that is, for centralized political authority at the expense of ethnonational aspirations. Tudjman believes that in order to survive as a geopolitical entity for the longer term, Yugoslavia must devise authentic confederal arrangements that confer real sovereignty on its constituent units, and also pursue a consistent policy of complete neutrality between East and West.

Speaking more generally, Tudjman reiterates classic 19th-century postulates affirming the affinity between nationality and democracy and stressing national self-determination as the linchpin of international order. "The fate of all its nations and the role of Europe in the modern world," he writes, depends on "the manner in which a united Europe solves the historical task of our time—national self-determination or national sovereignty and the interdependence or integration of nations" (p. 293).

Much the same thought is voiced by an Italian social scientist, Riccardo Petrella, in his contribution to the collection of papers on ethnic minorities in Western Europe, *Nations without a State,* edited by Charles R. Foster. Alas, no one has yet come up with an even half-way plausible blueprint of specific institutions and procedures that might serve simultaneously to accommodate ethnonationallist particularism and advance the political unification of Europe. In the absence of concrete proposals, we are left with little more than the mere expression of pious hopes.

IF CONTEMPORARY EUROPE, both Eastern and Western, confronts the dilemma of reconciling its larger political structures with fissiparous nationalist tendencies, the problem existed in even more acute form in the experience of the Hapsburg Empire. As Andrei S. Markovits reminds us in his introduction to *Nationbuilding and the Politics of Nationalism,* "seldom have the two processes of *state formation* and *nationbuilding* been at such irreconcilable odds as in the case of the Austrian Empire" (p. 3). The papers contained in the volume edited by Markovits and Frank E. Sysyn, an outgrowth of a 1977 conference on Austria-Hungary, 1867–1918, sponsored by the Ukrainian Research Institute and the Soviet and East European Language Center at Harvard, deal exclusively with the experience of Austrian Galicia. Treating the collective life of the major eth-

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nic groups, their social, cultural, and political organizations, a variety of nationalist movements, and individual representative figures, all of the volume's chapters are as fascinating as they are informative. The larger contemporary relevance of this rich mine of historical case material should also be obvious. If, as Peter Brock's contribution reminds us, "at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Ukrainians in eastern Galicia appeared to be doomed to extinction as a separate ethnic group" (p. 111), why do some ethnic identifications weaken and even disappear while others survive and flourish?

This knotty question and many other crucial matters are addressed in John A. Armstrong's magisterial *Nations Before Nationalism.* It is impossible to begin to do justice here to the prodigious scholarship, sure mastery of interdisciplinary method, and creative analytical imagination that together make Armstrong's book such a splendid achievement. Suffice it only to mention that it sheds particular light on the pre-political self-definition of ethnic groups in terms of the institutional, cultural, and linguistic boundaries they establish and maintain against outsiders. Among its numerous outstanding attainments, Armstrong's treatment of Christian, Muslim, and Jewish civilization, in the broadest definition of that term, explains more completely and convincingly than previous, more segmental approaches how Eastern Europe became the "shatter zone" that spawned so much turmoil and travail in the modern period.

WHERE, THEN, do all the above studies leave us with respect to the quest for a general theory of ethnonationalism? This is a matter on which, as Nathan Glazer noted, "the arrant nonsense of Marxism [has] competed with the tepid confusions of liberalism."[5] As the aptly chosen title of Armstrong's valuable contribution indicates, we are dealing with a phenomenon that does have tenacious roots in the far distant past but whose political expression is distinctly modern and, it may be added, seems destined to exhibit endless novelty as the content of modernity itself evolves and changes. Thus, despite the facile suggestion of certain observers, things are far from simple. For example, in introducing the volume on Western Europe that he edited, Charles Foster notes "the availability of a large body of empirical data on ethnic attitudes" and implies that this provides a sufficient basis for a general explanatory theory (p. 6). Would that it were so, but it is not. Given the depths and the intangibility of its indispensable psychocultural underpinnings as well as the diversity of its manifestations and the variety of its possible mutations, ethnonationalism is only too likely to evade capture by even the most elaborately designed and painstakingly constructed interdisciplinary nets. Indeed, to presume to craft such intellectual constructs entails a certain amount of hubris. Armstrong, for one, intimates that the patterns and life cycles of nations may reflect the divine plan for the universe, something obviously beyond full comprehension by mere mortals, irrespective of the power of their individual intellects. More than two decades ago, the late Rupert Emerson, a pioneer in the field, gently cautioned against "an overly mechanical approach" and concluded that "nationalism, like other profound emotions such as love and hate, is more than the sum of the parts which are susceptible of cold and rational analysis."[6]

If the study of ethnonationalism requires more than a little intellectual humility, it also calls for some old-fashioned common sense. Much of the literature on the subject manifests a pronounced tendency toward what might be termed neo-Herderism, that is, the celebration of all facets of the recent upsurge of ethnic identity as a gain for humanity as a whole. There is, to be sure, quite a lot to be said for the preservation of diverse cultural heritages on this shrunken and increasingly homogenized planet. But one must never lose sight of the fact that ethnic consciousness, whether fully politicized or not, always involves primordial attachments that set off a specific group against one or more other groups considered to be alien and, as often as not, hostile as well. The greening of the world for ethnicity has already taken on too steely a hue to permit complaisance, much less to feel comfort about the future of the human condition in general.

[5]Glazer, "The Universalization of Ethnicity," p. 17. For their part, successive generations of Soviet Communist leaders have suffered from the very same distorted view, i.e., an underestimation of the appeal of nationalism, for which Lenin once chastised Rosa Luxemburg. See James W. Hulse, "The View from the Kraków Anthill: One Source of the Comintern's Misunderstanding of East European Nationalism," in Ivo Banac, John C. Ackerman, and Roman Szporluk, *Nation and Ideology: Essays in Honor of Wayne S. Vucinich,* Boulder, CO, East European Monographs, 1981, pp. 351–67.

[6]Rupert Emerson, *From Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples,* Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1960, p. 102.

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Notes & Views

Correspondence

NOTE: Readers are welcome to comment on matters discussed in this journal. Letters should be addressed to the Editors, Problems of Communism, *US Information Agency, 400 C Street, SW, Washington, DC 20547, USA.*

EUROPEAN PEACE MOVEMENTS

TO THE EDITORS: J. A. Emerson Vermaat's article "Moscow Fronts and the European Peace Movement" (*Problems of Communism*, November–December 1982) contains an inaccuracy. On p. 55, the author writes that in Norway "two Soviet diplomats were expelled because of their direct involvement as KGB operatives in the peace movement."

The facts are as follows: on November 27, 1981, the Oslo newspaper *Verdens Gang* accused two Soviet diplomats of having offered Norwegians money to write in the press on behalf of a nuclear-free zone in the Nordic area. On November 30, 1981, the Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Police declared that according to their information, nobody in the Norwegian peace movement had been offered money from foreign diplomats in order to write in the Norwegian press against nuclear weapons. (The statement was issued in the form of a press release that was referred to by the Oslo newspapers *Morgenbladet* and *Dagbladet* on December 1, 1981.) In response to a telephone query on February 14, 1983, I was told by a police inspector Tofte that no Soviet diplomat had been expelled for the reasons mentioned in the *Verdens Gang* account. Stanislav Chebotok, the one Soviet diplomat specifically mentioned by Mr. Vermaat, was still in Oslo as of February 1983.

ROLF THUE
Oslo, Norway

MR. VERMAAT RESPONDS: I thank Mr. Thue for clarifying matters concerning the current status of Stanislav Chebotok. My impression that Chebotok and one other Soviet diplomat had been expelled from Norway for attempting to influence the local peace movement was based on press accounts. *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* of November 26, 1981, reported that Chebotok was under suspicion of having "doubtful contacts" with members of the Norwegian peace movement, and Oslo's *Aftenposten* on November 28, 1981, said that Norwegian security police had recommended that three KGB agents in the Soviet Embassy in Oslo be declared persona non grata. I incorrectly assumed that Chebotok was one of two Soviets reported expelled from Norway on February 5, 1982 (see Stockholm International Service in Swedish, Feb. 5, 1982, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Western Europe* [Washington, DC], Feb. 8, 1982, p. P/2).

Chebotok's continued presence in Norway is, of course, no proof that he has not been involved with the Norwegian peace movement. Indeed, as the Oslo newspaper *Verdens Gang* reported on February 10, 1983, Mr. Chebotok is considered to be the head of the KGB's political intelligence service in Norway, for which the peace movements are an important area of operation. Chebotok has personally addressed gatherings of the Norwegian peace movement. (Some governments are very reluctant to give any details regarding such Soviet involvement. Successive governments may even contradict each other in this regard. In Holland, for example, Soviet involvement in the peace movement was denied by the Socialist minister of the interior in 1981, but confirmed by his Liberal successor in 1982. Cf. *Hantelignen Tweede Kamer* [Dutch Parliamentary Records], The Hague, Sept. 29, 1981, pp. 78 ff., and ibid., Dec. 16, 1982, pp. 1278 ff.)

Moreover, Chebotok's history lends some credence to allegations about his activities in Norway. Prior to assignment to Oslo in 1977, Chebotok had served for a period in the mid-1970's at the Soviet embassy in Copenhagen. According to the *Aftenposten* article

CORRECTIONS

Two passages in Samuel P. Huntington's essay-review "Weighing Power and Principle," published in the May–June 1983 issue of *Problems of Communism*, were inadvertently garbled. The passage beginning five lines from the bottom of column 1 on page 75 should read:

> "In many instances, however, the differences over policy toward the Communist states appear to have been not so much between Vance and Brzezinski as between the State Department and Brzezinski. The book recounts how Vance, in discussions with the President and Brzezinski, would often agree to a relatively tough line toward the Soviets, only to come back the next day with objections and different recommendations to which he had been exposed in his department."

The sentence beginning on line 1 of column 3, page 75, should read:

> "Brzezinski makes a powerful argument that the failure of the United States to respond to the Soviet-Cuban military intervention in the Horn of Africa with a carrier task force encouraged the Soviets to make their subsequent moves in Cuba and Afghanistan."

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cited above, he departed from Denmark when the press began to accuse him of clandestine contacts with persons suspected of having been recruited as Soviet spies. Chebotok was succeeded in Copenhagen by Vladimir Merkulov, who in November 1981 was expelled from Denmark for providing Danish writer Arne Herloev Petersen money to place an advertisement in the Danish press supporting a nuclear-free zone in Scandinavia. A subsequent public statement by the Danish Ministry of Justice, issued on April 17, 1982, noted that Petersen had maintained contact with three Soviet diplomats who "all could be identified with a high degree of certainty as being in the service of the Soviet intelligence agency, the KGB. . . ." (quoted in *Soviet Active Measures: Hearings before the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the US House of Representatives, July 13, 14,* Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1982, p. 62).

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